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1 General Introduction
Information plays an important role in many economic problems. A backbone of
economic theory is that agents optimize their behaviour subject to the information
they possess at the time of decision making. Due to several frictions information is
often incomplete in a sense that not everyone acting in an economic environment
has access to the same information set. Such information asymmetries may in fact
be responsible for the breakdown of markets in which trade would otherwise be
beneficial. The most famous example of this is the “market for lemons” going back
to Akerlof (1970). Broadly speaking, economic theory has dealt with problems of
asymmetric information in two different ways: positively and normatively. Positive
analysis mainly falls into the area of game theory making use of so called “Bayesian
Games” describing games where players hold a “belief” about the state of the world
(see Fudenberg and Tirole (1991) for a discussion on this). The scope in this area is
to analyse how the rules of a game and asymmetric information of the participants
interact. The second branch, normative analysis, is to a large extend inspired by
the theory of mechanism design, asking which rules on a game are best to achieve
a given goal. An important corner stone of the mechanism design literature is the
so-called “revelation principle”. The revelation principle states that any possible
indirect mechanism implements an allocation that can also be achieved using a
direct revelation mechanism. A direct revelation mechanism is a mechanism in
which players simply report their entire private information directly and privately
to the mechanism. The mechanism enforces an allocation based on the agents
reports, according to a certain rule. The mechanism can be seen as a contract, the
players agreed upon ex-ante such that both the mechanism and the players fully
commit to obeying this contract.
This thesis consists of three self contained articles. Chapters 2 and 3 are joint
work with Benjamin Balzer, while Chapter 4 is single authored. All three chapters
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address issues of information economics both from a normative (chapters 2 and 3)
and a positive (chapter 4) perspective. A common theme over the three chap-
ters is that they centre around the question how a particular bit of information is
interpreted by economic agents in light of the surrounding environment. I show
that the interpretation of information, can be very different and depends on the
surrounding. The underlying reason for this is that preferences over outcomes are
often misaligned to some extend in economic environments. Thus, any form of
communication between the different players is likely to have a strategic compo-
nent. The receipients of the information take this knowledge, and the knowledge
of the (sometimes constraint) information transmission technologie, into account
when making their decisions. In Chapter 2, I address this within the field of
Law and Economics, while chapter 4 is within the field of Industrial Organization.
Chapter 3 serves as a bridge between the two by considering issues present in both
fields on a more abstract level. Both, in Law and Economics and Industrial Orga-
nization, one can find many situations in which competitors interpret any sort of
communication as a signal about the competitor’s type. At the same time, private
information is typically valuable to competitors within the fixed environment and
communication mechanisms are embedded in the context of a greater institution
which is why the issues discussed above are relevant in these areas. Next, I briefly
comment on the three different chapters.
Chapter 2 contributes to the outlined theme by showing how litigation shapes
the design of an optimal alternative dispute resolution mechanism (ADR). ADR
is present in many legal disputes and describes any attempt to settle the dispute
outside court with support of a third party. ADR helps to overcome overburdened
legal systems that can be observed in many countries. An overburdened legal
system imposes large costs on society as it limits access to the legal system. Thus,
many countries aim at minimizing the number of cases that enter formal litigation
and try to settle as many as possible outside court. At the same time it is a pillar
of most modern societies that anybody who wants to bring her case to litigation
can do so. This is called the rule of law. There is a debate among practitioners
and policy makers that centres around the following question: How can one best
design an alternative dispute resolution mechanism that minimizes the number of
cases that enter formal litigation while keeping the rule of law in place? We use
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ensuring that the rule of law is kept in place. The rule of law provides ADR with
a non-cooperative outside option, the formal litigation process. In this chapter
we investigate how the design of ADR interacts with the players actions in the
litigation process following a breakdown of ADR. The interaction is a consequence
of the expensive and highly competitive nature of litigation: The player providing
the better argument in her favour is going to win litigation. Thus, the actions
players choose very much depend on their beliefs about the other player. These
beliefs are not only updated in light of the existence of ADR, but also by the
exact specification of ADR. Depending on what happened in ADR, players may
thus react differently in litigation after breakdown. Formally, this means that the
litigation game serves as a belief dependent outside option to ADR.
Chapter 3 generalizes the findings of chapter 2 by characterizing optimal con-
flict management for a general class of conflict games. Economically, conflicts are
relevant in many settings and often the default resolution option provides unsat-
isfying results and externalities on other, not directly involved, agents. Therefore,
conflict management has a long tradition in most areas were conflicts occur. In
chapter 2 we have seen that players interpret breakdown of conflict management
in light of the underlying game. In this chapter we show that this insight carries
over to more generalized settings. Again, beliefs after breakdown play a crucial
role. Further, we simplify the problem by showing that there are several equivalent
versions of the problem that allow us to use different techniques for finding a solu-
tion. Moreover, we provide necessary and sufficient conditions for implementation
of any solution that is derived in expected values. We show that if the players
cannot commit to ignore publicly available information, the mechanism designer
can always ensure full participation at the optimum by convexifying the players
rejection payoffs via publicly available signals. We offer a general approach to
limit the set of solution candidates to those belief choices that provide a concave
expected payoff in the conflict game. Our findings provide a guideline for practi-
tioners on how to design the conflict management mechanism as a function of the
underlying game.
Chapter 4 contains a positive analysis of a model of project choice. I look
at this in a merger context in which a firm can choose between two different
11
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merging partners. The merger serves as a project and the proposing firm can choose
between two different mergers. The choice is made endogenously and I assume
efficient bargaining among firms who then propose the merger to an antitrust
authority that can accept or reject the proposed merger. An accepted merger is
implemented. If a merger is rejected the status quo remains and the firm may
propose a merger again in the subsequent period. I am interested in how the
dynamics of the game shape the authoritie’s understanding of the proposed mergers
and find that in such a game there are essentially two types of equilibria. In
one equilibrium type the authority screens by accepting some proposals with a
probability smaller one which leads the firm to pander towards the authorities
preferences. This equilibrium is called the pandering equilibrium. A second class
is that of “waiting equilibria” in which the firm signals by waiting that she has high
synergies in the larger merger. While the pandering equilibrium is the most desired
equilibrium of the firm, the most desired equilibrium of the authority always lies
in the class of waiting equilibria. The model offers a new insight on the dynamics
of project proposal. Using the idea of delay as a signal, I provide a model that
shows that, contrary to conventional wisdom, delay may beneficial for society. My
results offer an explanation as to why firms push towards fast processes in merger
control. At the same time, I show that ruling out waiting equilibria by limiting the
time-horizon may harm society. More generally, my model offers a novel theory of
project choice. Contrary to existing project choice models, I incorporate a notion
of signalling by waiting into the problem. I show that if it is impossible for the
sender to end the game after her first proposal, an uniformed decision maker may
gain from additional time periods. Thus, even in the absence of verifiability, time
can help a party to screen projects. In fact, the longer the time-horizon the better
for the uninformed receiver.
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2 Alternative Dispute Resolution in
Contests
with Benjamin Balzer
2.1 Introduction
Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) is a tool introduced into the legal system
of many countries to increase the system’s efficiency by settling as many cases as
possible outside court. ADR itself can take many forms and describes a third-
party mechanism other than formal litigation to solve the conflict. However, ADR
typically cannot overturn the rule of law, such that parties return to the litigation
track once ADR fails. Given that ADR and litigation remain thus connected,
several questions arise. How does the information exchanged during ADR influence
the behavior in litigation post ADR-breakdown? How does the threat of ADR-
breakdown influence the litigants’ willingness to release information during ADR?
How should we design ADR “in the shadow of the court”?
The aim of this paper is to study the optimal third-party ADR-mechanism that
uses litigation as the fall-back option in case no agreement is reached. We provide
a model identifying the two-way channel that links an optimal mechanism (ADR)
and an underlying contest (litigation). We show that optimal ADR and litigation
cannot be considered as independent problems: the information revealed in the
ADR-stage influences the choice of action in both ADR and litigation. Litigants’
investment into evidence provision after breakdown depends on the beliefs about
their opponent’s action. The ADR-designer needs to be concerned about manag-
ing the players’ beliefs in case ADR breaks down. Moreover, ADR cannot fully
eliminate litigation as parties differ in their marginal cost of evidence provision.
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ADR breaks down sometimes to screen parties and to ensure truth-telling during
ADR.
Most modern societies accept the concept of the “rule of law” despite an over-
burdened legal system: in 2014 each judge in the U.S. district courts received 658
new cases. At the same time the number of pending cases is even larger with 694
per judge. The large caseload leads to a median time from filing to trial of around
2 years. As litigation requires a lot of time and resources from courts, each case
that forgoes litigation also has a positive externality on the functioning of the legal
system as a whole.
Thus, most jurisdictions encourage parties to engage in some form of ADR before
starting the formal litigation process. The U.S. Alternative Dispute Resolution Act
of 1998 states that courts should provide litigants with ADR-options in all civil
cases. ADR is defined as “any process or procedure, other than an adjudication
by a presiding judge, in which a neutral third party participates to assist in the
resolution of issues in controversy” (Alternative Dispute Resolution Act, 1998).
However, ADR supplements the “rule of law” rather than replacing it. Ultimately,
each party has the right to return to formal litigation.1 Hence, ADR indeed
happens “in the shadow of the court:” whenever no settlement is achieved via
ADR, litigants return to the traditional litigation path.
Nonetheless, ADR is a very effective tool to settle conflicts and has success
rates substantially above 50% across time, jurisdictions, and case characteristics.
Furthermore, litigants report that ADR has an impact on the continuation of the
trial even if unsuccessful (Genn, 1998; Anderson and Pi, 2004). The informational
spillovers to post-breakdown litigation influences the design of optimal ADR: if the
information a player receives during ADR depends on the information she provides,
parties have an incentive to strategically extract information within ADR which
they can use in litigation once ADR breaks down.
We follow a large literature dating back to Posner (1973) and consider litigation
as a legal contest (for an overview on the litigation literature see Spier (2007)). The
party providing the most convincing evidence wins the case. In such a contest,
the optimal amount of evidence the plaintiff provides is a function not only of
her own cost of evidence provision, but also of her beliefs about the defendant’s
1For a detailed discussion on this, see Brown, Cervenak, and Fairman (1998).
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evidence choice and vice versa. Hence, litigation strategies after ADR-breakdown
are a function of the players’ belief system.
Optimal ADR-design should take the belief-channel into account to ensure in-
centive compatibility: suppose a plaintiff who only has access to circumstantial
evidence reports to the mediator instead that she has direct evidence. She then
might gain from misreporting in two dimensions. First, through a direct effect:
reporting better evidence can lead to a more favorable settlement. Second, there
is an indirect effect: if the plaintiff misreports, she may also benefit if ADR fails to
resolve the conflict. By misreporting in the ADR stage, the plaintiff may influence
her post-breakdown expectation about the defendant’s type since breakdown is
a function of both players’ reports. Changing the beliefs post-breakdown affects
expected litigation outcomes and provides an additional incentive to misreport.
While the direct effect is present in standard mechanism design models, we seem
to be the first to consider the indirect effect as the outside-option of our mechanism
depends on the belief system.
Our analysis highlights several important features of ADR in the shadow of a
legal contest: we show that if ADR cannot promise full-settlement for all type-
profiles, then ADR cannot promise full-settlement for any type-profile. The reason
is that if the mediator promises settlement for a specific type-profile, it imposes
an externality on the other types by influencing their breakdown beliefs.
We further show that the optimal mechanism is always asymmetric. It favors
one player when ADR breaks down and the other when ADR is successful, even
when players are fully symmetric ex-ante. At the time of participating, players
only care about their expected valuation being the sum of the valuations in case
of both settlement and breakdown. To keep the expected valuations constant, the
valuation promised to players in settlement must increase the more competitive
and therefore wasteful litigation post ADR-breakdown is. Consequently, optimal
mediation makes the litigation process post-ADR less competitive by inducing
asymmetric beliefs to save on resources needed for settlement.
While the optimal mechanism results in asymmetric beliefs, it ensures that be-
liefs are independent of the player’s type-report. If a player could obtain different
information from different reports, she could induce a situation without common
knowledge of beliefs post-breakdown: the deviating player knows that she mis-
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reported, but her opponent does not. Each player’s optimal action depends on
both her own belief about the opponent and what the opponent thinks this belief
is. Learning from reports can thus provide an incentive to misreport in hope of
breakdown. If beliefs are independent of the report, however, such a problem does
not arise because deviations do not create an information advantage.
We significantly differ from standard models of conflict resolution in that we
consider a model in which investment into the conflict is made after the resolution
mechanism broke down. Nonetheless, a key result derived by Hörner, Morelli, and
Squintani (2015) carries over to our setting: if the mediator can talk to parties in
private, the players’ level of commitment is not important. Compared to a situa-
tion in which parties commit to the mechanism at an interim stage, the mediator
can achieve (almost) the same result if parties are allowed to unilaterally opt-out of
mediation after the settlement proposal. The reason is that private communication
allows the mediator to conceals some information even at an ex-post stage.
Our findings contribute to the ongoing discussion of optimal ADR-design by
pointing out several important aspects: (1) optimal ADR can settle most of the
cases outside court independent of the cases’ characteristics; (2) the level of com-
mitment needed by the parties is not important if the mediator can communicate
to parties in private; (3) regulators should be careful when preventing mediators
from using asymmetric protocols as they increase the probability of ADR break-
ing down; and (4) to incentivize settlement, optimal ADR should predominantly
manage beliefs in case a breakdown occurs.
We also contribute to the literature on mechanism design. If screening can
happen only through an underlying game, on-path breakdown is informative for
players and necessary for optimality. Our model emphasizes the relevance of belief
management by the mechanism if the underlying game, and thus the outside op-
tion, is belief dependent. Our findings directly apply to other situations in which
a wasteful contest is the last resort such as strikes, political lobbying, patent races,
and standard setting organizations.
Outline. After discussing the literature in Section 2.2, we set up the model in
Section 2.3 and derive the optimal mechanism in Section 2.4. Subsequently, we
discuss the findings in Section 2.5 and several extensions in Section 2.6. Section 2.7
concludes.
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2.2 Related Literature
We contribute to three strands of literature: (1) to the best of our knowledge we
provide the first formal model in the law and economics literature that explicitly
addresses the complementarity of litigation and ADR; (2) we add a new channel
to the literature on mechanism design with endogenous outside option by showing
that a mechanism which cannot fully avoid a post-mechanism game should be
concerned about the information release during the process; and (3) we add to
the existing literature of mechanism design and conflict resolution as we consider
a setup in which parties make their decision on investment into the default game
after the conflict arises.
We connect to the law and economics literature on settlement under asymmetric
information dating back to the seminal paper by Bebchuk (1984). Spier (1994) is
the first in this line to consider a mechanism design approach. She uses a model
that applies to situations in which investment in evidence provision was made prior
to negotiations and is interested in optimal fee-shifting between parties. We differ
in two aspects: we hold the rules of litigation fixed and study a model in which
the choice on how much evidence to present is made after settlement negotiations.
This results in an optimal mechanism that conditions on informational spill-overs
of ADR onto litigation.2
Brown and Ayres (1994) highlight that managing the information flow between
litigants can be a rationale for ADR that goes beyond reducing psychological
barriers to negotiation. There is, however, to the best of our knowledge no paper
yet, that links information exchange in pre-litigation ADR with litigation as a
strategic game. We model litigation in the tradition of Posner (1973) as a legal
contest.3 Our findings show that such a link is important as ADR and litigation
should not be treated as two independent problems, but two stages of the same
game.
2Another recent paper discussing third-party mediation is Doornik (2014) who studies the
optimal use of a fixed mediation mechanism. Different from us, she is interested in when to use
a certain ADR mechanism,while we focus on the optimal design of ADR.
3Examples include Katz (1988), Baye, Kovenock, and Vries (2005), Spier and Rosenberg
(2011), and Prescott, Spier, and Yoon (2014). In addition, see Spier (2007) for a general discus-
sion on litigation in the law and economics literature.
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The second strand of literature we relate to is that of mechanism design with
endogenous outside options, i.e. mechanisms which cannot fully replace an under-
lying strategic game. Similar to Cramton and Palfrey (1995) and Celik and Peters
(2011, 2013), we consider a mechanism that needs to be ratified by both parties.
Without mutual consent, parties play the litigation game. In our model moreover,
mediation sometimes breaks down and parties are referred to the underlying game.
Breakdown is informative as in Cramton and Palfrey (1995) and Celik and Peters
(2011). While Cramton and Palfrey (1995) are interested in finding worst off-path
beliefs, Celik and Peters (2011) show that for some games it is optimal to design a
mechanism without full participation. In our model, both channels are not present
and full participation is optimal. Instead, we explore an additional channel: we
ask how on-path references to the default game by the mechanism interact with
the belief structure of the players after breakdown.
We also connect to the literature on conflict resolution as the two closest pa-
pers to ours are Bester and Wärneryd (2006) and Hörner, Morelli, and Squintani
(2015). Bester and Wärneryd (2006) were the first to study conflict resolution in
a mechanism design environment. Similar to us, they look for the conflict min-
imizing mechanism and find that it is typically stochastic. Hörner, Morelli, and
Squintani (2015), building on Bester and Wärneryd (2006), study optimal media-
tion in the context of international relations. They show that limited commitment
of the disputants does not change the outcome of the optimal mechanism as long
as the mediator can talk to parties in private.
The main difference between our model and those of Hörner, Morelli, and Squin-
tani (2015) and Bester and Wärneryd (2006) is the timing of events: through
their fixed, type-dependent outside option, Hörner, Morelli, and Squintani (2015)
implicitly assume that investment decisions take place before the conflict arises.
While this assumption may apply to mediation attempts in international relations,
it applies less to ADR negotiations as the collection of evidence typically happens
after the conflict arises. Our results are thus a complement to Meirowitz et al.
(2015) who study the relationship between dispute resolution and pre-conflict in-
vestment. Contrary to that, we study the relationship between dispute resolution
and post-mediation investment. An important result of Hörner, Morelli, and Squin-
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tani (2015), however, carries over to our setting: limited commitment changes the
result of the optimal mechanism arbitrarily little.
Although the result on limited commitment is similar, the optimal mechanism
itself is qualitatively different: in Hörner, Morelli, and Squintani (2015), the result
is always symmetric and involves full-settlement between weak types. In our setup
neither occurs: the optimal mechanism is never symmetric and mediation has a
positive breakdown probability for all type profiles as weak types are needed in
the post-mediation contests to ensure full participation which is always optimal.
Our concept of mediation is based on Bester and Wärneryd (2006) and lies
between pure communication devices as in Mitusch and Strausz (2005) and a
mediator with independent sources of information (Fey and Ramsay, 2010). Pavlov
(2013) shows that the former has no effect on the outcome in contests but, different
to Fey and Ramsay (2010), the mediator can resolve the majority of conflicts
without the need of an exogenous information source.
2.3 Model
Litigation Game. The underlying litigation game Γ of our model is an all-pay
contest with asymmetric information as in Szech (2011) and Siegel (2014).4 There
are two risk-neutral players i = 1, 2 who compete for a good of a commonly known
value of 1. Both players simultaneously decide on a score si and the player with
the highest score wins the good. Ties are broken in favor of player 1.5 Obtaining a
score is costly. Players are ex-ante symmetric and have low marginal cost, cl, with
probability p, or high marginal cost, ch ≡ κ cl; κ > 1, with probability (1 − p).
All but the realization of the cost, which is privately learned by each player, is
common knowledge. To simplify notation, we denote the low-cost type “l” and
the high-cost type “h”. In line with this simplification, we are going to use the
expressions “player i, type k” and “player ik” interchangeably.
4We follow the terminology of Siegel (2009), indicating that players have heterogeneous cost
of effort but a common perception of the prize.
5This technical assumption allows us to circumvent openness problems off-path. However,
any other tie-breaking rule would work at cost of additional notation.
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Mediator. We model the mediator as a neutral third-party possessing no private
information who announces a protocol X and has the ability to commit to it. The
protocol is a mapping from a message profile, M , to triple (G,X1, X2) where G
denotes the matrix of breakdown probabilities and Xi the matrix of settlement
shares. It is without loss of generality to restrict the message space to the number
of type-pairs once the mechanism has been ratified (Cramton and Palfrey, 1995;
Celik and Peters, 2011). Thus, let
G =
γ(l, l) γ(l, h)
γ(h, l) γ(h, h)
 ,
and
Xi =
xi(l, l) xi(l, h)
xi(h, l) xi(h, h)
 ,
where γ(M) denotes the probability of mediation breakdown after message pro-
fileM = (m1,m2), that is the probability that players are sent back to the litigation
game Γ after message M . Further, xi(M) denotes the share of the good assigned
to player i after M .6
We assume budget balance and non-negative shares: the designer can only divide
the good in question and allocate shares to players. These shares sum up to not
more than one, that is x1(k1, k2) + x2(k1, k2) ≤ 1.7
Formally, the mediator is a mechanism designer who cannot enforce actions in
the contest. In principle, we could allow the mediator to send players non-binding
recommendations within the contest. It is without loss of generality to abstract
from such recommendations as they would induce a communication equilibrium in
the litigation game and all communication equilibria in all-pay contests are payoff
equivalent to the unique Nash equilibrium.8
We are looking for a mechanism that minimizes the ex-ante probability of me-
diation breakdown, Pr(Γ). The solution concept is perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
6For the ease of notation, we assume without loss of generality that the message k is assigned
to the meaning “I am type k”.
7If the good itself was indivisible, a lottery could implement the same result.
8See Pavlov (2013), especially Proposition 6 for details on this. Uniqueness of the Nash
equilibrium is discussed in section 2.4.1.
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Timing. For most of the analysis, we consider an interim individually rational
mechanism.9 Hence, the timing is as follows: first, the mediator commits to the
mediation protocol X and players learn their type privately. Second, players si-
multaneously decide whether to participate in the mediation mechanism. If any
player rejects, players update beliefs and play the litigation game. If both accept,
players privately send a message mi to the mediator.
Following her protocol X , the mediator either implements an allocation (x1, x2)
or initiates breakdown. In the latter case players update beliefs and go to litigation.
Discussion of the Assumptions. We follow a large strand of the literature in
assuming that litigation is a legal contest. The all-pay contest, a limiting case of
a general Tullock (1980) contest, is only assumed to ensure closed form solutions.
As expected, contest utilities are continuous for every action pair, hence adding
noise would not change our results qualitatively.10 The same is true for the con-
stant marginal cost of evidence production. Results maintain if we assume a
more sophisticated (monotonic) evidence provision function as used e.g. in Baye,
Kovenock, and Vries (2005). Ex-ante symmetry is chosen for simplicity, too, and
can be relaxed without changing the results.
The assumption that mediation is designed by a neutral third-party follows the
U.S. Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998. In practice, ADR is typically
conducted by (retired) judges, law professors or private mediation companies all
repeating the mediation services on a regular basis. Clearly, trust is a relevant
issue for those mediators and provides a rationale for commitment.
Interim individual rationality of the players is assumed for the ease of notation,
only. In Section 2.6 we show in line with the argument by Hörner, Morelli, and
Squintani (2015) that assuming ex-post individual rationality changes results only
arbitrarily little.
Finally, the assumption that the mediator aims to minimize breakdown is in line
with the theoretical literature on conflict resolution. Courts have an enormous
backlog in pending cases. Mainly because of the backlog, the time from filing
to trial takes typically more than two years. Decreasing the number of court
9In Section 2.6 we show in an extension that assuming ex-post individual rationally can
changes results arbitrarily little.
10See e.g. Baye, Kovenock, and Vries (1996), Che and Gale (2000), and Ewerhart (2015) for
a detailed discussion.
21
2 Alternative Dispute Resolution in Contests
cases therefore has a positive effect on caseloads as well as on possible future
conflicting parties and their ability to use the legal system effectively. Related
to that, reducing the backlog is the main goal of ADR in practice: the success
of dispute resolution programs is typically measured in the share of cases settled
(see, e.g., Genn (1998) and Anderson and Pi (2004)). Moreover, the assumption
that ADR minimizes the number of court cases adds to the tractability of the
model: contest utilities are not well behaved in the mediator’s choices. A different
objective complicates the analysis substantially by adding non-convexities to the
objective function.
2.4 Analysis
We proceed with the analysis in several steps. First, we characterize the equilib-
rium of the continuation game after on-path breakdown for a given information
structure. Next, we characterize the properties of the continuation game following
a misreport during the reporting stage. Breakdown after a false report essentially
produces a situation without common knowledge of beliefs and provides the devi-
ator with an informational advantage. We show that all players and types weakly
prefer the on-path contest to the deviation contest only if beliefs are independent
of their type reports. The third step is to rewrite the problem to overcome non-
convexities and to make it tractable. Litigation is the only source of screening, and
thus, the mediator is concerned about choosing the optimal information structure
post-breakdown. This determines the solution of the problem up to a constant.
We show that this constant is entirely determined by the fact that the optimal
mechanism is budget balanced. Finally, we characterize the optimal mechanism.
We show that it discriminates even between symmetric players, but involves a
type-independent belief structure.
We organize the remainder of this section as follows: for each step we first
state its result and provide an intuition thereafter. Formal proofs are provided in
Section 2.C.
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2.4.1 Equilibrium Characterization of the Continuation Game
The continuation game after breakdown of mediation is an all-pay contest with
type-dependent probabilities as defined in Section 2.3.
Let pi(ki|m−i) denote the probability that player i is of type ki, given that player
-i is of type m−i. For readability, we drop the player subscript in the arguments
and write pi(k|m). In contests, the literature typically assumes some form of
monotonicity condition which guarantees that having a low-cost type is desirable
for all players. We follow Siegel (2014) and call the environment monotone if
pi(k|l)
pi(k|h) >
cl
ch
= 1
κ
∀ i, k. (M)
In what follows, we are going to assume that (M) holds, i.e. we assume that it
is optimal for the mediator to induce post-breakdown belief structures that satisfy
(M). In the Appendix we show that this is indeed optimal even if the mediator
could choose non-monotone environments.11 Further, we assume throughout the
paper that the probability that player 1 has low-cost, given player 2 reported
low-cost, is weakly larger than the probability that player 2 has low-cost, given
player 1 reported low-cost. Hence, player 1 is the stronger player in the contest or
p1(l|l) ≥ p2(l|l). This assumption is without loss of generality.
Lemma 1. Suppose (M) holds and p1(l|l) ≥ p2(l|l). Then, the all-pay contest has
a unique equilibrium which has the following properties:
• the support of equilibrium strategies of each type is disjoint from but connected
to the other type of the same player,
• the highest score played in equilibrium, ∆l,l, is in the strategy support of any
l-type,
• the joint support of player 1’s strategies is (0,∆l,l],
• the joint support of player 2’s strategies is the same as that of player 1 plus
an additional mass point at 0, in case p1(l|k) 6= p2(l|k) for some k,
11Siegel (2014) shows that in principle little can be said if (M) is violated. In our setting,
the mediator can only induces Bayes’ plausible belief structures. Thus, it is actually possible to
characterize the non-monotonic equilibria explicitly. We characterize them in the Section 2.C.
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• both players play mixed strategies with piecewise constant densities on at most
three subintervals of (0,∆l,l].
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Figure 2.1: Strategy support of player 1 and 2 with type-dependent priors.
The Lemma is a direct application of Siegel (2014) to our setting. Figure 2.1
summarizes the equilibrium strategies. The horizontal axis depicts the score s.
The dark-red and the light-blue line denote equilibrium strategy support for both
players if player 1 is more likely to have low-cost. Player 1 (dark-red line at the
top), type h (dashed part), is indifferent for all scores on the bottom interval b
from 0 up to and including ∆h,h. This is the lower bound for the score of 1l (solid
part) who is indifferent on all scores on intervals m and t up to and including ∆l,l
given the strategy of player 2. Player 2h (light-blue dashed line at the bottom) is
indifferent between a score of 0 (indicated by the dot) and on intervals b and m up
to and including ∆l,h. Player 2l is indifferent on interval t. If players become ex-
ante symmetric, intervalm vanishes, the mass point at 0 disappears, and strategies
become fully symmetric.
There are no pure-strategy equilibria: whenever one player scores on a singleton
only, it is either optimal to marginally overscore this value or to score 0 instead.
There are several relevant properties of this mixed-strategy equilibrium. First, the
highest score obtained by both players is the same. If one player was to strictly
overscore her opponent, she could always deviate by reducing her score to the
highest possible score of her opponent. Such a deviation does not reduce the
probability of winning, but reduces the cost of the score.
Second, choices in all-pay contests are similar to strategic complements: when-
ever the likelihood of player 1l increases, player 2l reacts by scoring more aggres-
sively. As l-types share the upper bound in their strategies, 2l has a higher average
score than player 1l.
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Third, for every information structure at least one h-type player receives 0-utility
in expectations. This player is always the ex-ante weakest player-type combination,
here player 2h. If this is not the case, no player would score exactly 0 with positive
probability. But then, whatever the lower bound of the joint support, scoring at
this lower bound yields a negative utility, which can always be avoided by deviating
to a score of 0.
If player 2h has a mass point at 0, player 1h receives strictly positive utility as
every score arbitrarily close to 0 guarantees her to win if player 2h decides to score
0.
Overall, the equilibrium actions in the all-pay contest depend on the belief about
both the opponent’s type, and the opponent’s action, where the latter is a function
of the opponent’s beliefs. Thus, expected utilities depend on the entire belief
structure. The following corollary to Lemma 1 defines the expected contest utilities
in closed form.
Corollary 1. Under the assumptions of Lemma 1, and pi(l|k) > 0, the expected
contest utilities are
U1(l) = U2(l) = 1− cl ∆l,l > 0,
U1(h) = p2(h|h)F2,h(0),
U2(h) = 0.
(U)
Moreover, utilities are linear in beliefs, if beliefs are type-independent. If beliefs
are symmetric, F2,h(0) = 0.
The utility of the low-cost types is a direct consequence of the common highest
score. Both players win with probability 1 if they score at ∆l,l and have cost
cl∆l,l. On all other scores in their support they must be indifferent. The utility
of the high-cost type of player 1 is derived as she always wins against those high-
cost types that score 0 even if she scores arbitrarily close to 0. High-cost types
of player 2 score 0 with probability F2,h(0) which gives them utility 0. If beliefs
become type-independent, that is pi(l|l) = pi(l|h), the upper bound, ∆l,l, and the
mass on 0, F2,h(0), is linear in beliefs. If beliefs are symmetric between players,
that is p1(l|k) = p2(l|k), the mass point on 0, F2,h(0) = 0 and U1(h) = 0.
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2.4.2 Deviator Payoffs in the Continuation Game
As players in our model differ only with respect to their cost in the contest, it is im-
portant for incentive compatibility to characterize the post-deviation continuation
game. It needs to be assessed how players’ actions and utilities change in case of
breakdown conditional on a false report during the reporting stage. A false report
introduces non-common knowledge of beliefs between the players. The deviating
player knows about her deviation and assigns correct beliefs to her opponent. The
non-deviating player and the mediator, on the other hand, are unaware of the de-
viation and incorrectly predict the deviator’s beliefs. The wrong prediction affects
actions, expected contest utilities, and thus incentive compatibility.12
Lemma 2. Assume (M) and p1(l|l) ≥ p2(l|l) > 0. All player-type combinations
but player 1h are weakly better off in their respective deviation contest. Player 1h
is strictly worse off in the deviation contest if and only if the probability of facing
a high-cost type in her deviation contest is strictly smaller than in her on-path
contest.
Lemma 3. Assume (M) and p1(l|l) ≥ p2(l|l) > 0. Then, exactly one type of
each player is strictly better off in the deviation contest than in the on-path contest
if and only if the beliefs the player holds are not type-independent. If beliefs are
type-independent, no player is better off in the deviation contest.
Lemmas 2 and 3 state that the only situation in which no player-type prefers the
deviation contest to the on-path contest is when beliefs, pi(l|m), are independent
of the reported type m. To understand the intuition, let us first define the two
types of contest.
Definition 1. On-path contest: the contest is called on-path contest if the belief
structure is such that any player i, type k, holds belief p−i(l|k) about player −i.
Further, the belief that each player and type holds is common knowledge.
Definition 2. Deviation contest: the contest is called deviation contest of player ik
if player i, type k holds a belief p−i(l|¬k) that is the same belief that player i, who
12The deviator of course correctly predicts the wrong prediction of the non-deviator, and so
on.
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is not k, holds on-path. This belief is called the deviator’s belief. Player −i,
however, holds her on-path belief pi(l|k) about player i. Thus, generically, there
is no common knowledge of beliefs in this contest.
A direct consequence of non-common knowledge of beliefs is that the deviating
player is no longer indifferent between several scores. The non-deviating player
chooses her strategy to make an on-path opponent indifferent on some interval.
The deviator, however, has a different belief about the non-deviator than the on-
path opponent and is thus not indifferent as second-order beliefs differ. Decisions
are similar to strategic complements, such that a too aggressive choice of the non-
deviator leads the deviator to pick an aggressive response. If the choice is too soft,
the deviator picks a soft response. The best response is generically a singleton.
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of player 2h
after report l
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0
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Figure 2.2: Optimal behavior in the deviation contest of player 2 if p1(l|h) > p1(l|l).
Notice that the deviation strategies are conditional on 2l reporting h and 2h
reporting l without player 1 noticing.
Figure 2.2 illustrates the optimal strategies for player 2’s deviation contest in
case it is more likely that l-types appear after an h-report, i.e. p1(l|h) > p1(l|l).
The horizontal axis describes the scores, the dark-red line the strategy of player 1,
which is the same as in equilibrium. The light-blue, dashed arrow points to the
unique best response of player 2h who reported l, the solid arrow to that of player 2l
who reported h.
If the probability that the opponent has low cost is larger in the deviation
contest, the deviating l-type decides to score more aggressively. By the common
upper bound in the strategy support, scoring above the highest score, ∆l,l, is never
beneficial. Thus, her optimal strategy in the deviation contest is to score at ∆l,l
and to win with probability 1, if she is more likely to meet an l-type. Therefore,
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her utility is the same as on path, where she wins with probability 1 at a score
∆l,l which is part of her equilibrium strategy.
Whenever reporting h increases the likelihood to meet an l-type opponent for
player 2, reporting l must increase the likelihood to meet an h-type, i.e. p1(h|l) >
p1(h|h). Similar to the case of 2l, a deviation by 2h makes her increase the score
against an h-type (interval b in Figure 2.2), but decrease it against an l-type
(interval m in Figure 2.2), since those occur less likely. Thus, her optimal response
is ∆h,h which leads to a win against all h-types. High-cost types occur with higher
probability as p1(h|l) > p1(h|h), and hence, 2h prefers the deviation contest to the
on-path contest.
Low-cost players are never worse off in the deviation contest, as they can always
score at the top. Moreover, player 2h is not worse off either as she can secure her
on-path utility of 0. The only player that can be worse off in the deviation contest
is player 1h, if she expects to meet less 2h. She then softens her bid to 0 and wins
by the tiebreaker but suffers from the low probability of meeting 2h.
Having discussed both on-path and post-deviation behavior in the continuation
game, we shorten notation and use Ui(k|m) to describe the expected utility that
player i, type k enjoys in the contest stage if she reported to be typem and behaves
optimally thereafter.
2.4.3 Rewriting the Problem
We now turn to the problem of the designer. Note that the problem is highly
non-convex and standard techniques do not apply. To be able to characterize
the solution we need to transform it to a tractable problem. We do so in several
steps. As the transformation is a series of technical issues we proceed as follows.
First, we state the proposition describing the reformulated problem. Second, we
state the original problem. Third, we provide a brief, non-technical comment
on each transformation step in the main text. We refer the interested reader
to Section 2.A for the corresponding detailed description of the transformation
including the intermediate lemmas.
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Proposition 1. Any ex-post implementable, individually feasible and incentive
compatible solution to
min
P
Pr(Γ) = min
P
R(P )γ∗(P ) (P1’)
is also a solution to the mediator’s problem if and only if γ∗(P ) ≤ 1, where R(P ) =
Pr(Γ)/γ(l, l).
The proposition states that an equivalent formulation of the mediator’s problem
exists. Under this equivalent formulation, she optimizes over the set of breakdown
beliefs, P = {p1(l|l), p2(l|l), p1(l|h)}, instead of the set of shares and breakdown
probabilities, X = (G,X1, X2). The remaining breakdown belief about player 2,
p2(l|h), is implicitly defined by P and Bayes’ rule. The rewritten problem comes at
the cost of two additional, technical constraints, namely ex-post implementability
and individual feasibility. We are going to discuss these constraints below.
The Original Problem of the Mediator. As the mechanism needs to pass
a ratification stage it is not necessarily without loss of generality to assume full
participation. Given the payoff structure of the litigation game, however, we can
use a result of Celik and Peters (2011) to conclude that full participation is indeed
optimal in our setting, the corresponding lemma stating this result is included in
Section 2.A. Given full participation, the mediator’s problem is
min
X
Pr(Γ) = min
X
(
p, (1− p)
)
·G ·
 p
(1− p),
 (P1)
subject to the following sets of constraints for all i ∈ {1, 2} and k,m ∈ {l, h}
Πi(k|k) ≥ Vi(k), (PCki )
Πi(k|k) ≥ Πi(k|m), (ICki )
x1(k1, k2) + x2(k1, k2) ≤ 1, xi(k1, k2) ≥ 0,
0 ≤ γ(k1, k2) ≤ 1,
where Πi(k|m) describes the expected total payoff of a participating player i,
type k given she reports m. Vi(k) describes the value of vetoing the mechanism for
29
2 Alternative Dispute Resolution in Contests
player i, type k. The first set of constraints are participation constraints, (PCki ),
indicating that each player and type should prefer to participate in ADR over veto-
ing. The second set, the incentive compatibility constraints (ICki ), state that it is
optimal for each agent to announce her true type. The third set of constraints pro-
hibits additional payments by the agents or the mechanism and ensures a balanced
budget. Finally, the last set of constraints ensures that breakdown probabilities
are between 0 and 1.
Value of vetoing. To determine the outside option we need to define the
equilibrium of the litigation game after a veto by either of the parties in the
ratification stage. High-cost types do not receive any payoff after a veto and are
thus always at least indifferent to participate in ADR. Low-cost types’ value of
vetoing depends on the choice of beliefs after vetoing. In our case any choice of
these off-path beliefs after vetoing which satisfy the intuitive criterion leads to the
same value of vetoing: the expected litigation payoff under the prior p.13
Whenever the value of vetoing is smaller than 1/2 for low-cost types, however,
the mediator could offer parties a sharing rule of (1/2, 1/2) for each type-realization
and settle all cases. To make the problem interesting we make the following as-
sumption.
Assumption 1. The low-cost types’ value of vetoing is strictly above 1/2.
Assumption 1 translates into the following condition on parameters: κ > 2−2p1−2p .
Expected payoff. The expected payoff from participation, Π1(k|m), has two
components: the expected value of successful settlement and the expected value
of mediation breakdown and subsequent litigation. Thus,
Πi(k|m) = zi(m) + γi(m)Ui(k|m), (2.1)
where message m leads to a value of settlement, zi(m), and a value of breakdown
γi(m)U1(k|m). The expected contest probability, γi(m), is a convex combination
13This is a direct consequence of the low-cost types’ contest utilities being a function of the
weaker players’ probability to have low-cost in case of type-independent beliefs. Any deviation
belief satisfying the intuitive criterion, makes the non-deviating player the weaker one. Thus,
the relevant belief remains constant at p.
30
2.4 Analysis
of the breakdown probabilities conditional on the opponents type
γ1(m) = pγ(m, l) + (1− p)γ(m,h),
the value of settlement is a convex combination of realized shares and settlement
probabilities
z1(m) = p(1− γ(m, l))x1(m, l) + (1− p)(1− γ(m,h))x1(m,h),
and analogously for player 2. Equation (2.1) shows how optimal mediation relies
on the litigation game. While the value of settlement, zi, is similar to transfers
in standard mechanism design, the utility of the contest continuation game is the
screening device.
Step 1: Reduced-Form Problem à la Border (2007). In this step we make
use of a procedure introduced by Border (2007) to reduce the problem from realized
values to expected values. The reduced form problem has the advantage that the
exact composition of the settlement shares, Xi, becomes irrelevant and we can
use the settlement values, zi(·), directly as choice variables. To ensure a feasible
Xi, reducing the problem introduces two additional constraints: an individual
feasibility constraint, (IF ), and an ex-post implementability constraint, (EPI).
The first constraint states that each player cannot get more than the whole good
in case of settlement. The second constraint guarantees that the total amount of
value distributed to a given type-profile does not exceed the total probability of
any of the types within that profile occurring.
Step 2: Backing out Expected Settlement Shares. In the second step, we
make use of the fact that we can assume without loss of generality that both
the high-cost types’ incentive compatibility constraints and the low-cost types’
participation constraints are binding. The latter follows naturally from the values
of vetoing, that is the fact that low-cost types need to be compensated to take
part in ADR. Binding incentive compatibility for high-cost types follows from their
low expected payoff in litigation: it provides an incentive to mimic low-cost types
to get their settlement value. The binding constraints allow us to eliminate all
settlement values, as they can be expressed in terms of breakdown valuations.
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Step 3: From Breakdown Probabilities to Breakdown Beliefs. This step
uses that breakdown beliefs are homogeneous of degree 0 with respect to the set
of breakdown probabilities, G by Bayes’ rule. Thus, the set of breakdown beliefs
defines the set of breakdown probabilities up to a constant. We choose this constant
to be γ(l, l) such that all other breakdown probabilities are defined relative to
γ(l, l). This allows us to eliminate all breakdown probabilities but γ(l, l), and
replace them by breakdown beliefs.
Step 4: Eliminate γ(l, l) via expected feasibility. The final step is to elim-
inate γ(l, l). We use the fact an ex-ante feasible settlement rule is a necessary
condition for individual feasibility, (IF ). All expected breakdown probabilities
increase linearly in γ(l, l) by Step 3. Therefore, the mediator wants to set γ(l, l)
as low as possible, as long as the problem remains feasible in expectation. This
introduces an equality constraints γ(l, l) = γ∗(P ) by which we replace γ(l, l). The
additional constraint γ∗ ≤ 1 ensures that γ(l, l) remains a probability. This con-
cludes the rewriting of the problem.
2.4.4 Optimal ADR-Mechanism
Having established the reduced problem (P1’), which is a problem of three choice
variables only, we can now state the main result:
Theorem 1. Suppose Assumption 1 holds. Then, any optimal mediation protocol
has the following properties:
• on-path breakdown beliefs are type-independent, that is for any i it holds that
pi(l|l) = pi(l|h) =: ρi,
• on-path breakdown beliefs are asymmetric, that is ρi 6= ρ−i,
• both player’s on-path breakdown belief is weakly larger than the prior, that is
ρi ≥ p ∀i,
• all type profiles {k1, k2} have a breakdown probability that is strictly positive.
Theorem 1 states that, independent of the primitives, any optimal protocol
induces an information structure that is report-independent. In addition, although
32
2.4 Analysis
parties start perfectly symmetric, the mediation protocol should always be set up
asymmetrically. At the same time the ADR protocol ensures that both parties
appear to be at least as strong after mediation breakdown as they appeared before
mediation. Therefore, the fraction of low-cost types is at least as high in a post-
mediation contest as before the start of the game. Finally, the mediator needs to
ensure that in principle any type profile can lead to a breakdown of mediation to
get the above mentioned features.
To build intuition we organize the remainder of the section as follows. We
first discuss the optimal solution to (P1’) ignoring (IC li) and γ∗(P ). We then
reintroduce (IC li) and later γ∗(P ) ≤ 1. Finally, we verify that the solution is
implementable in the sense of Border (2007).
Recall that the assumption of player 1 appearing weakly stronger in the contest
implies the following expected litigation utilities of the high-types: U2(h|h) = 0
and U1(h|h) ≥ 0 with strict inequality whenever player 1 appears strictly stronger.
Further, litigation utilities, Ui(k|m), depend on breakdown beliefs and all expected
breakdown probabilities, γi(m), are linear in γ(l, l). In addition, the following
technical lemma is useful to keep in mind. It states that whenever it is more likely
for player 2 to meet 1l after a report of l, the same is true for player 1 and vice
versa.
Lemma 4. p1(l|l) > p1(l|h)⇔ p2(l|l) > p2(l|h) if pi(l|m) ∈ (0, 1).
Part 1: Neglecting (IC li) and γ∗(P ) ≤ 1. First, we want to argue that be-
liefs are type-independent. The basic idea is straight-forward: if the mechanism
does not allow parties to influence the opponent’s type distribution in case of
breakdown, then there is no incentive for a false report. Similar to a second price
auction, where expected payments are independent of the type report, the medi-
ator ensures that the type distribution the player faces, and by that her contest
utility, is independent of her type report.
Proposition 1 states a problem with the three breakdown beliefs, p1(l|l), p2(l|l),
p1(l|h) as choice variables. Given Lemma 4 we can fix p2(l|l) and p1(l|h) for the
upcoming argument and concentrate on p1(l|l) without loss of generality.
As the mediator cannot achieve full settlement by the participation constraint
of the low-cost types and the high-cost types’ desire to mimic them, she needs to
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strategically fail mediation to screen types. High-cost types need to be present
in the contest to guarantee some utility for the low-cost player and to match her
participation constraint. However, the high-cost players should have an incentive
to avoid the contest to report truthfully. Thus, the probability of a high-cost player
meeting another high-cost player after mediation breakdown, pi(h|h), should be
smaller than the ex-ante probability of a high-cost type, 1 − p. Without a belief
dependent outside option this effect typically drives pi(l|h) to 1 as in e.g. Hörner,
Morelli, and Squintani (2015).
There is, however, a second, non-standard effect, changing utilities after break-
down. If breakdown is informative, i.e. pi(l|l) 6= pi(l|h), the expected utility in the
deviation contest might differ from the expected utility in the on-path contest.
Recall from Lemmas 2 and 3 that Ui(h|l) > Ui(h|h) whenever it is more likely
to meet a low-cost type under truth-telling than under deviation, that is whenever
pi(h|h) < pi(h|l)⇔ p1(l|l) < p1(l|h),
due to the information advantage effect in the contest. This advantage vanishes
as p1(l|l) → p1(l|h). If p1(l|l) increases further, player 2 receives no utility in the
contest and therefore also no marginal breakdown utility from lying. Player 1,
on the other hand, actually starts gaining utility again, as an intimidation effect
becomes dominant. Player 1 appears to be much stronger in expectation than
player 2. Thus, player 2 invests less into the contest which increases player 1’s
utility. Therefore, both deviation utilities have a minimum at type-independent
beliefs.
Deviation utilities have a kink at type-independent beliefs by the all-pay contest
assumption. The kink is a direct consequence of Lemma 3 as deviating high-cost
players are only indifferent for type-independent beliefs. High-cost types score at
the upper end of their on-path equilibrium strategy set for lower values of p1(l|l)
and at the lower end for higher values of p1(l|l). Hence, for type-independent
beliefs their utilities are non-differentiable and obtain a minimum. The left panel
of Figure 2.3 plots the deviation utilities as a function of p1(l|l).
If we combine the effects on breakdown probabilities γi(m) and contest utilities,
we find that the minimum at type-independent beliefs prevails. The result can
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Expected Utility in Deviation Contest
p1(l|l)
U
0
1p2(l|l) p1(l|h)
U1(h|l)
U2(h|l)
U1(h|h)
Marginal Breakdown Value of Lying
p1(l|l)
U
0
1p2(l|l) p1(l|h)
γ1(l)U1(h|l)− γ1(h)U1(h|h)
γ2(l)U2(h|l)− γ2(h)U2(h|h)
Figure 2.3: The left panel depicts the high-types deviation utilities as a function of p1(l|l).
The right panel depicts the marginal breakdown-value of lying. Red is for
player 1, blue player 3. The gray line in the right panel is the on-path utility
of the high-cost type of player 1.
best be seen if we consider the marginal breakdown-value of lying. This break-
down value is the right-hand side of the following representation of the high-types
incentive constraint,(IChi ),
zi(h)− zi(l) = γi(l)Ui(h|l)− γi(h)Ui(h|h).
The left hand side can be interpreted as the marginal settlement value of truth-
telling which matches the right hand side being the marginal breakdown value of
lying. The right panel of Figure 2.3 displays the marginal breakdown value of lying
and illustrates how the minimum property prevails and type-independent beliefs
are optimal. We can thus simplify notation and define ρi to be the probability
that player i is the low-type post-mediation.
Having established that beliefs are type-independent we can simplify the analysis
using a corollary to the derivation of the breakdown beliefs.14
Corollary 2. If beliefs are type independent, breakdown probabilities can be sim-
plified to
γi(l) =
p
ρ−i
γ(l, l), γi(h) =
(1− ρi)
(1− p)
p
ρi
γi(l), P r(Γ) =
p2
ρ1ρ2
γ(l, l).
14To be precise, Corollary 2 is a corollary to Lemma 11 which is stated in Section 2.A.
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Moreover, Corollary 1 allows us to write contest utilities with type-independent
beliefs as
Ui(l|m) = (1− ρ2)κ− 1
κ
, U1(h|m) = (ρ1 − ρ2)κ− 1
κ
. (2.2)
These expressions are useful in the argument for asymmetry of the optimal mech-
anism which we turn to next. We discuss the general argument non-formally to
provide a good understanding of the qualitative results. A more detailed and
formal analysis is in Section 2.B.
The main argument for asymmetry lies in the structure of a contest. A symmet-
ric contest is expected to be tight: parties expect to be matched with an opponent
of similar strength and the marginal value of investment is high. By contrast, an
asymmetric contest appears to be less tight, and the marginal value of investment
is lower for both parties. This imposes an externality, especially for the high-cost
type of the ex-ante stronger player. Her opponent’s high-cost type is going to
increase her investment but remains at a utility of 0 as she is the weakest of all
player-types. Thus, the stronger player’s h-type can reduce the investment and
still has a reasonable chance to win the contest as the opponent believes she likely
faces a low-cost type. This effect can be seen by inspecting equations (2.2). If we
start in a symmetric setting and unilaterally increase the belief put on player 1,
then l-types would not benefit in terms of expected utilities and neither would 2h.
However, player 1h actually achieves a positive utility in such a case which she
would not under symmetry.
Although only concerned about the probability of contest, the optimal ADR-
mechanism uses this property of the underlying game to increase the breakdown
utility of one of the high-cost types. This allows the mediator to reduce the
settlement value that needs to be paid to this player which in turn increases the
available resource for settlement. There is, however, a second effect that limits the
extent to which the mediator can use this feature: as breakdown probabilities are
derived in their relative relation to γ(l, l) in problem (P1′), an increase in ρ1 is
effectively a decrease of the breakdown probability of high-cost types of player 1,
γ(h, l) and γ(h, h). This implies, in turn, a decrease in the breakdown probability
for player 2l, γ2(l), according to Corollary 2. While such a decrease has a positive
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effect on the objective, Pr(Γ), it also leads to a decrease in player 2’s breakdown
utility. Thus, the mediator would need to increase player 2’s settlement utility.
Making the contest less resource intensive is therefore only optimal up to a certain
point. This point balances the additional resources needed to finance the loss for
player 2l and the gain from making the contest less resource-intensive. A similar
argument is true for the other player-types.
To see the aggregate effect consider the expected settlement share paid to
player i, zi. The expected settlement share is a convex combination of the set-
tlement share paid to the l-type to ensure participation and the settlement share
paid to the h-type to ensure incentive compatibility. The shares are given by
z2 = V (l)− 1− ρ2
ρ1
κ− 1
κ
pγ(l, l)
z1 = V (l)− 1− ρ1
ρ2
κ− 1
κ
pγ(l, l)︸ ︷︷ ︸
symmetric part
+ ( p
ρ1
− p
ρ2
)κ− 1
κ
pγ(l, l)κ.︸ ︷︷ ︸
asymmetric part
The first part in z1 is present in the symmetric case, too, while the second vanishes.
Without the second part z1 would be the anti-symmetric version of z2 which would
lead to endogenous symmetry. However, the second part provides a clear incentive
for asymmetry driven by U1(h|h).15 An increase in ρ2 requires more resources to
compensate the players than an increase in ρ1. Thus, the optimal choice involves
ρ1 > ρ2 , that is player 1 appears relatively stronger in the contest. Finally, notice
that the asymmetric part is always negative and thus, some asymmetry always
saves resources. The next lemma states the findings up to this point.
Lemma 5. Ignoring (IC li), (IF ), (EPI) and γ(l, l) ≤ 1, and assuming that
ρ1 ≥ ρ2, the unconstrained optimum of (P1’) is achieved at
ρ∗1 =
1 + p
2 ρ
∗
2 =
1− p
2 .
Moreover, the optimal breakdown belief ρ∗i is independent of the opponents break-
down belief ρ−i.
15Notice that this part can also be written as −Pr(Γ)U(h|h).
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Part 2: Reintroducing (IC li). Next, we reintroduce the low-cost type’s incen-
tive compatibility constraint, (IC li). For type-independent beliefs and with (IChi )
satisfied this boils down to
(
γi(l)− γi(h)
)
Ui(h|h) ≤
(
γi(l)− γi(h)
)
U(l|l). (2.3)
A sufficient condition for this to hold is γi(l) ≥ γi(h), as U(l|l) ≥ Ui(h|h) by
construction. For player 2 it is also necessary since U2(h|h) = 0. Using Corollary 2,
γi(l) ≥ γi(h) is equivalent to ρ2 ≥ p. Intuitively the reasoning is straightforward:
suppose ρ2 ≤ p. The likelihood of breakdown must be larger when reporting to be
an h type. By (ICh2 ), the value of settlement, z2(l) = z2(h), is independent of the
report and the low-cost type prefers to be sent to contest more often and would
misreport. Thus, incentive compatibility requires ρ2 ≥ p.
Taking into account the results from Lemma 5, this means that (IC li) is violated
whenever (1−p)/2 < p which holds if and only if p > 1/3. Note further that ρ∗1 > p
for all p and thus, (IC l1) never binds. As the optimal ρi does not depend on ρ−i,
we get the following lemma.
Lemma 6. Ignoring (EPI) and γ∗(P ) ≤ 1, and assuming that ρ1 ≥ ρ2, (IC li)
binds for player 2 if and only if p ≥ 1/3. In this case the constrained optimum is
achieved at
• ρ∗1 = 1+p2
• ρ∗2 = p.
Lemma 6 states that the probability of breakdown for low-types is larger than
the probability of breakdown for high-types, i.e. γi(l) ≥ γi(h). In such a case one
individual feasibility, (EPI), which is one of the two constraints coming from the
reduced form, is always satisfied. Section 2.C provides details on this.
Part 3: Full model. So far we have ignored that the scaling parameter γ∗ is in
fact always equal to the probability of breakdown for two low-cost types, γ(l, l), in
the original problem. Thus, we need to ensure that γ∗ ∈ [0, 1] to guarantee that
γ(l, l) remains a probability.
Whenever the constraint γ∗(P ) binds, (IC li) must hold, too. To see this recall
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γi(l) =
p
ρ−i
γ(l, l).
To ensure γi(l) ∈ [0, 1] even if γ(l, l) = 1 we need p ≤ ρ−i. Such a high post-
breakdown belief ensures incentive compatibility by Lemma 6. If the ex-ante
probability of low-cost types is high enough for (IC li) to bind, the scaling parameter
γ∗(P ) < 1. Thus, γ∗ ≤ 1 does not change the results of Lemma 6. Next, recall
that
γ∗(P ) = ν
Q(P )−R(P ) ,
such that γ∗ is increasing in ν for any P . The value of ν, in turn, is large for small
p and large κ. Therefore, the solution computed in Lemma 5 violates γ∗ ≤ 1 if
cost difference between low-cost and high-cost types are high, or the probability
to have high-cost is small.
To compensate this, the mediator can decrease either ρi. As in the discussion
of Lemma 5 such an operation increases the resources available for distribution in
settlements and allows to reduce γ∗.
Given small values of the prior, p, the optimal breakdown belief ρi without con-
sidering the γ∗-constraint is strictly larger than p, and thus the mediator reduces
both beliefs, ρ1 and ρ2, simultaneously up to the point at which one equals the
prior, i.e. ρ2 = p. If this does not suffice to make γ(l, l) feasible, the mediator
decreases the belief on player 1, ρ1, further until γ∗(P ) = 1. It turns out that the
remaining Border-constraint, (EPI), holds at any such point and ex-post imple-
mentation is thus possible. Combining all results allows us to make a statement
about any set of parameters, κ and p. The characterization is given in the next
lemma which concludes the argument for Theorem 1.
Lemma 7. Consider without loss of generality only ρ1 ≥ ρ2. Fix some κ such that
assumption 1 holds. Then there are three cutoff values p′, p′′ and p′′′ such that the
optimum of the minimization problem is either 0 or satisfies
• (IC l2) and therefore ρ2 = p with equality only if p /∈ (p′, p′′′),
• γ(l, l) ≤ 1 with equality only if p ≤ p′′,
• 2p < ρ1 ≤ (1 + p)/2 where the last holds with equality only if p ≥ p′′.
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The cutoffs are given by:
p′ = 16(κ− 1)
(
κ− 8 +
√
28− 4κ+ κ2
)
,
p′′ = 12 + 3κ
(
2(κ− 1)−
√
8− 4κ+ κ2
)
,
p′′′ = 13 .
The cutoffs describe the main characteristic of the optimum. For low p the me-
diator offers low-cost types a litigation utility post breakdown which is smaller
than their value of vetoing, i.e. ρ2 > p. To do this l-types need a high enough
settlement share which the mediator finances by reducing the overall breakdown
probability by increasing γ∗. However, for very low p not even γ∗ = 1 suffices
as V (l) is too high. To account for the constraint, the mediator decreases both
breakdown probabilities, ρ2 and ρ1. However, ρ2 cannot fall below p as this would
violate both (IC l2) and γi(k) ≤ 1. Thus, for very low p, the mediator chooses
ρ2 = p and adjusts ρ1 accordingly.
As the prior p increases, the solution ρ2 increases, too, and ρ2 ≥ p does not bind
anymore. The resource constraint, γ∗ ≤ 1, however, still does. If p is larger than
p′′, the solution of Lemma 5 can be implemented directly. For p > 1/3, on the
other hand, low-cost types of player 2 have an incentive to misreport given the
protocol from Lemma 5 which means that (IC l2) binds and the belief on player 2
is set to the prior, ρ2 = p. The left panel of Figure 2.4 illustrates the findings. The
dashed line plots the optimal protocol according to Lemma 5 whereas the solid
line is the full model.
2.5 Discussion of the Results
Comparative Statics. Figure 2.4 depicts the probability of litigation under the
optimal mechanism both as a function of the prior, p (left panel), and as a function
of the distance between low and high cost, κ (right panel). The different colors
indicate the different regimes as discussed in Lemma 7. Red and blue (for p < p′′)
denote the areas in which the resource constraint, γ∗ ≤ 1, binds; green (to the right
of p′′′) is the area in which 2l’s incentive constraint binds and black is the area
40
2.5 Discussion of the Results
Figure 2.4: Ex-ante probability of the contest as a function of p (left panel) and κ (right
panel). The dashed line describes the situation of the unconstraint problem
(P1′) as in Lemma 5. The green solid line corresponds to Lemma 6. All
solid lines together display the result of Lemma 7.
in which (P1′) is solved “unconditionally” as in Lemma 5. p0 indicates the point
at which Assumption 1 starts to fail and the mediator achieves full settlement for
p > p0. For comparison, the dotted line depicts the solution ignoring (IC li) and
γ∗ ≤ 1.
As expected, the probability of litigation increases in the distance between high-
costs and low-costs. As the low-cost type’s cost advantage increases, it becomes
more expensive to compensate her for participation and thus the mediator initi-
ates breakdown more often. The relationship with respect to the prior is non-
monotone. When chances to meet a low-cost type are small, litigation can effec-
tively be avoided. Although low cost types require a large compensation for a
settlement, the mediator can grant this as she needs to pay this compensation sel-
dom. As the ex-ante probability of low-cost types increases the mediator must pay
the compensation more often, but at the same time the amount decreases. The
result is an inverse U-shaped relationship between the prior and the probability of
litigation.
In addition, comparative statics show that ADR is a very effective tool. In our
setup the mediator can settle the majority of the cases for any set of parameters,
p and κ. The next proposition summarizes these findings.
Proposition 2. Under the optimal mediation protocol, the ex-ante probability of
breakdown is never greater than 1/2. Moreover, the probability of breakdown is
increasing and concave in κ while it takes the form of an inverse U-shape in p.
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(a) Breakdown Probab. by Type (b) Expeceted Share by Type (c) Settlement Valuation by Type
Figure 2.5: (a) Expected Contest Probability, (b) Expected Share conditional on settle-
ment taking place, and (c) Valuation of Settlement by player-type as a func-
tion of the ex-ante probability of being a low-cost type. Solid lines depict
low-cost types, dashed lines depict high-cost types. Dark-red is player 1 and
light-blue is player 2. The dotted gray line in (b) is the value of vetoing for
low-cost type players. In (c), player 2h has the same settlement value as 2l
by incentive compatibility.
Next, we want to discuss how the asymmetry translates to the different outcome
variables. A first result is straightforward and a direct consequence of Theorem 1:
low cost types experience breakdown more often than high-cost types. Moreover,
player 1l is sent to court more often than player 2l as the belief on player 1 is larger
than on player 2. Since the participation constraint binds, both low-cost type
players experience the same utility in expectations. However, the contest utility
is the same for both low-cost types and smaller than the value of vetoing, V (l),
as low-cost types are more likely after breakdown than in the initial population.
Thus, player 2l, who is sent to court less often, receives a smaller expected share
than player 1l. For high-cost types the intuition is the other way around. Player
2h, who experiences no utility in contest post-mediation, is compensated with a
larger amount than 1h. The next proposition states that this is the case for all
parameter values. Thus, player 1, who is stronger in the contest, expects a less
favorable settlement contract than player 2 who, in turn, faces a more difficult
task to win the litigation process after breakdown.
Proposition 3. Both the pre-mediation probability of being sent to court during
mediation and the expected share conditional on settlement are largest for player 1l
and smallest for player 1h.
Figure 2.5 illustrates the results of Proposition 3 as a function of the prior
distribution. The left panel (a) describes breakdown utilities, the middle panel (b)
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expected shares conditional on settlement, xi(m) ≡ zi(m)/(1 − γi(m)), and the
right panel (c) the settlement valuation. Dark-red lines are for player 1 and light-
blue lines for player 2. Dashed lines indicate high-cost types, solid lines indicate
low-cost types. The linear, gray, dotted line in panel (b) denotes the value of
vetoing for the l-type, V (l).
If the probability of low-cost types is very small, the mediator sends one of
the two low-cost types to litigation with certainty to ensure that the resource
constraint holds. As the probability of low-cost players increases, the pressure
from the resource constraint relaxes as compensation for low-cost types declines.
The mediator thus wishes to implement a less asymmetric solution. As p increases
further, the mediator can in fact reduce the probability of litigation for all types up
to the point where Assumption 1 seizes to hold and the problem therefore becomes
trivial.
Another feature of our model is that we are able to evaluate the consequences
of the mediation decision on the litigation process. As litigation in our model is
a strategic game with actions that depend both on first and second order beliefs,
we should not expect players to play the same strategies as in litigation without
a preceding mediation stage. Indeed the mediation attempt changes the belief
structure of the opposing parties in two ways: (1) it increases the likelihood for
both players to meet a low-cost type in court and (2) it introduces an asymmetry
that makes player 1 more likely to be the low-cost type than player 2.
The first effect clearly makes competition more intense as litigants are afraid
that the opponent can and will produce good evidence. The second effect works in
the other direction, since the high-cost type of player 2 has little chance of winning
in court. She refuses to compete at all from time to time and gives away the good
for free. The second effect exceeds the first, if player 2’s likelihood of being the
low type is the same as the prior, that is if ρ2 = p or p 6= (p′, p′′′). In such a case
the incentive to downsize investment in evidence due to the asymmetry between
players always supersedes the incentive to increase investment in evidence due to
the higher probability of low-cost types and we would see lower legal expenditure
post-mediation.
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Proposition 4. Assume parameters are such that p < p′ or p > p′′′. Then,
the sum of expected legal expenditures after breakdown never exceeds the sum of
expected legal expenditures if mediation did not exist.
Outside this range no clear statement can be made other than that for any κ
there exists a possibly empty interval (pˆ, pˇ), with pˆ ≥ p′ and pˇ ≤ p′′′. Only in this
interval, the expected legal expenditure after breakdown is higher than without
mediation.
2.6 Extensions
Pre-trial Bargaining. The traditional law and economics literature focuses
mainly on bilateral settlement negotiations. Typically, these bargains are modeled
as a simple take-it-or-leave it bargaining game (Schweizer, 1989; Shavell, 1995;
Posner, 1996). For illustration assume the following bargaining procedure close to
Schweizer (1989): one player (Sender) makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the other
player (Receiver) who decides whether to accept or reject the offer. Upon rejection
both players update their beliefs and proceed to litigation.
To compare our results, notice first that by the revelation principle and Lemma 8,
the equilibrium rejection channel is absent. Pre-trial negotiations thus cannot out-
perform the result of the mechanism.
As in the mediation mechanism, off-path beliefs play a crucial role in the bar-
gaining game. The actions in the contest are based on the belief structure as
discussed above.
The solution concept of perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium allows to freely choose
beliefs put on the deviator at the first node of deviation, but requires Bayes’
rule thereafter. Any bargaining equilibrium that performs as well as the media-
tion mechanism replicates outcome utilities of the mechanism and is furthermore
equipped with a set of off-path beliefs that deter any deviation by any player. It
turns out that no off-path belief exists such that the bargaining can replicate the
mediator’s solution as long as Assumption 1 holds.
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Proposition 5. Independent of the off-path belief structure, take-it-or-leave-it bar-
gaining leads to a strictly higher probability of litigation than the optimal mediation
mechanism provided that Assumption 1 holds.
The intuition behind the result is that a low-cost Sender could always profitably
deviate by proposing an arbitrarily small share  to Receiver. Then, given any
belief Receiver holds after observing this deviation, she either accepts the share
which gives Sender a higher utility than in the optimal mechanism, or rejects the
share if she thinks Sender is weak. Assuming a weak Sender, however, induces her
to score softer than in the litigation game under priors. By strategic complemen-
tarity, Sender scores softer as well. But then, Sender expects a higher utility as
winning is less costly. Thus, it is not optimal for a low-cost Sender to reproduce the
outcome of the optimal mechanism: the incentive to deviate from the mechanism
leads to a higher breakdown probability in expectations.
This shows the importance of a third-party who manages the information flow.
With direct bargaining, Receiver always interprets Sender’s proposal as a signal
and Sender cannot commit to abstain from signaling via her proposal. A neutral
third-party can overcome this adverse selection problem and thus improves upon
bilateral negotiations.
Asymmetric Players. Asymmetric players do not change any of the results
obtained. The reason is that the mediator would always treat the ex-ante stronger
player as “player 2”, i.e. the player that gets the better settlement conditions. The
ex-ante weaker player accepts a small settlement share, since she fears a strong
opponent in litigation. The weaker player, however, is compensated for the small
share with a favorable contest after breakdown. Thus, while the ex-ante weaker
player is strong post-breakdown, she agrees to settlement-contracts that favor her
opponent. With such a protocol the mediator is still able to solve the majority of
the cases. A key result of our analysis is, however, that we get asymmetric results
even with symmetric players.
Different forms of commitment. So far we have assumed that both players can
fully commit to the proposed mediation protocol. In particular, once the mech-
anism is accepted, parties commit to only go back to litigation if the mediator
tells them. In reality this is not always the case. Many jurisdictions demand that
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parties can unilaterally opt-out of ADR at any point to return to litigation. We dis-
cuss two stages at which parties can unilaterally decide to break down ADR. The
first is a situation in which they can leave after the mechanism has told players’
their expected share conditional on settlement. We call this commitment struc-
ture post-ADR individual rationality (PAIR). The second commitment structure
is that parties can veto the mechanism after they have learned their realized share
conditional on settlement. We call this ex-post individual rationality (EPIR).
The mediation protocol developed in Section 2.4 does not directly carry over to
PAIR and EPIR. In fact, given these commitment schemes, the mediator profits
from the ability to communicate to parties even after ADR breaks down. If this
is the case, the mediator can give parties non-binding recommendations for the
play of the contest and by that restore the outcome under full-commitment. The
modified game thus follows a slightly enhanced timeline:
1. the mediator commits to X and recommendation structure Σ; players learn
their types,
2. players send a message mi to the mediator,
3. the mediator privately announces a share xi according to X to each player i,
4. players accept/reject the share,
5. players receive a recommendation σi by the mediator,
6. if either of the players rejected her offer, the contest is played under updated
beliefs.
Note that since the mediator first observes the behavior of the players with respect
to the announced share she has the ability to detect a deviation in this stage (other
than in the reporting stage). To restore the result of Section 2.4 the mediator uses
the following slightly more sophisticated mechanism(s).
To find the optimal PAIR mechanism, we need to define a convex combination of
the protocol derived in Section 2.4 and its mirror image switching roles of player 1
and 2. Define Xˆλ, a mediation protocol such that Xi applies with probability λ
and X−i with probability (1− λ). Xi denotes a mediation protocol similar to the
one discussed in Theorem 1. When mediation is successful, player i is treated as
“player 1”. To trigger litigation in this protocol, the mediator offers a share of 0
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to at least one of the players. This share is going to be rejected such that parties
move to the litigation game.
To ensure EPIR we need that, in addition, the mediator sends both parties to
contest irrespective of their reports with probability  > 0. Thus, we define Xˆ λ to
be a mediation protocol such that with probability  players are send to court and
with probability (1− ) the mediator executes Xˆλ. This is sufficient to ensure the
following two results.
Proposition 6. There exists a signal Σ, such that an incentive compatible PAIR
mechanism (Xˆ1/2,Σ) has the same breakdown probability Pr(Γ) as the mechanism
X under interim individual rationality.
Proposition 7. For any δ > 0, there exists a signal Σ and an  > 0, such that an
incentive compatible EPIR mechanism (Xˆ 1/2,Σ) achieves a breakdown probability
Pr(Γ) < Pr(Γ) − δ, where Pr(Γ) is the optimal breakdown probability of the
mechanism X under interim individual rationality.
To gain intuition observe the following. First, with both PAIR and EPIR the
mediator can trigger the play of a contest by offering at least one party an un-
acceptable share as rejection leads to contest. Second, the mediator achieves the
result by obfuscating two issues: the role of the player and the relevance of her
decision.
The latter derives from the possibility that the mediator wants to trigger contest
play and has offered the player’s opponent an unacceptable share. As both do not
know which litigant takes the role of player 1, and who is offered the trigger share
0, she cannot learn much from her own offer. As the conditional distribution post-
breakdown is on-path revealed via the signal σ, obfuscation is only payoff relevant
in deviation games. Deviation is, however, only detected by the mediator, not by
the non-deviator. Thus, the mediator can react to deviation by sending the the
deviator a signal of a strong non-deviator to punish her. This suffices to get the
same result as under full-commitment.
In the case of EPIR the mediator is more constrained as revealing the ex-post
share xi(k1, k2) to player i allows for more inference by the player. For some
parameter values it might be the case that certain constellations do not settle
on-path. Thus, the mediator might have a degenerate belief after some proposed
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realized shares which makes the procedure of PAIR impossible. The mediator
can use another option instead, though. She can commit to initiate breakdown
for any type-profile with a small probability  and to send a fully informative
signal thereafter. In such a case both parties can end up with 0 expected utility
after breakdown. If the mediator commits to signal this event to the non-deviator
after any deviation, the non-deviator will always invest an amount large enough to
effectively punish the deviator. As →0 the mechanism converges to Xˆλ and the
resulting probability of breakdown is arbitrarily close to that of the mechanism
described in Theorem 1.
Nonetheless, allowing the types to go back to court after all uncertainty has
unraveled would naturally lead to a different result. Typically however, once a
detailed settlement agreement has been signed by both parties, it is hard to imagine
a legal system that allows parties to overturn this contract simply because they
have learned that they might have a good chance to beat the opponent.
2.7 Conclusion
In this paper we characterize optimal Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) in
the shadow of the court. We show that optimal ADR is always asymmetric and
offers one player an advantage after breakdown and the other one an advantage
under settlement. We show that the optimal information structure post-ADR is
completely independent of the players’ report, but conditions only on their identity.
Such a mechanism prevents players from misreporting to achieve an informational
advantage.
We find that a litigation-minimizing ADR-protocol is highly effective and solves
the majority of cases. The effectiveness indicates that mandatory ADR should
be considered by all courts to reduce the prevalent stress on judges and court’s
backlog of cases. In addition, the asymmetry of the optimal mechanism implies
that regulators should act carefully when defining their notion of fairness for medi-
ation protocols. The same holds true for discretionary policies: mediators should
always have the possibility to talk to the disputants in private as this eliminates
commitment problems on the disputants side. Finally, we show that mediators
should not be forced to disclose all their information in the event of breakdown.
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Trust in the mediator’s discretion is an important driving force of the success of a
mechanism.
More broadly, we show that the most important aspect of the optimal ADR-
protocol is the management of the information structure in litigation post-break-
down. The optimal protocol imposes type-independent beliefs to minimize the
potential gain a deviator can earn in the litigation game following a misreport.
In addition, the protocol is asymmetric to reduce resource intensity in case of
breakdown.
We demonstrate that the standard assumption of fixed, type-dependent outside
options in mechanism design is not innocuous when the following two conditions
are satisfied: (1) the mechanism cannot replace the underlying default game com-
pletely and (2) the actions chosen in the underlying game depend on player’s
beliefs. We show that the behavior of the players in the mechanism and those in
the underlying game are interconnected. For the case of contests, we show that
players invest less resources post-breakdown for extreme type distributions com-
pared to a situation in which no resolution mechanism is present. For intermediate
type-distributions, however, the post-mediation contest can also be more resource
intensive.
Not claiming that the actual ADR-mechanisms we observe in reality are opti-
mal, we want to note that our findings are in line with some observations on ADR.
Its success rates are beyond 50% across cases and jurisdictions and mediation is
considered to be informative when breaking down. In addition, one reason why me-
diation is perceived to be successful is its ability to not rely on publicly observable
actions of the mediator, but allowing for private settlement negotiations.
Our findings provide several interesting directions for future research. First of
all, the assumption that the mechanism designer has full-commitment could be
relaxed to allow for third-party renegotiation. Especially when mediators compete
for clients this seems reasonable. Further, extending the analysis to a setup of
more than two players and possibly correlated types might add several interesting
channels to the model. In addition, many conflicts evolve around a variety of
battlefields on different subjects or points in time. If types are correlated over time
this adds an additional signaling dimension which is interesting to analyze further.
Finally, although minimizing court appearances is optimal given the public good
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properties of the legal system, it is less clear in other contest situations whether
this is the most suitable objective. Although a richer model is needed to address
such issues properly, we are confident that the results of this papers provide a first
step towards analyzing these problems.
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2.A Details on Rewriting the Problem
Full Participation. Full participatio is a consequence of the fact that litigation
utility is convex in beliefs and Proposition 2 from Celik and Peters (2011).
Lemma 8. It is without loss of generality to assume full participation in the op-
timal mechanism.
Value of Vetoing. Any off-path belief structure that satisfies the intuitive crite-
rion leads to a player independent value Vi(k), which is
V (l) = (1− p)κ− 1
κ
, and V (h) = 0.
Given the constant outside option, the channels identified by Cramton and Palfrey
(1995) and Celik and Peters (2011) are not present in our model as off path beliefs
are less important.
Reduced Form Problem à la Border (2007). We reduce the problem by
replacing the settlement shares, Xi, by the settlement values, zi. For any given
matrix of breakdown probabilities, G, this reduction is possible if and only if
each settlement share is both individually feasible (condition (F ), below) and ex-
post implementable (condition (EPI), below). The following lemma states these
conditions. With some abuse of notation, let p(m) be the ex-ante probability that
player i is of type m, that is p(l) = p and p(h) = 1− p.
Lemma 9. For every message m ∈ {l, h}, let mc :=
{
k ∈ {l, h}|k 6= m
}
, and fix
some feasible G and zi ≥ 0 for every i. Then there exists an ex-post feasible Xi
that implements zi if and only if the following constraints are satisfied:
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• ∀{m,n} ∈ {h, l}2 :
p(m)zi(m) + p(n)z−i(n) ≤ (EPI)
1− Pr(Γ)−
(
1− γ(mc, nc)
)
p(mc)p(nc)
• ∀m ∈ {h, l} and i = 1, 2:
zi(m) ≤ 1− γi(m) (IF )
Moreover, if γi(l) ≥ γi(h) then zi(l) ≤ 1− γi(l) and (IC li) imply equation (IF ).
Note that a necessary condition for individual feasibility (IF ) is that it holds
in expectations, that is the weighted sum of settlement values cannot exceed the
probability of successful ADR,
∑
i∈{1,2}
∑
m∈{l,h}
p(m)zi(m) ≤ 1− Pr(Γ). (AF )
The High-Cost’s IC and the Low-Cost’s PC bind. Next, we eliminate all
settlement values with help of the following lemma stating that in the optimal
mechanism the high-cost type’s incentive constraint and the low-cost type’s par-
ticipation constraint bind for both players.
Lemma 10. It is without loss of generality to assume that (IChi ) and (PC li) hold
with equality in the optimal mechanism.
The result is a direct consequence of the different costs. High-cost types care
more about settlement than about breakdown. Thus, incentive compatibility re-
quires a large value of settlement, zi(h), for them. However, there is no reason for
the mediator to set zi(h) too high, as the h-type would never veto ADR. We can
express (IChi ) as
zi(h) + γi(h)Ui(h|h) ≥ zi(l) + γi(l)Ui(h|l). (IChi )
If this inequality is strict, the mediator can reduce the value of settlement, zi(h),
without affecting the breakdown probability Pr(Γ) or any of the other constraints.
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Similarily the mediator can reduce the value of settlement, zi(l), if l-types’
participation constraint is not binding, as any negative effect on l-types incentive
constraint (IC li) is of second order compared to the positive effect on h-types
incentive constraint, (IChi ). By readjusting the settlement value for h-types, zi(h),
incentive compatibility for both types can always be guaranteed. The l-types
participation constraint is
zi(l) + γi(l)Ui(l|l) ≥ V (l). (PC li)
Using (PC li), (IChi ) and Lemma 10 we can eliminate all settlement values, zi, and
express the result only in terms of breakdown valuations, γi(m)Ui(k|m).
Breakdown Probabilities and Beliefs. Breakdown beliefs pi(l|k) are a result
of breakdown probabilities. The belief that player 1 is type l, given 2 reported m
is
p1(l|m) = pγ(l,m)
pγ(l,m) + (1− p)γ(h,m) .
Observation 1. Any pi(l|m) is homogeneous of degree 0 in G.
Thus, any set of beliefs pi(k|m) induced by some G is induced by G′ = αG, too.
Lemma 11. Fix any feasible G with 1 ≥ γ(l, h), γ(h, l), γ(l, l) ≥ 0 and define
qi(m) :=
p
1− p
1− pi(l|m)
pi(l|m) .
Then the induced information structure P > 0 satisfies:
γ(h, l) = q1(l)γ(l, l) ≤ 1 γ(l, h) = q2(l)γ(l, l) ≤ 1; (C)
γ(h, h) = q2(h)q1(l)γ(l, l) ≤ 1 q2(h)q1(l) = q1(h)q2(l),
where the last equation ensures consistency with the prior. Conversely, for any
γ(l, l) ∈ (0, 1] and P > 0 satisfying (C) there exists a feasible G.
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The Fully Reduced Problem. By Lemma 11 all breakdown probabilities are
linear in γ(l, l). If we plug all breakdown probabilities into the aggregate feasibility
constraint, (AF ), we get an expression of the form
2V (l)− γ(l, l)Q(P )︸ ︷︷ ︸
LHS of (AF )
≤ 1− γ(l, l)R(P )︸ ︷︷ ︸
1−Pr(Γ)
, (2.4)
where γ(l, l)Q(P ) := ∑i∑m p(m)zi(m) − 2V (l). Assumption 1 implies Q(P ) ≥
R(P ) and we can reformulate
1 ≥ γ(l, l) ≥ ν
Q(P )−R(P ) =: γ
∗(P ), (AF ′)
with ν = 2V (l) − 1 independent of P . Reducing γ(l, l) reduces Pr(Γ). Thus,
constraint (AF ′) binds at the optimum, and γ(l, l) = γ∗(P ). Plugging into Pr(Γ),
we get
min
P
R(P )γ∗(P ) (P1’)
subject to the remaining constraints (IC li), (IF ), (EPI) and γ∗(P ) ≤ 1 and any
solution to (P1) is also a solution to (P1′).16
2.B Forces of Asymmetry
We first consider the optimal symmetric mechanism. Notice that the designer of a
symmetric mechanism has only one choice variable ρ˜ := ρ1 = ρ2. In a symmetric
mechanism, Corollary 1 holds and any subscripts can be dropped. In combination
with type-independent beliefs we get U(h|h) = U(h|l) = 0. By incentive compat-
ibility, (ICh), settlement values must thus be equal, i.e. z(l)=z(h)=z. Using the
participation constraint, (PC l), the settlement value z can be expressed as
z = V (l)− γ(l)U(l|l).
Ignoring any effect on U(l|l), an increase in ρ˜ increases the settlement-value the
mediator needs to offer. This effect is strengthened as ρ˜ decreases U(l|l). Next,
16Problem (P1’) is in fact equivalent to problem (P1) whenever P > 0. As every argument is
continuous in P this limitation only becomes relevant once (P1’) has no minimum.
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consider the total resources distributed
2z = 1− Pr(Γ). (AF )
As ρ˜ increases, breakdown decreases and the mediator can distribute more re-
sources in case of settlement.
Combining the two equations yields
2V (l)− 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
=ν
= 2γ(l)U(l|l)− Pr(Γ). (2.5)
Using Corollary 2 and (2.2) we can rewrite equation (2.5)
ν =γ(l)
(
(1− ρ˜)(κ− 1)
κ
− p
ρ˜
)
⇔ ν =2 γ(l)p
ρ˜︸ ︷︷ ︸
=Pr(Γ)
(
(1− ρ˜)ρ˜
p
(κ− 1)
κ
− 1
)
.
Solving for Pr(Γ) yields
Pr(Γ) = ν2
(
(1− ρ˜)ρ˜
p
(κ− 1)
κ
− 1
)−1
which is minimized for ρ˜ = 1/2. Thus, the optimal symmetric solution to (P1′) is
obtained for breakdown probability ρ˜ = 1/2.
A symmetric mechanism is, however, never optimal. This follows from the
differences in the resources needed to sustain a certain level of either ρi. First,
observe that despite any asymmetry, (ICh2 ) still requires that the settlement value
of the high type z2(h) = z2(l). As U2(h|h) = 0, the breakdown value is 0 and
expected settlement valuation of player 2 is
z2 := z2(l) = V (l)− γ2(l)U(l|l) = V (l)− (1− ρ2)
ρ1
(κ− 1)
κ
pγ(l, l).
The first equality comes from (PC l2) and second from the results of Corollary 2
and the equations in (2.2).
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For player 1, on the other hand the results change more substantially under
asymmetry. Player 1h’s incentive constraint is
z1(h) = z1(l) +
(
γ1(l)− γ1(h)
)
U1(h|h). (ICh1 )
As U1(h|h) 6= 0 the mediator pays an information rent to player 1 if γi(l) 6= γi(h).
Thus, the ex-ante expected valuation of player 1 under settlement is
pz1(l)+(1− p)z1(h) = z1(l)+(1− p)
(
γ1(l)− γ1(h)
)
U1(h|h)
= z1(l) + γ1(l)
(
1− p
ρ1
)
U1(h|h) (2.6)
where the first uses (ICh1 ) and the second uses Corollary 2 to simplify. Simplifying
this using (PC l1), (2.2), and Ui(·, ·) yields
z1 := V (l)−
(
(1− ρ1)
ρ2
)
κ− 1
κ
pγ(l, l)︸ ︷︷ ︸
symmetric part
+
(
p
ρ1
− p
ρ2
)
κ− 1
κ
pγ(l, l)︸ ︷︷ ︸
asymmetric part
.
While the symmetric part is always present, the asymmetric is only non-zero in
asymmetric cases. As ρ1 > ρ2 in such cases the asymmetric part is genereically
negative. Marginal effects on the second part cancel out with those on z2. As the
asymmetric part is additive separable in ρi, the optimum of ρi is independent of
the choice of ρ−i.
2.C Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. The proof is along the lines of Siegel (2014). However, as the proof is
instructive and our setup differs slightly, we spell it out here. We first show that
at least one type of one player has 0 expected utility. Second, we show that at most
one type has an atom at 0. Third, we constructively show that the equilibrium
exists and then show that it is indeed unique given (M). Then we calculate ∆ to
state Corollary 1.
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Step 1: One player has 0 expected utility and no atoms at positive
scores. We prove this by contradiction. Suppose that both players and both
types expect a utility larger 0. That means the smallest score s > 0 in the union
of the best-responses of all players wins the contest with positive probability as
otherwise it is no best response. As a result, the smallest score is an atom in the
strategy of at least one type of each player. But then, there exists an  in the
neighborhood of s such that the probability of winning increases with more than
∗κcl. Deviating to s+  is profitable for that type of player, and thus s cannot be
an atom in her strategy. Therefore, at least one player earns an expected utility
of 0 for sure. Note that this player may very well have an atom at 0 as there is no
need to win the good with positive probability for an atom at 0. However, if both
players had a type with an atom at 0 at least one of them can profitably deviate
to a positive neighborhood of 0 winning against the atom scoring opponent with
a probability that exceeds the cost of scoring. Thus, at most one player has an
atom at 0.
Step 2a: Construct the equilibrium. First, consider the following strategy
of player 2l: she uniformly mixes on (∆l,h,∆l,l] with density f2,l(t) = cl/p2(l, l).
Then, player 1l is indifferent between playing any point on s ∈ (∆l,h,∆l,l] as
U1(l, s) = F2(∆l,h) + p2(l|l)(s−∆l,h) cl
p2(l|l) − cls =
= F2(∆l,h)−∆l,hcl.
We want to construct strategies with constant density and non-overlapping strate-
gies, thus the length of the top interval L(t) is the solution to
L(t)f2,l(t) = 1.
To make player 2l indifferent as well, player 1l plays a similar strategy only flipping
the probabilities from p1 to p2. As we assumed p1(l|l) ≥ p2(l|l), the mass of player
1l is only fully exhausted on the top interval iff p1(l|l) = p2(l|l). If this is not
the case, player 1 has some mass left to place. She does so on the middle interval
(∆h,h,∆l,h]. For the same reasons as above, she assigns density f1,l(t) = cl/p1(l|h)
to this interval to make player 1h indifferent.
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The length of the medium interval can be calculated by acknowledging that
player 1l needs to place all mass available to her and not placed on the top interval
on this interval.
By a similar exercise we can find the length of the interval (0,∆h,h) and by this
the absolute values of all ∆.
Step 2b: Show that no (global) deviation is possible. What remains to be
shown is that any player that scoring on more than one interval is in fact indifferent
between those and that no global deviation is possible.
Note that the indifference across intervals follows from the intervals being con-
nected. Consider for example player 1l. From the above we know that
U1(l, s = ∆l,h) = U1(l, s = ∆l,l)
but also that
U1(l, s = ∆h,h) = U1(l, s = ∆l,h).
Thus, it must be the case that
U1(l, s = ∆h,h) = U1(l, s = ∆l,l).
The same holds true for player 2h. The two other player-type tuples place there
scores on a single interval only. Note that, since player 1h has positive mass only
on (0,∆h,h] it can in fact earn an expected utility greater 0 if and only if player
2h does not enter the auction with positive probability.
To exclude global deviation observe that player 2h would only deviate to any-
thing on the interval (∆l,h,∆l,l] if the probability of winning increases faster in the
top interval than in the middle interval, that is the density is smaller in the top
interval,
f1,l(m) =
cl
p1(l|l) ≥
κcl
p1(l|h) = f1,l(t),
which is ruled out by (M).
For 1h, the deviation could be made into the middle or the top interval if
κcl
p2(h|h) ≥
cl
p2(h|l) ,
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which again is ruled out by monotonicity. As player 1h prefers the bottom interval
to anything in the m she must prefer scoring at ∆l,l to ∆h,l. However as player 2h
does not prefer to score at ∆l,l it follows that ∆l,l > 1/κcl. Thus player 1h does
not want to deviate. Similar arguments hold for the second player, such that we
can conclude that global deviations are not beneficial.
Step 3: Uniqueness. For uniqueness observe first that there is only one mono-
tonic equilibrium, that is an equilibrium such that the lowest score of player i,
type l, is weakly above the highest score of player i, type h. This follows directly
from the equilibrium construction.
Second, we need to show that no non-monotonic equilibrium exists. We do so
by contradiction, that is suppose there exists a score shi > sli such that ski is in the
set of best responses for player i type k, BR(k). Then, it must hold that
Ui(h, s = shi ) ≥ Ui(h, s = sli)
⇔ ∑
k
pi(k|h)F−i,k(shi )− κclshi ≥
∑
k
pi(k|h)F−i,k(sli)− κclsli
⇔ ∑
k
pi(k|h)(F−i,k(shi )− F−i,k(sli)) ≥ κcl(shi − sli). (2.7)
Similarly, as sli is a best response for l it must hold that
∑
k
pi(k|l)(F−i,k(shi )− F−i,k(sli)) ≤ cl(shi − sli). (2.8)
But, as F−i,k(·) is always positive and pi(h|·) = 1 − pi(l|·), inequalities (2.7) and
(2.8) only hold if
pi(l|h)
κcl
∑
k
(F−i,k(shi )− F−i,h(sli)) ≥
pi(l|l)
cL
∑
k
(F−i,k(shi )− F−i,h(sli)).
As the sum is identical on both sides, this boils down to the inverse of (M), a
contradiction.
(Addendum) Step 4: Equilibrium expected utilities. The length of the top
interval, (∆l,h,∆l,l], is p2(l|l)/cl that of the bottom interval, (0,∆h,h), is p1(h|h)/κcl
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and that of the middle interval (∆h,h,∆l,h] is
p1(l|h)
κcl
(1− f1,l(t)
f2,l(t)
) = p1(l|h)
κcl
(1− p2(l|l)
p1(l|l)).
Putting the respective probability masses on the different intervals leaves player 2
with some mass µ ≥ 0. This is placed on scoring 0 and constitutes F2,h(0).
Notice that scoring ∆l,l wins the auction for sure at cost of ∆l,lcl for both players,
type l, and player 1 scoring (arbitrarily close) to 0 wins the auction with probability
F2,h(0) at almost no cost.
Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. First, consider player 2h. She earns an expected utility of 0 on-path. Post-
deviation she can always choose a score of 0 to secure this utility.
Second, consider player il. Independently of her report she can always choose
a score ∆l,l and win with probability 1. As this is also part of the best response
on-path and the probability is 1 in that case as well, she can only be better of by
choosing a score different than ∆l,l.
Finally consider player 1h after reporting to be type l. She holds belief p2(h|l)
while her opponent plays the equilibrium strategies. If she were to score 0, then
by our tie-braking assumption she would enjoy a utility at least as good as the
equilibrium utility if p2(h|l) ≥ p2(h|h). Thus, in those cases she is weakly better
of.
If, however, p2(h|l) < p2(h|h) then player 1 suffers whenever scoring against
an h-type compared to the on-path game as the probability of winning decreases
while costs stay the same. However, scoring against the low-cost type and at
the same time earning a higher expected utility than in the default game can, by
the constant density of player 2’s low-cost type on the support of her equilibrium
strategy, only mean scoring to the very top, that is ∆l,l which yields negative
utility to a high type by the construction of the equilibrium.
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Proof of Lemma 3
Proof. First, notice that player il benefits if and only if p−i(l|l) > p−i(l|h). The
if part follows directly from the density of the opposing player on the top interval
which is f−i,l(t) = cl/p−i(l|l). As p−i(l|h) is smaller than this, scoring at ∆l,h is
strictly preferred to ∆l,l, but ∆l,l yields the same result as the on-path game.
The only-if party follows as for p−i(l|l) = p−i(l|h) would induce type independent
beliefs and therefore the same result as the on-path game. For p−i(l|l) < p−i(l|h),
however, scoring at the top, i.e. ∆l,l is preferred leading to no changes in expected
utilities at all.
As p−i(l|l) < p−i(l|h) implies p−i(h|h) < p−i(h|l) we know that player 1, type
h is better off, as scoring 0 yields him already a higher payoff by p2(h|l)F2,h(0) >
p2(h|h)F2,h(0). Player 2 strictly prefers to score at ∆h,h compared to 0 as the
density of her opponent is given by f1,l(b) = cl/p1(h|h) which leads to a (strictly)
increasing utility on the bottom interval. Thus scoring at ∆h,h must yield strictly
positive utility.
The only setup in which neither party has a type that strictly profits from
deviating is that of type-independent beliefs.
Proof of Proposition 1 (together with lemmas 8 to 11)
The proof of the proposition is along the lines described in section 2.A.
Proof of Lemma 8
Proof. We show that the condition stated on the optimality of full participation
stated in Proposition 2 of Celik and Peters (2011) is satisfied. That is, given the
independent prior p, there is no Bayes’ plausible belief structure p˜ = (p, p) such
that the expected utility Ui(k, p˜, p) < Ui(k, p, p) for any type k. The condition is
a direct consequence of expected contest utilities under a type-independent prior
as defined in Corollary 1. For type independent priors utilities are in fact linear in
beliefs except for a kink at the point where utilities become flat. However, around
that point utilities are convex and Jensen’s inequality yields the desired result.
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Proof of Lemma 9
Proof. We apply theorem 3 of Border (2007) which says the following:
Border (2007), Theorem 3: The list P= (P1, ..., PN) of functions is
the reduced form of a general auction p= (p1, ....pn) if and only if for
every subset A ⊂ T of individual-type pairs (i, τ) we have
∑
(i,τ)∈A
Pi(τ)µ•(τ) ≤ ({t ∈ T : ∃(i, τ) ∈ A, ti = τ}).
An individual type pair in our setting is given by (m, i), in what follows we are going
to abuse notation slightly by treating p(m) such that p(l) = p and p(h) = 1 − p.
The general auction p in our setup is defined by a list
qi(m,n) := xi(m,n).
We want to implement p by the list P containing
Qi(m) := qi(m, l)µi(l|m) + qi(m,h)µi(h|m)
where
µi(n|m) := µ(m,n)
µ•i (m)
,
µ(m,n) := p(l)p(m)1− γ(m,n)1− Pr(Γ) ,
µ•i (m) := p(m)
1− γi(m)
1− Pr(Γ) .
Plugging in yields,
Qi(m) =
p(l)(1− γ(m, l))xi(m, l) + p(h)(1− γ(m,h))xi(m,h)
1− γi(m) = xi(m).
To state the conditions let in addition
mc :=
{
y ∈ {l, h}|y 6= m
}
.
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Applying the above quoted theorem of Border (2007) to this and reformulating
everything in terms of zi allows us to conclude that X can be implemented via
zi ≥ 0 if and only if the following conditions are satisfied:
• ∀{m,n} ∈ {h, l}:
p(m)zi(m) + p(n)z−i(n) ≤ (EPI)
1− Pr(Γ)− (1− γ(mc, nc))p(mc)p(nc)
• ∀m ∈ {h, l} and i = 1, 2:
zi(m) ≤ 1− γi(n) (IF )
• ∀i = 1, 2
zi(l)p(l) + zi(h)p(h) ≤ 1− Pr(Γ) (BC2)∑
i∈{1,2}
∑
k∈{l,k}
p(k)zi(k) ≤ 1− Pr(Γ) (AF )
• ∀{m,n} ∈ {h, l}2 and i = 1, 2:
∑
k∈{l,h}
pi(k)zi(k) + pz−i(n) ≤ 1− Pr(Γ). (BC4)
Note that in our setup equation (IF ) implies (BC2) and equation (AF ) which
implies (BC4). For the second claim, recall (IC li), that is
γi(h)Ui(h|l) + zi(h) ≤ γi(l)Ui(l|l) + zi(l).
Hence,
zi(h) ≤ γi(l)Ui(l|l)− γi(h)Ui(l|h) + zi(l) ≤ (γi(l)− γi(h))Ui(l|l) + zi(l), (2.9)
where the last equality follows from Lemma 2.
If γi(l) ≥ γi(h) and zi(l) ≤ 1− γi(l) we can rewrite (2.9) to
zi(h) ≤ (γi(l)− γi(h))Ui(l|l) + zi(l) ≤ 1− γi(h),
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which indeed is equation (IF ).
Proof of Lemma 10
Proof. We proof this by contradiction. Suppose there exists a feasible X that
forms an optimal mediation protocol without (IChi ) binding for some i. That is,
without loss of generality assume that for player 1 it holds that
z1(h)− z1(l) > γ1(h)U1(h|h)− γ1(l)U1(h|l).
Recall that
z1(h) = p(1− γ(h, l))x1(h, l) + (1− p)γ(h, h)x1(h, h),
but then if X was feasible before, it remains feasible if we reduce x1(h, l) such that
(ICh1 ) holds with equality. Changing this has no effect on the right hand side of
the inequality and (IC li) gets relaxed as it is
z1(h)− z1(l) ≤ γ1(h)U1(l|h)− γ1(l)U1(l|l)
Similarly, suppose (PC li) is not binding, then
zi(l) > Vi(l)− γi(l)Ui(l|l).
Provided that zi(l) > 0 the mediator could react, by changing zi(l) such that
the participation constraint is binding. Then, she can reduce z1(h) such that
the high-cost types incentive constraint is binding which leads to another X with
both (PC li) and (IChi ) binding that is feasible and delivers the same value to the
objective.
If zi(l) = 0, this procedure is not possible, but then the mediator could use the
homogeneity of degree 1 of γi(k) and the homogeneity of degree 0 w.r.t. G to
satisfy (PC li) by multiplying all elements of G by α < 1. Again, if zi(h) > 0 the
increase in in zi(h) can always be off-set by reducing Xi appropriately which is
always possible. If zi(h) is indeed 0, then multiplying G by α has if at all only a
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positive effect on incentive compatibility. Thus, it is without loss of generality to
assume that (PC li) holds indeed.
Proof of Lemma 11
Proof. Recall that the elements of P can be rewritten such that e.g. the probability
of meeting player 1l, given a report m2 = l is
p1(l|l) = pγ(l, l)
pγ(l, l) + (1− p)γ(h, l) . (2.10)
As p1(l|l) > 0 which is guaranteed by γ(l, l) > 0 the probability representation
for γ(h, l) follows immediately, that is
γ(h, l) = 1− p1(l|l)
p1(l|l)
p
1− pγ(l, l).
Repeating the same exercise for any γ(k,m) yields the desired representation.
The last equation of (C) can be obtained noticing that given we have established
all other results from (C) and using the homogeneity of degree 0 of P w.r.t G we
can rewrite G as
G = γ(l, l)G′ = γ(l, l)
 1 q2(l)
q1(l) q2(h)q1(l)
 .
We know that G′ induces the same P as G in particular we know that
p1(l|h) = pγ(h, l)
pγ(h, l) + (1− p)γ(h, h) =
pq2(l)
pq2(l) + (1− p)q2(h)q1(l)
which after rearranging yields the desired
q1(l)q2(h) = q1(h)q2(l). (C)
As all we have done have been rearrangements, the converse holds as well, that
is, for a given P and γ(l, l) > 0 that satisfy equation (C) we can establish a feasible
G such that P and γ(l, l) is induced by G.
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Proof of Theorem 1 (together with Lemmas 4 to 7)
We proof the proposition in several steps. In line with the text, we first solve the
“unconstrained problem” (P1′) which is also the proof of Lemma 5.17 After that
we introduce (IC li) and proof Lemma 6 before finally introducing the remaining
constraints with the proof of Lemma 7. Throughout this proof we make use of the
following lemma
Lemma 12. At any optimum of (P1′), the monotonicity condition (M) is always
satisfied.
The proof of this lemma can be found at the end of the appendix as it is neither
constructive nor relevant to understand the main argument. However, with help
of this lemma, we can restrict the choice set of the mediator to the set of induced
beliefs that result in monotonic equilibria as discussed in Lemma 1.
Proof of Lemma 4
Proof. Rewrite p2(l|h) with help of Lemma 11
p2(l|h) =
(
1− p1(l|l)
)
p2(l|l)p1(l|h)
p2(l|l)p1(l|h)− p1(l|l)
(
1− p2(l|l)− p1(l|h)
) . (2.11)
p2(l|h) > p2(l|l) if equation (2.11) divided by p2(l|l) is larger 1 that is
p2(l|h)
p2(l|l) = (1− p1(l|l))
p1(l|h)
p2(l|l)p1(l|h)− p1(l|l)
(
1− p2(l|l)− p1(l|h)
) > 1.
Rewriting yields,
(1− p1(l|l))p1(l|h) > p2(l|l)p1(l|h)− p1(l|l)(1− p2(l|l)− p1(l|h))
⇔ p1(l|h)− p1(l|l) > (p1(l|h)− p1(l|l))p2(l|l),
which holds if and only if p1(l|h) > p1(l|l).
17Recall that “unconstrained” refers to (P1′) which includes all constraints that bind at all
points already in the problem definition.
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Proof of Lemma 5
Proof. Notice that the unconstrained problem is (P1′) is a problem of three ele-
ments P = (p1(l|l), p2(l|l), p1(l|h) only, as the fourth is directly defined via con-
sistency equation (C). We calculate the unconstrained optimum in several steps.
First, we show that at the optimum the objective is not differentiable with respect
to at least one of the three choices variables. Second, we show that if p1(l|l) is
either p1(l|h) or p2(l|l)m then it is p1(l|l) = p1(l|h) and calculate this optimum.
Finally, we show that a deviation to p1(l|l) = 1 is not optimal.
Step 1: No optimum in the differentiable interior exists. To proof this
claim we are going to proof that the objective Obj(P ) := R(P )v/(Q(P ) − R(P ))
is locally concave at any critical point in p1(l|l) in what we call the “differentiable
interior”, meaning that such a critical point is in fact a local maximum in p1(l|l),
which is sufficient to proof the claim. Let us begin with defining the differentiable
interior.
Definition 3 (Differentiable Interior). The differentiable interior of problem (P1’)
is the set of all P such that for each 1 > p(k|m) > 0 the left-derivative and the
right-derivative of Obj(P ) with respect to all variables coincides.
Next, for the ease of notation define ρ = (ρ1(l), ρ2(l), ρ1(h)) :=
(
p∗1(l|l), p∗2(l|l), p∗1(l|h)
)
Step 1a: Transform R(P ) and Q(P ).
Observe that
R(P ) = Pr(Γ)
γ(l, l) =
p2
ρ1(l)ρ2(l)ρ1(h)
(ρ1(l)(1− ρ2(l)) + ρ2(l)ρ1(h)) .
Defining the function
Y˜ := Y ∗ ρ1(l)ρ2(l)ρ1(h)
p2
allows us to rewrite (dropping the argument to simplify notation)
Obj = R˜v
Q˜− R˜ .
Notice that R˜ is linear in any variable of ρ. Step 1b: Define necessary con-
ditions for an optimal interior point. Suppose (P1′) has indeed an optimal
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point in the differentiable interior. Then a necessary condition on this point is
that it is indeed a critical point in all three variables, that is
Obj′(ρ) := ∂Obj(ρ)
∂ρ
= ν
(Q˜(ρ)− R˜(ρ))2︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:f(ρ)
(
R˜′(ρ)Q˜(ρ)− Q˜′(ρ)R˜(ρ)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:g(ρ)
= 0 (FOC)
for every ρ ∈ ρ. Noticing that f(ρ) 6= 0 for any ρ by definition, the necessary first
order condition boils down to g(ρ) = 0. Another necessary condition for a local
minimum is that any critical point in any ρ is not locally concave in this variable.
If it was locally concave in any ρ this means that we are at a local maximum in this
variable ρ and that the second order conditions for a minimum are never fulfilled.
Formally, this means that at any critical point ρcp it needs to hold that
Obj′′(ρcp) = f ′(ρcp)g(ρcp)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0 by equation (FOC)
+f(ρcp)g′(ρcp) ≥ 0 (2.12)
for every ρcp ∈ ρcp. The first term is 0 by the standard envelope argument, such
that (2.12) boils down to
Obj′′(ρcp) = f(ρcp)g′(ρcp) = f(ρcp)
(
R˜′′(ρcp)Q˜(ρcp)− R˜(ρcp)Q˜′′(ρcp)
)
≥ 0.
By the linearity of R˜ and the observation that R˜ ≥ 0 by construction, a necessary
and sufficient condition for (2.12) to hold is simply
Q˜′′(ρcp) ≤ 0 (2.13)
for every ρcp ∈ ρcp. Step 1c: Show that the necessary conditions never
hold for ρ1(l). To complete the claim of step 1 we are now going to show, that
Q˜(ρ1(l)) is indeed a convex function.
To see this observe first by plugging in we can reduce γi(l) = γ(l, l)p/ρ−i(l) which
in turn means that while γ˜2(l) is constant in ρ1(l), γ˜1(l) is linearly increasing in
ρ1(l). In addition, we do not need to worry about γ2(h) as player 2h has no
expected utility by Corollary 1. Further we can rewrite using Corollary 1 and
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Lemma 11
γ˜1(h)U1(h|h) = γ(l, l)1− p (1− ρ1(h))ρ1(h) (ρ1(l)− ρ2(l))
(κ− 1)
κ
which is linearly increasing in ρ1(l) and positive. Rewriting yields
γ(l, l)Q˜ =
∑
i
γ˜i(l) (Ui(l|l)− (1− p)Ui(h|l)) + γ˜1(h)(1− p)U1(h|h)
it suffices to show that
hi(ρ1(l)) = γ˜i(l)
(
Ui(l|l)− (1− p)Ui(h|l)
)
is convex for every i.
For h2, observe that by Lemmas 2 and 3, player 2h only gains from deviating
if ρ1(h) > ρ1(l) . In such a case player 2h, best post-deviation strategy is to play
∆h,h with probability 1, which yields utility
U2(h|l) = p1(h|l)−∆h,hκcl. (2.14)
Bidding the same on-path is in the best response set of player 2 yielding
U2(h|h) = p1(h|h)−∆h,hκcl = 0. (2.15)
Subtracting equation (2.15) from equation (2.14) yields
p1(h|l)− p1(h|h) = ρ1(h)− ρ1(l) = U2(h|l) (2.16)
and thus U2(h|l) is linear in ρ1(l). As γ˜2(l) is constant in ρ1(l), h2(ρ1(l)) is convex
if and only if U2(l|l) is convex in ρ1(l) which can easily be verified by the utilities
derived in (U). The last step is now to show that h1(ρ1(l)) is convex as well.
To see this, observe first that whenever deviation is profitable for player 1, type
h, she would deviate by playing ∆h,h. But, ∆h,h is in fact the lower bound of player
1, type l and thus in such a case we can rewrite
U1
(
h|l, p2(h|l) > p2(h|h)
)
= U1(l|l) + (1− κ)cl∆h,h.
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As γ˜1(l) = ρ1(l)ρ1(h)p we can use the expression derived in Corollary 1 to establish
that γ˜1(l)U1(l|l) is linear in ρ1(l) and thus convex.
What remains is to show that −ρ1(l)∆h,h is weakly convex. This can be estab-
lished using that ∆h,h = p1(h|h)/κcl which is independent of ρ1(l) which proofs
the claim.
Step 2: ρ1(l) ∈ {ρ2(l), ρ1(h)}.
By assumption ρ1(l) ≤ ρ2(l) is ruled out. Second, fix some ρ2(l) and ρ1(h). If
ρ1(l) ∈ [ρ2(l), ρ1(h)] then Obj(ρ1(l) = 1) > Obj(ρ1(l) = ρ1(h)). Further we know
that Obj is continuously differentiable on ρ1(l) ∈ (max{ρ2(l), ρ1(l)}, 1). By Step 1
we know that every interior point is a maximum in ρ1(l).
Next, notice by Lemma 4 that for ρ1(l) > ρ1(h) ⇒ ρ2(l) > ρ2(h) ⇒ pi(h|h) >
pi(h|l)⇒ U2(h|l) = 0 and U1(h|l) < U1(h|h).
Now, notice that ρ1(l) = 1 can only be optimal if Obj is (LHS-)decreasing at
ρ1(l) = 1 as there cannot be a local minimum in ρ1(l) by Step 1. To check this it
suffices to look at the sign determining function of the derivative which is, by Step
1, R′Q−Q′R. Solving this for ρ1(l) > ρ1(h) yields a quadratic function in ρ1(l).
The sign-determining function at ρ1(l) = 1 is quadratic in ρ1(h), i.e. a condition
aρ1(h)2 + bρ1(h) + c < 0 (2.17)
where
a = (κ− 1 + ρ2(l)2) (2.18)
b = 1 + 2ρ2(l)− 2
(
ρ2(l)
)2
+ p(1− κ) (2.19)
c =
(
ρ2(l)
)2
κ− ρ2(l)
(
(κ− 1)(1− p) + κ
)
+ (κ− 1)(1− p). (2.20)
Note first, that (2.17) is decreasing in ρ2(l), second note that for ρ2(l) = ρ1(h)
condition (2.17) becomes
(κ− 1)
(
1− p− 2ρ1(h)
)
+
(
ρ1(h)
)4 − 2(ρ1(h))3 + (ρ1(h))2(1 + 2κ) < 0. (2.21)
Note that this is minimal if κ is minimal and p is maximal. Therefore, it must
hold that
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1/2 + ρ1(h))2
(
(ρ1(h))2 − 2ρ1(h) + 5
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
>4
−2ρ1(h)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
>−1/4
< 0,
a contradiction. Thus, whenever ρ1(h) ≥ ρ2(l), choosing ρ1(l) = 1 is not pre-
ferred to ρ1(l) = ρ1(h). Solving the first order conditions given ρ1(l) = 1 for
0 < ρ1(h) < ρ2(l) yields that no critical point in both variables exists and there-
fore no interior solution. As Obj is decreasing at ρ2(h) = 0, there cannot be any
solution with ρ1(l) = 1. Thus, ρ1(l) must either be equal to ρ1(h) or to ρ2(l).
Step 3: Calculate the optimum if ρ1(l) ∈ {ρ2(l), ρ1(h)}. By Step 1, we know
that if ρ1(l) ∈ [ρ2(l), ρ1(h)] the optimum involves ρ1 being equal to either of the
bounds.
Therefore, we only need to consider the two cases for any ρ2(l) and ρ1(h).
Step 3a: The equilibrium for ρ1(l) = ρ2(l). First, consider ρ(l) = ρ1(l) = ρ2(l).
By Lemma 11, ρ1(h) = ρ2(h) = ρ(h).
All payoffs are symmetric and, by Corollary 1, Ui(h|h) = 0 and, by Lemma 2,
Ui(h|l) = max{0, ρ(h)− ρ(l)). Finally, Ui(l|l) = (κ− 1)/κ+ (ρ(h)− ρ(l)κ)/κ.
In addition, γ1(l) = γ2(l) = p/ρ(l) and therefore
Q˜ = 2ρ(l)ρ(h)
p
(Ui(l|l)− (1− p)Ui(h|l)).
Finally, as R˜ = ρ(l)(1− ρ(l) + ρ(h)) we can simplify Obj to
Obj(ρ(l), ρ(h)) = p(1− ρ(l) + ρ(h))2ρ(h)(Ui(l|l)− (1− p)Ui(h|l))︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:Qˆ
− p(1− ρ(l) + ρ(h))︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:Rˆ
.
Employing the same technique as in Step 1, we know, as Rˆ is linear in both ρ(k)
any interior solution needs to have that Qˆ is concave in ρ(k).
Notice that the second derivative of Qˆ when Ui(h|l) = 0 boils down to 4/κ
as Ui(l|l) is linearly increasing with factor 1/κ in ρ(h). Thus, any solution with
ρ(l) ≥ ρ(h) can be ruled out.
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Second whenever ρ(l) < ρ(h) observe that Qˆ is linearly decreasing in ρ(l) with
factor 2ρ(h)p. Hence, the sign determining function of the first derivative Rˆ′Qˆ −
Qˆ′Rˆ becomes
Rˆ′(ρ(l))Qˆ− Qˆ′((ˆl))Rˆ|ρ(l)<ρ(h) = −2ρ(h)p
((
Ui(l|l)− (1− p)Ui(h|l)
)
− Rˆ
)
. (2.22)
Note that by construction Obj defines a probability and is thus in [0, 1]. Whenever
equation (2.22)=0, then Qˆ − Rˆ = (2ρ(h)p − 1)Rˆ which can only be positive if
2ρ(h)p = 1. As p < 1/2 this condition never holds. Therefore, we do not find an
interior solution when ρ(h) > ρ(l).
What remains are then boundary solutions with either of the ρ(k) ∈ {0, 1}.
If ρ(h) = 1 we need to go back to the original Q and R as our modifications are
not valid if ρi(k) 6= (0, 1).
This is for ρ(h) = 1
R = p2 2− ρ(l)
ρ(l)
Q = p2 2(1− ρ(l))
ρ(l) ,
which obviously violates Q > R and is thus not feasible. ρ(l) = 0 would violate
monotonicity and is ruled out by Lemma 12.
Step 3b: The equilibrium for ρ1(l) = ρ1(h). It remains to show that an
equilibrium exists in which ρ1(l) = ρ1(h) = ρ1. Note that again by consistency in
Lemma 11 we get ρ2 = ρ2(l) = ρ2(h).
With this, we know that Ui(k|m) = Ui(k|k) for every i and k and U2(h|l) = 0,
Ui(l|l) = (1− ρ2)κ−1κ , and U1(h|h) = U1(h|l) = (ρ1 − ρ2)κ−1κ . As γ˜i(l) = p/ρ−i we
get
Q˜ = 1
κp
ρ1(κ− 1)
(
(ρ1)2 − ρ1(1 + p)− ρ2(1− ρ2 − p)
)
and
R˜ = ρ1.
Note that this means that for an optimum in ρ1 we need Q˜ = ρ1Q˜′(ρ1) and for an
optimum in ρ2 we would need Q˜′(ρ2) = 0.
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Notice that
Q˜′(ρ2) =
ρ1(κ− 1)
κp
(1− p− 2ρ2)
⇒ ρ1Q˜′(ρ1)− Q˜ = (ρ1)
2(κ− 1)
κp
, (1 + p− 2ρ1)
and thus we arrive at the desired results. Checking second order conditions in each
variable yield that the function is convex in both arguments. As cross derivatives
are 0 at the optimum, the critical point is a minimum by the second order derivative
test.
Proof of Lemma 6
Proof. Step 1: The unconstrained optimum satisfies (IC li) for p ≤ 1/3. As
Ui(l|h) = Ui(l|l) by Lemma 3 and with the help of Lemma 10 stating that (IChi )
binds, we can rewrite (IC li)
(γi(l)− γi(h))Ui(l|l) ≥ (γi(l)− γi(h))Ui(h|h). (2.23)
As Ui(l|l) ≥ Ui(l|h) by construction this holds if and only if (γi(l)− γi(h)) > 0.
Calculating the difference yields
γi(l)− γi(h) = p
ρ−i
ρi − p
1− p (2.24)
which is positive if and only if ρi ≥ p.
Recall from Lemma 5 that the optimal unconstrained ρ2 = 1−p2 which is larger
p if and only if p < 1/3.
Step 2: Describe the equilibrium including (IC li) for p > 1/3.
Step 2a: No solution with ρ1(l) > ρ1(h). First, we show that we do not want to
deviate to any ρ1(l) > ρ1(h) for p > 1/3. To do so, consider (IC l2). By Lemma 3
the RHS remains at 0, and U2(l|h) > U2(l|l). Thus, for (IC l2) to hold we would
still need that γ2(l) ≥ γ2(h). However, then also ˜γ2(l)− ˜γ2(h) needs to be positive.
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Plugging in and simplifying, we find that
γ˜2(l)− γ˜2(h) = ρ1(h)ρ2(l)(1− p)− ρ1(l)p2(1− ρ2(l)) (2.25)
which is decreasing in ρ1(l). Hence, no deviation to ρ1(l) > ρ1(h) is profitable
since whenever IC holds for this deviation, it also holds for ρi(l) = ρi(h) which is
preferred by Lemma 5.
Step 2b: The proposed solution is indeed an optimum. Next, we need to
show that also no deviation to ρ1(l) < ρ1(h) is optimal. For this we use a guess
and verify approach to show that the proposed equilibrium with ρ2 = p is indeed
an optimum.
To do this, this solution needs to satisfy the first order conditions of the La-
grangian at the proposed point. As we know from Step 2a we do not need to
consider ρ1(l) > ρ1(h). Define g(ρ) ≤ 0 to be the incentive constraint, reformu-
lated such that if g ≤ 0, (IC l2) holds.18 The Lagrangian is given by
L(λ, µ,ρ) = Obj(ρ) + λgρ) + µ(ρ1(l)− ρ1(h)). (2.26)
Any solution to the constrained minimization problem ρ∗ must be such that it
solves the following problem
minL(·) (2.27)
and
λ, µ ≥ 0. (2.28)
It turns out that the proposed solution is such a point and further L is strictly
concave at this point, thus the problem is indeed locally minimized at ρ∗.
Step 2c: Show that no other solution exists. It is not clear whether the
problem is also globally minimized at this point, as both the objective as well as
the constraint do not satisfy the usual assumption needed for global optimality, in
particular they are not globally convex. However, fixing k we know the following
two aspects:
18As ρ1 ≥ p at the imposed constrained optimum, we do not worry about (ICl1) which always
has slack.
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(a) at p = 1/3 the solution is the same as the “unconstrained” optimum consid-
ered in Lemma 10. For p > 1/3 the solution is worse than the unconstrained
optimum,
(b) as all functions are continuous in p the functional value and thus the equi-
librium value must be continuous in p.
This means that if another solution (strictly better than the candidate) exists for
some pˆ > 1/3 then there also must exist some pˇ ∈ [1/3, pˆ] such that the equilibrium
values ρˆ of pˆ as a function of p yield the same outcome as the proposed equilibrium.
Further, as L is strictly convex at the proposed optimum, this alternative value
ρˆ must be bounded away in at least one of its variables.
Suppose the other optimal point is at some ρi(k) not in the neighborhood of ρ∗i .
Then by continuity, the mean value theorem, and the strict convexity of L at the
proposed point this point can only be optimal if the derivative of Obj w.r.t. ρi(k)
is 0 at some point on (ρi(k), ρ∗i ).
As ρ1(l) has no extreme value on the interval (ρ2(l), ρ1(h)) by Step 1 in sec-
tion 2.C, ρ1(l) must be the same in both optima.
But then, if ρ1(l) is constant, ρ1(h) is increasing on (ρ1(l), 1). Then again
ρ1(h) = 1 cannot be optimal. Thus, no other minimum exists and our proposed
minimum is the only and therefore global minimum.
Proof of Lemma 7
Proof. Finally, introducing γ(l, l) ≤ 1 to the problem it is straightforward to com-
pute that the constraint has slack for any p ≥ 1/3.
Also, by computing ν/(Q(P ) − R(P )) one can verify that it holds at ρ∗1, ρ∗2
whenever
k ≤ 2− 4p− 2p
2
1− 4p+ 3p2 .
Further, if the constraint γ(l, l) ≤ 1 binds, we can use Lemma 11 to see that
γ(l, h), γ(h, l) ≤ 1 if and only if ρi(l) ≥ p.
We know that at the unconstrained optimum with ρ1(l) = ρ1(h) and thus, we
have a boundary solution in those variables for a given ρ2(l). However, the solution
with respect to ρ2(l) is such that Obj′(ρ2(l)) = 0.
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In addition we know by strict concavity that in fact the regime change happening
at ρ1(l) = ρ1(h) (from high-cost types having a beneficial deviation payoff to low
cost types having one), must be such that around the unconstrained optimum we
would not change the equation ρ1(l) = ρ1(h) as this would either provide us with a
free lunch lowering ρ1(h) to put slack on γ(l, l) ≤ 1. Then, as we change the regime
to ρ1(l) > ρ1(h) it must be that Obj′(ρ1(l)) > 0 as we started at the optimum.
Thus, we could lower ρ1(l) at no cost on the constraint to ρ1(l) = ρ1(h) as the
constraint can be rewritten as
ν/(Q(P )−R(P ))− 1 = Obj −R ≤ 0,
and R|ρ1(l)=ρ1(h) = p2/ρ1(l)ρ2(l).
As ρ1(l) = ρ1(h) remains to hold the problem
min
ρ1,ρ2
Obj
s.t. ρ2 ≥ p and γ(l, l) ≤ 1 is well-behaved such that we get the desired solution of
the lemma.
Finally, plugging the solution for every regime into the Border constraints (EPI)
and (IF ) shows that they hold at the optimum.
Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. For the first result, observe that for p < 1/3, the solution at which ρ2 = p
and ρ1 = 2p + 1/(κ − 1) is always feasible and in line with γ(l, l) ≤ 1 and (IC li).
The corresponding probability of contest is given as
Pr(Γ,ρ∗) = (κ+ 1)p1 + 2(κ− 1)p, (2.29)
which is increasing in p and κ and becomes 1/2 for p = 1/3 and κ→∞.
Second, the optimal probability of a contest for p > 1/3 is
4p κp− (1− p)(κ− 2)(κ− 1)(7p2 − 2p− 1) + 4p, (2.30)
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which is falling in p for p > 1/3. Thus, it suffices to look at the probability at
p = 1/3. But at this point it becomes
κ− 4
2κ− 5 , (2.31)
which again is bounded by 1/2.
The inverse u-shape follows from Pr(Γ,ρ∗) being concave on all intervals and
that the derivative and smooth pasting at p′, p′′, p′′′.
Finally, monotonicity (and concavity) in κ follows from monotonicity and con-
cavity in κ for all regions as well as smooth pasting at the transition of the re-
gions.
Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. The results for the probability of being send to contest follow immediately
from the ex-ante symmetry and the equilibrium beliefs specified in Theorem 1 and
7.
The result on the expected share follows from Theorem 1 and Lemma 1. The
low-cost types expected utility from contest is weakly below her outside option V .
In order to fulfill the participation constraint in expectations, the player needs to
be compensated by a higher share if mediation fails. As player 1l has a higher
probability to enter the contest, she also needs to receive a higher share than
player 2l. A weakly higher share for any l-type compared to the same player’s
corresponding h-type follows from h-types binding incentive compatibility. Finally,
as player 1h gains a positive expected utility in case of the contest her expected
share can be pushed down the most completing the proof.
Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. The expected legal expenditure of player ik is by the uniform equilibrium
scoring functions given by
E[LEki ] =
∑
r∈{b,m,t}
Prob(ski ∈ r)
r + r
2
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where b,m and t are the scoring ranges used in Figure 2.1 and the proof of
Lemma 1. Further, r denotes the upper bound of range r and r denotes the
lower bound of range r.
The expected scoring function of player 1 entirely depends on ρ2, that is
ρ1E[LEl1] + (1− ρ1)E[LEh1 ] = ρ1
ρ1(2− ρ1) + (ρ2)2(κ− 1)
2ρ1clκ
+ (1− ρ1)(1− ρ1)2clκ
= 1 + ρ2(κ− 1)
clκ
.
Thus, the equilibrium expected contest score of player 1 is the same as in a contest
without mediation whenever ρ2 = p.
The expected score of player 2 is computed in a similar manner but depends on
both ρ1 and ρ2. It is given by:
1
2clκ
(
(κ− 1)
κ
(
ρ1(ρ1 − 2) + (ρ2)2(κ− 1) + 2ρ2
)
+ 1
)
.
The derivative of this function w.r.t. to ρ1
κ− 1
κ2
(ρ1 − 1) < 0.
As ρ1 > p by Lemma 7 and ρ2 = p for p /∈ (p′, 1/3), it follows that total legal
expenditures post-mediation are indeed smaller than under the prior belief p.
Proof of Proposition 5
Proof. As participation is optimal by lemma 8 and the optimal mechanism is
unique, no bargaining protocol can achieve a better result than Theorem 1. By
convexity of contest utilities in beliefs, no Bayes plausible signal structure over
the prior can make the receiver worse-off than the prior. Thus, the participation
constraint of the mechanism holds in the bargaining game as well.
To show that take-it-or-leave-it bargaining performs worse in environments that
satisfy 1 we show that the low-cost type of Sender has always an incentive to
deviate to some offer 0 <  < 1− V (l) that yields a utility higher than V (l) which
is her on-path utility. We do so by considering the possible response of Receiver
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to such an offer given any off-path βS describing the probability assessment of
Receiver on Sender in the contest game.
Any Receiver type accepts. As  < 1−V (l), Sender earns a utility larger V (l).
Any Receiver type rejects. The high-type only rejects an offer of  if she expects
a utility UR(h|βS) > , given her off-path belief βS. By Lemma 1 UR(h|βS, βR) > 0
only if βS < βR. Since any Receiver type rejects the offer, the belief on the receiver
is the same as the prior, that is βR = p. But βS < p implies via lemma 1 that
US(l|βS, βR) > V (l).
h-type Receiver rejects and l-type Receiver accepts. This case doesn’t
exist, as any offer that the h-type rejects is also rejected by the l-type as PBE
requires type-independent beliefs after the deviation (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1988)
and l-types have lower cost of evidence provision.
l-type Receiver rejects and h-type Receiver accepts. h-types only accept
if  ≥ UR(h|βS, βR) that is
 ≥ (βR − βS)κ− 1
κ
.
If Receiver h, type l rejects, then Sender, type l gains (1−p)(1− ) which is larger
V (l) = (1− p)(κ− 1)/κ as  goes to 0. Thus Receiver, type h must be indifferent.
Rewriting the above equation yields
βR =
κ
κ− 1 + βS.
In order to induce a belief of βR, Receiver, type h must choose to reject the offer
with probability
γR,h =
p
1− p
1− βR
βR
,
which follows analogously to Lemma 11.
Plugging this into Sender l-types yields:
(1− p)(1− γR,h)(1− ) +
(
p+ (1− p)γR,h
)
(1− βS)κ− 1
κ
=
(1− p)(1− ) + p
βR
(
(1− βS)κ− 1
κ
− (1− βR)(1− )
)
.
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Taking into account that βR is a function of βS this expression is continuous and
monotone in βS. βS is naturally bounded by 1 and βR. As we are looking for the
lowest utility, we can assign for any  > 0 it suffices to consider an upper and a
lower bound. For  close to 0 however, both βS = βR as well as βS = 1 yield a
utility larger (1 − p)(κ − 1)/κ. Thus, Sender, type l always has an incentive to
deviate to some  irrespective of the out-of-equilibrium beliefs of Receiver resulting
in an inferior solution which is actually strict as long as the case is not trivial by
the uniqueness of the proposed mechanism as shown in the proof of Theorem 1.
Proof of Proposition 6
The proof relies on three features of the model which can be exploited to guarantee
a weaker participation constraint:
• the mediator can ex-ante commit to probabilistic private messages she sends
to parties following any given message profile (but before the acceptance
decision),
• the mediator can ex-ante commit to an additional probabilistic private mes-
sage she sends to parties following any message and acceptance profile (that
is after the acceptance decision),
• yll type profiles lead to on-path to litigation with positive probability.
Proof. For PAIR we need that the expected share given one’s own type, that is
xi(l) is larger than the expected utility of a contest that occurs upon rejection of
this share. Suppose without loss of generality that an offer of 0 is rejected by all
parties and is used by the mediator to trigger litigation.
Two aspects facilitate the analysis: First, the mediator can choose a signal
σ(m,d) that depends on the received messages m as well as on the acceptance
decision d of both players. That is, the mediator has the possibility to define a
post-mediation protocol, too.
Recall from Theorem 1 that any type profile leads to litigation with positive
probability. At the same time rejection by one party is enough to trigger litigation.
Thus, as we allow for private communication, the mediator is free to choose one
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of the two messages sent to one party if she triggers rejection by the other party.
The mediator can therefore randomize not only between who takes the role of
player 1, that is which Xi to use, but also between whom of the two player’s
receives the “trigger message” 0. For the non-triggering player the mediator can
in fact randomizes between all messages the player could receive on-path when the
conflict is settled. This way the player does not know whether she is treated as
player 1 or player 2 in the mediation protocol at the time of making her decision
as to whether to accept or reject the offer. She does in fact not even know whether
rejecting the offer makes any difference at all (as the opponent might have received
an offer of 0 anyways). By Proposition 3, the mediator can choose Xi such that
for any offer xi(k) there exists an on-path continuation game in which the player
is worse off than xi(k). Hence, it is possible for the mediator to choose a signal
σi conditional on deviation that signalling the deviator is in this on-path subgame
deterring deviation altogether.
Proof of Proposition 7
Proof. Whenever γi(k) 6= 1 the proof is the same as that of Proposition 6.
The situation is however different if either of the players is sent to court with
probability γi(k) = 1. According to Theorem 1 and Lemma 7, γi(h) < 1. In
addition at most one of the l-types has γi(l) = 1 on path.
This way the player knows that in one of the two mediation protocols she is
always going to litigate anyways. Thus if x1(l, h) 6= x1(l, l), player 1 might have a
strong incentive to deviate as she knows whom she is facing in case her decision
is relevant at all. In all other cases she is going to litigate anyways and receives
V (l) as litigation payoff by Theorem 1 together with Lemma 1. Thus, it might be
optimal for her to reject anything but x1(l, l).
Suppose instead the mediator announces a mediation protocol X λ in which re-
porting two l-types follows mediation breakdown with full information disclosure
with probability  and a protocol as that derived in Section 2.4 otherwise. As
→ 0, the result gets arbitrarily close to that of Theorem 1. However, the media-
tor can signal any l-type deviator that in fact the low-cost vs. low-cost litigation
game is played, causing the l-type to also except ex-post shares.
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Proof of Lemma 12
Proof. If condition (M) is violated, the equilibrium is no-longer monotonic but
instead overlapping strategies might be possible. The reason for this is that if, e.g.
p1(l|l)κ < p1(l|h) the likelihood of meeting a low-cost type when being a high-cost
type is too high compared to being a low-cost type, such that the high-cost type
has a strong incentive to overscore the low-cost type. Further, by the consistency
condition equation (C) whenever the high-cost type faces a low-cost type, she
faces indeed a low-cost type that thinks she herself is facing a high-cost type with
very high probability. This provides an incentive for the h-type to compete more
aggressive and for the l-type to compete softer than under condition (M). The
equilibrium scores in the non-monotonic equilibrium are as depicted in figure 2.C.1.
Player 1l and player 1h overlap on the middle interval but are otherwise “close to
monotonic”. While the high-cost type of player 2 has a support covering the whole
scoring interval, player 2l only competes in the middle interval. In addition player
2h also has a mass point at 0.
s
b m t
Player 2 h
Player 1 h
Player 2 l
Player 1 l
0 ∆h,h ∆{l,h},{h,l} ∆l,h
Figure 2.C.1: Strategy support of player 1 and 2 if monotonicity fails.
Solving for the optimal mechanism, it turns out that there is still no inte-
rior solution in p1(l|l). The mediator would set p1(l|l) equal to any discontinu-
ity point or at the respective borders. That is either p1(l|l) = 0 or p1(l|l) =
max{p2(l|l), p1(l|h)/κ}. If p1(l|l) = p2(l|l) = ρ(l) under non-monotonicity, the
first order condition of the mediator’s problem is monotone in ρ(l) and thus, we
would need ρ(l) = 0 which is never optimal. If p1(l|l) = p1(l|h)/κ utilities con-
verge to their monotone counterparts and thus, the solution is no different than
that for monotonicity. Finally, p1(l|l) = 0 is never optimal as the objective is
always decreasing at this point.
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3 Conflict Management and
Conflict Games
with Benjamin Balzer
3.1 Introduction
Many economic conflicts are by default solved via a costly, non-cooperative game.
Examples include wars, strikes, legal disputes, and patent races. In many situations
conflict management provides a way to settle the disputes without the need of the
costly non-cooperative game. Participation in conflict management is typically
voluntary and the default game serves as a last resort to conflict management. If
parties possess private information relevant in the default game only, the conflict
management mechanism might not be able to settle all conflicts. If, however,
conflict management breaks down for whatever reason, players use information
from conflict management to update their beliefs. Especially if the underlying
game is Bayesian, updating effects their expected payoff at the point of breakdown.
The knowledge of this relation, in turn, feeds back onto players’ behaviour during
conflict management.
In this paper, we study the optimal design of conflict management if the underly-
ing game is Bayesian and private information is relevant only in the default game.
We investigate the informational effect of breakdown of conflict management if
parties are rational and use this information in the subsequent play of the default
game. We are particularly interested in the following questions: What is the con-
nection between the underlying default game and optimal conflict management?
How much information is or can be released during the conflict management mech-
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anism? how does the choice of mechanism influence the outcome of the default
game in case conflict management fails?
The answers to these questions are of substantial economic importance. Conflict
management helps to avoid not only costs borne by the fighting players, but also
negative externalities on their surroundings: wars destabilizing the world economy,
strikes affecting neighbouring firms, over-clocked courts limit access to the legal
system, and patent wars holding off important substantial research are only a few
examples of these externalities.
In reality there is indeed a large industry providing conflict management mecha-
nisms for various disputes. Examples include peace conferences, alternative dispute
resolution and standard setting organizations. A common feature of these mech-
anisms is that although they often lead to settlement, none of them guarantees
settlement and the typical response to breakdown is to revert to the rules of the
costly, initial mode of conflict resolution. Thus, the underlying default game can
be seen as a realistic outside option to conflict management.
The relevance of private information in the default game is central to our findings
and present in the applications mentioned above. The strength of an army, the
financial resources, the access to evidence, or the current research of the R&D
department may all be better known to a player herself and hard to verify without
playing the default game to be avoided.
We find that for the third-party (call her an ombudsman) designing the conflict
management mechanism, the players’ private information is a double edged sword.
On one hand, if the ombudsman possesses the private information of the parties,
she can design a settlement contract that efficiently solves the conflict. On the
other hand, the private information is irrelevant whenever the conflict is settled
without playing the non-cooperative default game. If parties do not get punished
via the play of the default game for making false claims during conflict manage-
ment, then they also have little incentive to tell the truth to the ombudsman.
The ombudsman designs conflict management in a way that screens the players’
types by inducing breakdown of the conflict management mechanism and thus
invoking the play of the default game. If player’s are rational, they are going to
incorporate the information received through breakdown of conflict management
before making decisions for the default game. If the default game is Bayesian,
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the players’ updating directly effects their (and their opponent’s) decision and
thus the expected outcome of the default game. Obviously, the exact design of
conflict management is going to influence the players’ updating, and thus their
action choices and expected payoffs. The underlying game therefore serves as
an endogenous and belief dependent outside option to the conflict management
mechanism, despite its fixed rules.
The aim of this paper is to study the design of optimal conflict management
in the presence of a default game with asymmetric information. We show that
the purpose of conflict management in such situations is to manage the beliefs
of the parties. We highlight that the result of optimal conflict management can
be entirely described by the beliefs that players hold in case no settlement can
be found. We provide an intuitive formulation of the optimal mechanism and
characterize its relation to properties of the underlying default game. In particular,
we show that games in which the players’ actions do not depend on her belief allow
for “sure settlement” of certain pairs of types. This finding generalizes Hörner,
Morelli, and Squintani (2015).
If this property is violated, that is, if the game has an action-relevant Bayesian
component, “sure settlements” may not exist any more and it becomes more im-
portant for the ombudsman to increase the strong player’s ability to separate. The
ombudsman does so by increasing the ability premium that measures how much the
fundamental characteristics of a strong player allow her to separate herself from
a weaker player only by mimicking the strong player during conflict management
and behaving optimally in the subsequent default game.
The ability premium is directly connected to the design of the conflict manage-
ment mechanism in the following way: The design of and the players’ behaviour
within the mechanism determine the beliefs in case of breakdown. These beliefs
influence the play of the subsequent continuation game. Mimicking another type
implies that a player – in terms of beliefs – plays the continuation game of the
mimicked type with two advantages: (i) she is not forced to behave as if she was
the mimicked type in the default game, but can freely optimize, and (ii) her oppo-
nents do not know that a deviation occurred and play alongside the equilibrium
path which induces a situation of superior knowledge of the deviator. Taking these
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two effects into account, the ombudsman aims to increase the ability to separate
from mimicking types, by increasing the ability premium.
We begin our analysis by formulating a traditional conflict management prob-
lem with some underlying default game as an outside option. One of the key
assumptions of our model is that the ombudsman has the ability to commit to a
certain structure of her proposed conflict management mechanism. This common
assumption in the mechanism design literature allows us to focus on the behaviour
of the players having the conflict rather than on the commitment issues of the
designer. We discuss the meaning of this assumption in the formulation of the
model below.
Next, we show that we can re-express the problem of finding the right settle-
ment contract as a search for conditional type distributions over players’ types
given breakdown. This allows us to relate the optimal contract directly to the
expected performance within the default game. Alongside this central simplifica-
tion we also formulate the problem in its reduced form using a tool from Border
(2007). Further, we show that full-participation in conflict management problems
is optimal.
After reformulation we can apply results from convex analysis to address the role
of public signals sent by the ombudsman in case no settlement is found. Examining
the relation between the expected posterior for any behaviour within conflict-
management and the realised posterior after having learned the signal’s realisation
allows us to make statements about both the (limited) scope of signals in such
problems and the choice of expected posteriors.
In the final part of the paper we then discuss several properties of the underlying
default game and how they relate to optimal conflict management.
3.2 Related Literature
We contribute to the literature on conflict resolution by offering a general approach
to solving problems of conflict management in the presence of a fixed default
game. We take the mechanism design approach to conflict management proposed
by Bester and Wärneryd (2006). Different to Bester and Wärneryd (2006) and the
related work by Hörner, Morelli, and Squintani (2015) who study a particular mode
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of conflict, we allow for a general class conflict games. In particular and different
to these papers we allow for games in which the choice of investment within the
conflict game is made after the outcome of conflict management is known. The
general formulation allows us to analyse conflict management at any stage of the
conflict while previous literature has mainly focused on “last minute” resolution
attempts. Economically, early stage conflict management has the advantage that
settlement obtained at this early point generates the largest economic effect, as
players do not engage in costly actions. Nonetheless, our approach is also valid for
conflict management carried out at a later stage. In fact, we can generalize some
of the findings of Hörner, Morelli, and Squintani (2015) to all conflict games in
which a player’s action choice is independent of her belief.
Another strand of literature related to ours is that of veto-constraint mecha-
nisms. Similar to Cramton and Palfrey (1995) conflict management is only carried
out if both players ratify the proposed mechanism. In our model, each player can
enforce the play of the default game. Similar to these models our mechanism can-
not influence any player’s behaviour in case the default game is played. Different
to them our designer can also send the players to the default game herself. Any
of these breakdown situations is informative to the players as in Cramton and
Palfrey (1995) and Celik and Peters (2011). Our scope is, however, different to
these models. Cramton and Palfrey (1995) as well as Celik and Peters (2011) are
interested in the set of implementable allocations by either finding the necessary
off-path beliefs or restricting participation. We explore how the mechanism in-
fluences the post-breakdown behaviour of the parties and in particular how such
behaviour feeds back on the design of the mechanism. Further, we show that full
participation can be assumed without loss of generality.
Some of our results also connect to the literature on Bayesian persuasion such
as Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011). Like them we are interested in a mechanism
design problem without transfers and allow the mechanism to distort the processed
information in a Bayesian manner. Similar to this literature we can use results
from convex analysis to determine the scope of public signals. Yet, our setup is
very different than that of Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011). The signals in our
setup are in fact only supplementary and have, in general, only limited scope as
the primary objective is to minimize the play of the game altogether.
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3.3 Model
3.3.1 Setup
Default Game. Consider a model of two ex-ante identical, risk-neutral play-
ers that could potentially distribute a pie of size normalized to one via a non-
cooperative game Γ. We refer to Γ as the default game or the outside option.
Each player possesses a private signal θi independently drawn from a given distri-
bution over a finite set, Θ = {θ1, .., θK} of cardinality K. We refer to the signal
as the player’s type. The type measures the strength of the player when playing
the default game and is payoff-irrelevant outside Γ. One interpretation of θi is to
view it as an individual cost parameter determining how costly it is for agent i to
exert effort within Γ. Each player also holds the same prior belief, βi = β∅ > 0
which is the ex-ante distribution of the signals. Beliefs are common knowledge,
such that the belief system is given by β∅ = (β∅, β∅). The kth element βk∅ describes
the ex-ante probability of a player being type θk. Notice that any distribution βi
is pinned down by its K − 1 elements. In what follows we are therefore going to
treat βKi as an endogenous variable defined as βKi = 1−
∑
k 6=K
βki .
Assuming the existence of a Bayes’ Nash equilibrium for every belief system β,
the expected payoff of player i, type θi is – up to the choice of equilibrium – given
by Ui(θi,β). Throughout the paper we assume that the game is such that Ui(θi,β)
is continuous in each element of β. Similarly, fixing some equilibrium strategies,
the reduced form payoff given the realisation of any type-profile can be denoted
by ui(θi, θ−i,β).1
We restrict attention to conflict games which are defined as follows.
Definition 4 (Conflict Game). A game Γ is called a conflict game if it has the
following properties:
i. (non-productiveness.) The sum of realised utilities in equilibrium is smaller
than the contested pie, that is ∑i ui(θi, θ−i,β) ≤ 1 for any (θi, θ−i,β).
1Observe that ui(·) does not necessarily coincide with the realised payoff, since players may
play mixed strategies even under full-information. Instead ui(·) describes the expected payoff
given the uncertainty about the players’ types has been resolved.
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ii. (monotonicity in own type.) The expected utilities Ui(θki ,β) are non-increasing
in k for any (θki ,β).
iii. (monotonicity in own belief.) Take any belief β′i that first-order stochastically
dominates βi. Then, for any type θi and a belief β−i the expected utility
Ui(θi, βi, β−i) is not smaller than Ui(θi, β′i, β−i).
Non-productiveness guarantees that a conflict always reduces the amount of re-
sources available in the economy and is therefore never desirable from a utilitarian
point of view as a settlement is always weakly preferred. The two monotonicity
properties ensure that the player’s type is a sufficient statistic for the player’s abil-
ity in the conflict game. While the first one states that higher ability results in
higher expected utility, the second one ensures that it is always preferable to play
against a weaker opponent.
Conflict management. Now assume that the parties can undertake a process
of conflict management offered by an uninformed third party, the ombudsman, that
seeks to settle the conflict without relying on the default game, if and only if they
mutually agree to participate. A natural interpretation of such a settlement would
be a contract offer conditional on the players’ reports. The contract, if offered,
then specifies the share of the pie assigned to each party. In case the ombudsman
does not offer a solution, parties go back to the default game to resolve the conflict.
We refer to this event as breakdown or Γ , since it invokes the play of Γ. Formally,
this means that the ombudsman cannot directly influence the players’ actions in
the default game. The conflict management mechanism is a game leading to (a
lottery over) allocations or the declaration of failure.
We are interested in conflict management that minimizes the probability that
the default game is played, Pr(Γ ) and satisfies ex-post weak budget balance, that
is a mechanism that cannot grant any additional resources into the system.
Timing. At first the ombudsman proposes a conflict management mechanism
and commits to it. Then players learn their private signal. Thereafter, both players
decide simultaneously whether or not to participate in conflict management, and if
so which action to play within conflict management. In case either (or both) of the
players reject conflict management, both players learn about each others partici-
pation decision, update their beliefs and play the default game non-cooperatively.
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If both players accept the mechanism, the mechanism is played. If the mechanism
reaches a terminal node, payoffs realize. Alternatively, if the mechanism decides
to send players to the default game, both players update their beliefs and play the
default game non-cooperatively.
Fixing the equilibrium played in the default game for any belief system, we
are looking for the conflict management mechanism that minimizes the ex-ante
probability of playing the default game. Our solution concept is perfect Bayesian
equilibrium.
Ratification and the Revelation Principle. As players can unilaterally
and publicly reject any proposed mechanism (by sending an empty message), our
problem is one of veto-constraint mechanism and it is therefore not obvious that the
revelation principle holds. In particular it may be the case that full participation
is not optimal. Nonetheless, we can, without loss of generality, restrict attention
to direct revelation mechanisms. The mechanism maps player’s type reports either
into (a lottery over) shares or into a distribution of public signals of participating
players. Any feasible mechanism induces a matrix of breakdown probabilities
G and a matrix of shares Xi for each player. Each of these matrices have at
most dimension K × K. The element in the mth row of the nth column of G
is denoted by γ(θm, θn). With slight abuse of notation we say that γ(θm, θn)
describes the probability that the ombudsman enforces breakdown of settlement
and sends parties back to the default game in case player i report type θm and
player −i reports θn. Similarly, xi(θm, θn) denotes the share player i receives if the
report profile is (θm, θn). We assume budget balance in a sense that x1(θm, θn) +
x2(θm, θn) ≤ 1 for all (θm, θn) ∈ {Θ}2.
In addition the ombudsman may send a public signal σ(θm, θn) before the default
game is played. Importantly, we assume that no party can ex-ante commit to ignore
public messages and that the ombudsman can send such a signal also if either of
the parties decides to not participate in the mechanism. Thus, the matrix of all
σ(·, ·), S, is of dimension K + 1 × K + 1. Observe that these signals induce a
posterior that is “Bayes plausible” with respect to a given posterior which means
they induce a mean preserving spread over that posterior. In particular the signals
σ(∅, θn) and σ(θm, ∅) induce a mean preserving spread over the prior β∅ such
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that E[βi(∅, s)|σ(∅, θn)] = β∅ with βi(∅, s) being the posterior induced by signal
realisation s.
Crucial Assumptions. As a benchmark we assume that all parties have full
commitment power once the conflict management mechanism has been ratified.
On the player’s side this assumption is innocuous to a large extend. At the end
we discuss an extension without full commitment on the players’ side. The as-
sumption of full commitment by the ombudsman on the other hand is crucial to
our model. However, if we assume that the ombudsman repeatedly deals with
conflicting situations, she has an incentive to commit by reputational concerns.
A second crucial assumption is that the players’ private information is only
payoff relevant within the default game. Our results can be seen as a benchmark
on the possibilities of third party conflict management that cannot influence the
behaviour of the players in the institutionalised default game. If each player’s
private information had a component that was valuable beyond the default game,
the ombudsman could use this information to screen types without relying on the
default game which would make it easier for her to find settlement. Our analysis
also provides a benchmark on what third party conflict management can achieve
by solely relying on (cheap-talk) messages of the parties. Such “pure-talking”
conflict management is typically considerably cheaper to implement than more
complicated modes of screening and thus often used as a first step. Hence, if we
consider anything that follows as “default game”, we can still use our approach to
capture the problems first stage.
Our objective is to minimize the probability of the default game being played in
equilibrium. This assumption is driven by the fact that we are mainly interested
in applications in which invoking the default game comes at a large fix cost for
uninvolved players, that is for example, civilians in case of a war, customers in
case of a strike, or other cases in case of legal disputes.
The assumption that also non-participating players can receive messages from
the ombudsman allows us to broaden the analysis without much further technical
complication. If we were to remove this assumption our results would still be valid
for games in which the expected payoff in Γ is convex in beliefs around the prior.
However, if the expected payoff is for whatever reason non-convex, public signals
allow us to convexify the payoff function in such a way that full participation is
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optimal. We are going to discuss this property next. Note that in many economic
problems it is hard for any of the players to commit to ignoring publicly available
information whenever it is interim beneficial to process it. Such situations are
exactly those we are interested in.
3.3.2 Players’ Behaviour and the Outside Option
By the revelation principle it is without loss of generality to restrict to truthful re-
porting for any participating player on the equilibrium path. To guarantee truthful
reporting, the player must have no incentive to deviate from the truthful reporting
strategy. In general a participating player’s strategy consists of two additive com-
ponents. Her expected utility in case the conflict settles, zi(m) and her expected
utility in case the conflict advances to the default game Γ, yi(θ,m). Observe that
since types become only relevant within Γ, zi is independent of the player’s type.
Thus, the ombudsman needs to rely on the default game to effectively screen types.
Within the default game it is not only the player’s own type that determines the
payoff, but also the belief system after breakdown of conflict management.
The belief system has three different effects. First, it determines the distribution
against which the player expects to play and by that influences expected payoffs.
We call that effect the direct effect of beliefs. A direct effect of beliefs is typically
also present even in games in which players cannot choose their action after break-
down but enter some form of distribution that potentially depends on the types
of their opponent.
Second, as we assume a non-cooperative Bayesian game as the outside option
to settlement, there is an indirect effect of beliefs. The underlying reason for the
indirect effect of beliefs is the influence of belief system on the players’ actions
in the default game. For example, if a change in believes leads to one player
playing more aggressively, the other player take this change of action into account
and adjusts her action, too. As the continuation game is on-path played under
common knowledge, all players are aware of the belief system of the other player.
Thus, a change in any of the beliefs has a potential spill-over on the utility of any
of the players.
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Finally, there is a third effect which is particularly relevant if we consider de-
viations of players within the mechanism. As discussed above, such deviations
remain entirely undetected if the ombudsman can implement a settlement. How-
ever, even if conflict management breaks down, a deviation is not detected right
away. Instead, the (non-deviating) opponent decides on her action as if there was
no deviation. This gives the deviating player an informational advantage within
the default game. Through the deviation she selects a different population to play
against, which may change her optimal action compared to the play on path. This
is in particular true since the opponent does not belief that there is a player of
the deviating type expecting endowed with that belief. We call this the deviator’s
information advantage.
To illustrate the deviator’s information advantage, consider the following ex-
treme example. Suppose conflict management is such that breakdown occurs only
if one player is the strongest and the other player is the weakest type. Suppose
further that since both players know this, the weak type immediately gives in
granting the strong type a high portion of the pie with little effort on her side,
too. Now, suppose a weak type claiming to be a strong type. After breakdown the
weak type faces another weak type who thinks she is facing a strong type. This
weak type may immediately give in and the deviating weak type gains the good
just by the ’reputation’ of being a strong type. Thus, the player has an incentive to
manipulate her own belief by deviation not only because it changes the population
she plays against, but also because it allows her to gain an information advantage.
The three effects highlight the role beliefs play in the problem of the ombudsman
and indeed, as we show in the following section, we can describe the solution
entirely by considering how the ombudsman manages the beliefs of the players.
3.3.3 Simplifying the Problem
Prior to the in-depth analysis it is useful to simplify the problem already at this
level of generality. The simplifying steps are largely technical in nature and we
give a brief summary before laying out the different steps.
First, we show that full participation is always optimal. The reason for this is
that the ombudsman can always ’punish’ a non-participating deviator by releasing
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a public signal such that it is interim rational to incorporate that signal. By that
the players payoff function is convexified which in turn provides sufficient slack on
the participation constraint for everyone to participate. Further, we provide an
assumption that guarantees that the ombudsman solves a non-trivial problem so
that there is no solution that avoids the play of the default game altogether.
Next, we discuss the connection between the choice of breakdown probabilities
and the realisation of a signal which can be seen as a mean-preserving spread over
the expected posterior.
Thereafter, we use a result from reduced form auctions to rewrite our problem in
expected terms. We show that the strong type’s participation constraint and each
type’s upward adjacent incentive compatibility constraint always bind. The reason
is simply that the strongest type is the most efficient within the conflict game and
thus needs to have a sufficiently high value to participate in conflict management.
Within the conflict management mechanism on the other hand, each type has an
incentive to mimic the next stronger type as she expects a higher settlement result,
but is similar enough when it comes to ability within the conflict game.
Finally, we use the two previous result to rewrite the entire problem in a way
that highlights the ombudsman’s sole objective to correctly manage the players’
beliefs. We then provide several alternative formulations of the problem which are
helpful both for understanding the ombudsman’s considerations and the analysis
of optimal conflict management.
Participation and Non-triviality
Lemma 13 (Full participation.). It is without loss of generality to assume that
there is full participation at the optimum.
The proof can, as all others not discussed in the text, be found in the appendix.
It is due to Balzer and Schneider (2015) and relies on the fact that for any initial
belief-system β∅ we can find a Bayes plausible public signal σ(∅, n) released upon
deviation of player 1 such that the value for player 1 of not participating in conflict
management, V˜1(θ1), is convex in her belief. By symmetry the same is true for
player 2. The second step is then to invoke proposition 2 of Celik and Peters (2011)
stating that whenever the value of not participating is convex in a player’s belief,
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it is without loss of generality to assume full participation. The value of non-
participation, V˜i(θi) corresponds to the expected payoff the player receives when
rejecting the mechanism and behaving sequentially rational. Thus, V˜i(θi) is the
expected equilibrium payoff given the choice of public signals by the ombudsman.
Formally, this means for player i, type θi
V˜i(θi) ≡ Eθ−i
[
Es(θ−i)
[
Ui
(
θi, βi (s (θ−i)) , βd2
)]]
,
where θ−i player −i’s type and s(θ−i) is a possible signal realisation of the public
signal σ(∅, θ−i). Player i’s, βi(s(θ−i)), is the probability distribution over player
−i’s types given signal realisation s. Similarly, βd−i is player −i’s off-path belief.
Obviously V˜1(θ1) depends on the ombudsman’s choice of public signals S. The
minimum value of non-participation that can be induced given any type θi is given
by
Vi(θi) ≡ minS V˜i(θi).
Observe that if we assume passive beliefs, that is βs2 = β∅, Vi(θi) is the value of
the convex hull in βi of U(θi,β) at βi = β∅ by Bayes’ plausibility of the signals.
Therefore, the minimum value of non-participation can be easily computed using
primitives only.
Definition 5 (Non-Triviality). A problem is called non-trivial if there exists no
conflict management mechanism such that settlement happens with probability 1.
Lemma 14 (Non-Triviality). The optimal conflict management mechanism is
non-trivial if and only if the sum of minimum values of non-participation for the
strongest type of each player is larger than 1.
Assumption 2. (Non-Triviality.) The optimal conflict management mechanism
is non-trivial.
Proof. If Assumption 2 was violated, the ombudsman’s optimal solution is to offer
the same sharing rule independent of the players’ reports. If the ombudsman
were to offer a trivial mechanism that satisfies the strongest player’s participation
constraint, then, whenever two strongest types meet, she cannot offer them more
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than 1 in total by weak budget balance. However, since types are irrelevant in case
of settlement, she can only pool across types and thus must offer a sharing rule such
that x1(m,n)+x2(m,n) > 1 for all type report to satisfy the incentive compatibility
constraint. Thus, there is no trivial incentive compatible mechanism that satisfies
the strongest players participation constraint and is budget balanced.
Breakdown Probabilities, Signals, and Beliefs
Due to monotonicity the strongest type always has the most attractive outside
option for any signal realisation s. Thus, the ombudsman always wants to choose
S such that the value of non-participation is minimized for the strongest type to
limit the distortions via the participation constraint.
When the ombudsman offers a non-trivial solution, breakdown is valued dif-
ferently by the different types. In particular, for any given believe the stronger
types are less afraid of breakdown than the weaker types, as the default game is
less costly to them. At the same time the beliefs players hold after breakdown
are both a function of the mechanism and their report. If the mechanism speci-
fies for example that the strongest type should never meet another strongest type
after breakdown, that is γ(θ1, θ1) = 0, then any player type can prohibit herself
from meeting the strongest type after breakdown by reporting θ1. Thus, the be-
lief system after breakdown plays an important role, as players could strategically
misreport to induce a different belief system in case of breakdown. This makes the
outside option not only type-dependent, but also endogenous to the design of the
mechanism. For any report m and any realisation of the public signal s, player i
holds a belief βi(m, s) conditional on breakdown. In other words, given a conflict
management mechanism, any report m pins down a belief system and thus an ex-
pected payoff conditional on breakdown. Any public signal σ(m, ·) then allows the
player to adjust her action conditional on the signal realisation s she receives. To
shorten notation we denote this expected payoff conditional on breakdown, given
any signal realisation s and report m as
Ui(θi|m, s) = Eθ−i [βθ−ii (m, s)ui(θi, θ−i,β(m, s))|m, s] (3.1)
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As the player does not know the signal realisation at the reporting state she
forms an expectation over the signal realisations. Thus we can write
Ui(θi|m) = Es[Ui(θi|m, s)], (3.2)
and similarly
βi(m) = Es[βi(m, s)]. (3.3)
We refer to βi(m) as the expected posterior given m while βi(m, s) is called
the realized posterior given m and s. Analogously to the matrix of breakdown
probabilities G, we can define a matrix of expected posterior distributions B which
also has dimension K ×K.
Observation 2 (Reduced Form Definition of B). Each expected posterior βi(m)
is uniquely determined by its K − 1 first elements. Each matrix of expected
posteriors B is uniquely determined by all expected posteriors of player 1, β1(m)
and the expected posterior of player 2, reporting to be the strongest type, that is
β2(θ1). We call these determinants the choice variables of B.
The first part follows simply because posteriors are distributions and the second
is a consequence of Bayes’ rule and the following observation.
Observation 3 (Determinants of Posteriors.). The expected posterior given m is
entirely determined by the matrix of breakdown probabilities, G, while the realised
posterior given any expected posterior is determined by S only.
In what follows, we always refer to the reduced form definition of B and treat the
remaining beliefs as endogenously determined functions of the (K − 1)× (K + 1)
choice variable mentioned in Observation 2.
Using the assumption that the player’s type is only relevant conditional on
breakdown we can determine an additively separable term yi(m, θi) which we call
the breakdown value of reporting m and that is denoted by
yi(m, θi) = γi(m)Ui(θi|m)
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with γi(m) being the expected breakdown probability given report m which is
given by
γi(m) :=
K∑
k=1
βk∅γ(m, θk−i).
Likewise, we can determine the settlement value
zi(m) =
K∑
k=1
βk∅ (1− γ(m, θk−i))xi(m, θk−i).
Combining the two gives us the unconditional expected payoff of reporting m,
that is
Πi(θi,m) = zi(m) + yi(m, θi). (3.4)
Observe that while the breakdown probabilities G influences both the settlement
and the breakdown value Xi is only relevant for the settlement value and S only
influences the breakdown value.
Binding Constraints and Border Transformation
Invoking the revelation principle we can restrict attention to direct mechanisms.
Thus, the probability that player i sends message θi, pi(θki ), simply corresponds
to the ex-ante probability that player i is of type θki , which is the kth value of
β∅. Now, similar to Border (2007) we can rewrite the problem in reduced form
replacing Xi by the vector zi. Thus, we can solve the problem in expectations while
applying Border (2007) provides a necessary and sufficient condition to implement
the found solution also under ex-post budget balance.
Lemma 15 (Border Transformation). Fix some feasible G and zi ≥ 0 for every
i. Then there exists an ex-post feasible Xi that implements zi if and only if the
following constraints are satisfied for any {m,n} ∈ K ×K and i:
βm∅ (1−γi(θm)−zi(θm))+βn∅ (1− γ−i(θn)− z−i(θn)) ≥ (1−γ(θm, θn))βm∅ βn∅ (EPI)
zi(θm) ≤ 1− γi(θm). (IF )
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To understand the intuition start with the individual-feasibility condition (IF )
and observe that it provides a natural upper bound on the settlement value. Indi-
vidual feasibility requires that no player can expect a settlement value that is higher
than that in which she receives the whole pie whenever settlement is achieved. Us-
ing this upper bound we can interpret the ex-post feasibility condition (EPI). For
a given type profile (θm, θn), the left-hand-side of (EPI) is the expected difference
between offering each party precisely the upper bound of the settlement value and
the actual settlement value. This difference then needs to be larger than the re-
sources the parties generate by foregoing the default game which is equivalent to
the right-hand-side of (EPI). This inequality needs to hold since the resources
generated together can only be used once to settle for the given profile. Therefore,
at most one of the parties can include these resources into her settlement value.
Thus, the combined expected settlement values need to be smaller than the sum of
their individual upper bounds by at least that amount. Finally, Lemma 15 implies
that the sum of settlement values is ex-ante feasible, that is
∑
i
∑
m
βmi zi(θm) ≤ 1− Pr(Γ ). (AF )
Using Lemma 15 reduces the problem of choosing settlement values from 2
K ×K-dimensional matrices of Xi to two vectors each of dimension K × 1 only.
Further, as the agents make their choices in expected rather than realized values,
we can use the binding constraints to reduce dimensionality even further.
Lemma 16 (Binding Constraints). It is without loss of generality to assume that
strongest type’s participation constraint as well as all upward adjacent incentive
constraints hold with equality.
The first part is an immediate consequence of the non-triviality assumption.
Monotonicity of the default game on the other hand implies the second part.
Further, we get two immediate corollaries to Lemma 16.
Corollary 3. It is without loss of generality to ignore all participation constraints,
but those of the strongest type.
Corollary 4. It is without loss of generality to consider upward deviations only
locally.
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The linearity of the payoff function in the settlement value allows us to express
all settlement values only in terms of breakdown values and the value of non-
participation for the strongest type. To see this, consider the strongest type’s
binding participation constraint
Vi(θ1i ) = zi(θ1i ) + yi(θ1i , θ1i ), (PC)
and any type’s upward adjacent incentive compatibility constraint
zi(θk−1i ) + yi(θk−1i , θki ) = zi(θki ) + yi(θki , θki ), ∀k > 1. (IC+)
Rewriting Equation (PC) and Equation (IC+) to
zi(θ1i ) = Vi(θ1i )− yi(θ1i , θ1i ) (PC)
zi(θki ) = zi(θk−1i ) + yi(θk−1i , θki )− yi(θki , θki ). (IC+)
Plugging all these constraints into each other we can fully determine zi(·) as
an additive function of the strongest types value of non-participation and a set
of breakdown valuations under truth-telling and deviation. Plugging all solutions
into the ex-ante feasibility constraint (AF ) yields
∑
i
(
Vi(θ1i )−
∑
m
∑
θ
qi(m, θ)yi(m, θ)
)
≤ 1− Pr(Γ ), (AF )
where q(m, θ) is the weight put on yi(m, θ) and is independent of the choice of
mechanism.
Given the above considerations we can determine the solution to the problem
entirely by the choice of G and S which, by Observation 3, induces an expected
posterior via G and a mean-preserving spread over the expected posterior via S.
Taking this as given, we can check whether the remaining constraints are satisfied.
All these constraints, too are a function of G and S only.
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Three Alternative Formulations of the Problem
While any G induces a belief system (βi(m), β−i(n)) for any type profile (m,n),
the reverse is not true as Bayes’ rule gives us one additional degree of freedom in
the choice of G.
Observation 4 (Homogeneity). Any expected posterior βi(m) is homogeneous of
degree 0 with respect to the matrix of breakdown probabilities, G.
Define {B}+ := {B|β1i (θ1) > 0} to be the set of all expected posterior such
that the two strong types expect to meet conditional on breakdown with positive
probability. Ignoring signals for a moment, we can combine the previous Lemmas
and Observations to establish a duality result that allows us to solve the problem
directly choosing expected posteriors.
Proposition 8 (Duality). Take any feasible matrix of expected posteriors, B ∈
{B}+. Then, for any α ∈ (0, 1], B and α uniquely determine a feasible matrix of
breakdown probabilities, Gα in which the first element, γ(θ1, θ1) = α and all other
elements γ(m,n) = q(B)α. Conversely, any feasible G determines B and α.
The duality of the two approaches greatly simplifies our analysis as it allows us to
solve the whole problem by focusing on choice variables that directly connect to the
rules of the underlying default game. Thus, we can directly connect the structure
of the underlying game to the optimal mechanism. Finally, Proposition 8 nicely
illustrates that the optimal choice of conflict management is directly depending
on the role private information plays in the underlying default game. A direct
consequence of Proposition 8 is that the ombudsman’s objective is to manage the
beliefs of the players in a sense that she, by choosing the optimal expected (and
realized) posteriors, minimizes the likelihood of the default game being played.
Given Proposition 8, we can implement any matrix of breakdown probabilities
G by the choice of expected posteriors and an appropriate α. More importantly,
all elements of G are linear in α. This linearity implies that γi(m) is linear in α.
Since Ui(θi|m) is independent of α, we get that yi(θi,m) is linear in α and so is the
probability that the default game is played, Pr(Γ ). Thus, we can rewrite (AF ) to
∑
i
Vi(θ1i )− 1 ≤ α(Q(B,S)−R(B,S)) (AF)
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with
Q(B,S) = ∑
i
∑
m∈Θ
∑
θ∈Θ
qi(m, θ)
yi(m, θ)
α
R(B,S) = Pr(Γ )
α
,
both depending on expected beliefs and a potential public signal only. Observe
that the ombudsman seeks to minimize the probability that the default game is
played, αR(·) which is a linearly increasing function of α. Thus given feasibility,
we would like to choose the smallest α possible which in turn means that it is
without loss of generality to assume that (AF ) holds with equality. Solving for α
yields
α = α∗ :=
∑
i Vi(θ1i )− 1
Q(B,S)−R(B,S) , (3.5)
if α∗ ≤ 1 since we picked G such that γ(θ1, θ1) = α.
Plugging everything back into the ombudsman’s objective, we obtain an alter-
native formulation of the ombudsman’s problem
min
B,S
R(B,S)
Q(B,S)−R(B,S)
(∑
i
Vi(θ1i )− 1
)
(P )
subject to (EPI),(IF ), α∗ ≤ 1 and the set of downward incentive compatibility
constraints (local and global) (IC−).
While the set of choice variables is now sufficiently reduced, the economic inter-
pretation of (P ) is less clear. There is, however, another dual to our problem that
provides an intuitive formulation of the ombudsman’s problem.
A first step towards this problem is to observe that any solution to (P ) subject
to some constraints is also a solution to
max
B,S
Q(B,S)
R(B,S) =
∑
i
∑
m
∑
θ
qi(m, θ)yi(m, θ)
Pr(Γ ) (O1)
subject to the same set of constraints. Notice that
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yi(m, θ)
Pr(Γ ) =
γi(m)
Pr(Γ )Ui(θ|m) = ρi(m|Γ )Ui(θ|m)
with ρi(m|Γ ) denoting the ex-ante probability of seeing player i, type m condi-
tional on breakdown, that is
ρi(m|Γ) := β
m
∅ γi(θm)
βm∅ γi(θm) +
∑
k 6=m βk∅γi(θk)
= β
m
∅ γi(θm)
Pr(Γ ) =
gi(m,B)
f(B) ,
where both gi(m) and f are linear functions of each element of B and more
importantly are independent of β∅. That is given any vector of expected ex-post
posteriors β(m) the ex-ante expected probability of meeting a certain type after-
breakdown is independent of the initial distribution. Further, the denominator f
is the same for all type reports.2
Now, defining ρi to be the 1 × K vector of all ex-ante expected conditional
probabilities ρi(m|Γ ) and Umi :=
∑
θ qi(m, θ)Ui(θi|m) the mth element of the K×1
vector Ui we can express (O1) as
max
B,S
∑
i
ρi · Ui (O2)
Finally, spelling out qi(m, θ) and slightly rearranging allows us to find a third
equivalent expression,
max
B,S
∑
i
Eθ[Di(θ)|Γ ] + Eθ[Ui(θ|θ)|Γ ], (O3)
with
Em[Di(θm)|Γ ] =
m∑
θ
ρi(θm)Di(θm),
Di(θm) = w(θm)ψ(θm),
and weighting function
w(θm) = (1−
m∑
k=1
βk∅ )(βm∅ )−1
2Although notationally intense, these results are just due to iteratively applying definitions.
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depending only on the prior, and
ψi(θm) =
Ui(θ
m|θm)− Ui(θm+1|θm), if m 6= K
0, if m = K.
We call ψi the ability premium and Di the weighted ability premium.
Summarizing the results of the previous calculations gives us the following propo-
sition
Proposition 9 (Different Formulations). The following problems are equivalent:
min
B,S
R
Q−R (P )
max
B,S
Q
R
(O1)
max
B,S
∑
i
ρi · Ui (O2)
max
B,S
∑
i
Eρi [Di] + Eρi [Ui] (O3)
In particular problem (O3) has an intuitive interpretation. It states the problem
as the sum of two expected values. The latter is simply the expected utility of the
on path conflict game, while the first part describes the expectations over what
we call the weighted ability premium, Di. To understand the weighted ability pre-
mium, let us first consider the un-weighted ability premium, ψi(θm). It describes
how much a player of type θm can separate herself from the next strongest type
via her true ability in the contest. It is the difference between the expected util-
ity conditional on breakdown of a truthfully reporting type θm and the next best
type’s expected utility conditional on breakdown if she mimics θm during conflict
management. This measure of distance between two adjacent types takes into
account that the mimicking type has two advantages from misreporting in case of
breakdown: she can adjust her behaviour and is the only one aware of a deviation.
What remains is the premium that is due to the fundamental ability difference
between the two types and is described by the ability premium. The actual abil-
ity premium is obviously determined by the mechanism as the mechanism defines
the belief system of player i, reporting m. Nonetheless, for any mechanism that
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induces a certain belief structure we can straightforwardly compute the ability
premium.
The ability premium enters the objective function in a slightly perturbed way,
however. The perturbation comes from the fact that the ability premium is an
inverse measure of the information rent that needs to be paid to the weaker type.
The higher the ability premium, the lower the information rent for a player of type
θm+1. By Lemma 16 the upward adjacent incentive constraints bind, however,
and thus paying a higher information rent to type θm+1 implies paying a higher
information rent to all weaker types, too. Thus, the weight decreases if we increase
the weight put on any type stronger than θm as we decrease the amount of players
that request the information rent. Obviously, the information rent needs to be
paid to any type not only those experiencing breakdown which leads to the prior
being the relevant statistic for weighting. As downward incentive compatibility is
not incorporated into (O3), we can ignore the distribution of those types weaker
than θm and care only about the weighting relative to θm which is why w(θm) is
decreasing in βm∅ .
The expected utility conditional on ending up in the conflict game which forms
the second part of (O3) has an intuitive interpretation, too. By the feasibility
constraint (AF ) and the definition of α∗ we see that the budget constraint is,
both in expectations and realized values, always binding for the ombudsman. In
turn, this means that the ombudsman has a valuation for decreasing the resources
needed to satisfy the binding constraints (PC) and (IC+). While the choice of
the expected weighted ability premium is mostly driven by the attempt to relax
(IC+), the expected utility is mainly driven by (PC). If the ombudsman manages
to increase the expected utility conditional on entering the default game, she makes
breakdown less costly for the players. That in turn means she needs to pay less
in case of settlement to achieve any expected payoff from taking part in conflict
management, Πi. The value of Πi(θ1) is pinned down by the strongest types’
outside option Vi(θ1) which then monotonically affects all other expected payoffs
via incentive compatibility. For any fixed ability premium, making the play post-
breakdown more efficient thus frees resources the ombudsman can use to settle
more conflicts.
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3.4 Optimal Conflict Management
To construct the optimal mechanism it is useful to first ignore any constraint on the
reduced form problem. Therefore, we first restrict attention to the unconstraint,
reduced form problem. Later, we comment on the remaining constraints α∗ ≤ 1,
(EPI), (IF ) and (IC−).
3.4.1 Relevance of Public Signals
By backward induction we solve for the optimal signal first as this can be done
based on the expected posterior, only. That is, given any expected posterior we
first ask: Is there a public signal that improves upon that expected posterior?
The answer to this question is a direct application of Bayesian persuasion as in
Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011). That is, whenever there are convexities to be
exploited, a public signal improves the result. To see this consider the formulation
(O2) and assume we are at the following (hypothetical) interim state: The om-
budsman has announced breakdown and players have updated their beliefs. The
signals, however, have not yet realized. At this point all actions of all players
(and the ombudsman) other than those when playing the default game are already
bygone. Any public signal realization can now only affect actions of the default
game.
Lemma 17. The Border-constraints (EPI) and (IF ) never mandate the use of
public signals.
The result is a direct consequence of the above mentioned hypothetical state.
The Border-constraints only effect the expected posteriors and are thus indepen-
dent of any signal. In fact, there is a straightforward notion of when signals indeed
may have a positive effect ignoring any of the other constraints: If the (probability)
weighted sum of the expected utility post-breakdown at the expected posterior is
strictly convex, then introducing a signal is strictly beneficial for the ombudsman.
This result follows directly from a Bayesian persuasion argument.
The argument outlined above is in particular helpful as we can answer the ques-
tion whether signals have an effect with a clear “no” for the unconstraint problem.
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Proposition 10 (No Signals). It is without loss of generality to characterize the
equilibrium outcome ignoring signals if neither the downward incentive compatibil-
ity constraints (IC)− nor the feasibility constraint α∗ ≤ 1 are binding.
The result follows from the fact that the ombudsman can implement any pos-
terior she likes. For any convex combination of two points on the objective she
can simply put all mass on the larger of these points, and thus improve the objec-
tive. Thus, signals never have an effect as the choice of expected posteriors is (up
to Bayes’ plausibility w.r.t. the prior) not limited. Using the Bayesian persua-
sion argument outlined above, we can derive a simple corollary to Proposition 10
excluding convexities in the expected utility of the default game.
Corollary 5 (No Convexities). It is without loss of generality to exclude any point
at which ∑i ρi · ∂Ui/∂βkj > 0 for some k ∈ {1, 2, ..., K} and j ∈ {1, 2}.
Considering the formulation in expected values (O3) we see that on-path ex-
pected utilities enter the objective positively while deviation utilities enter neg-
atively. Thus, Corollary 5 states that on-path utilities need to be sufficiently
concave at the optimum and off-path utilities need to be sufficiently convex in all
of the beliefs to be a candidate for the optimal solution.
While Proposition 10 provides us with a clear statement as long as the ignored
constraints are non-binding, the result is not true any more once those constraints
become relevant. The reason is that the additional constraint exclude certain
areas of the multi-dimensional belief-simplex. If the optimal solution lies within
an excluded area, it is possible that signals may lead to a constraint that is satisfied
in expectations, but not for all realizations. Although we cannot characterize the
optimal signal, we can put some structure on that signal. In particular, if any of
the downward incentive compatibility constraints bind, and the underlying conflict
game (and its equilibrium) were chosen such that only types and beliefs, but not
players matter, then the optimal signal is always going to be symmetrizing in a
sense that at the hypothetical interim state discussed above, both players are still
treated fully symmetric.
Definition 6 (Symmetric Game). The game is symmetric if Ui(θi, βi, β−i) depends
only on (θi, βi, β−i), but not on i directly for any (θi, βi, β−i).
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Definition 7 (Symmetrizing Signals). A symmetrizing signal is a signal that only
publicly announces which of the players takes the role of player 1 and which player
takes the role of player 2.
Lemma 18. If in any symmetric game, the downward adjacent incentive compat-
ibility mandates the use of a public signal than it is without loss of generality to
assume that this signal is going to be a symmetrizing signal.
The intuition for this Lemma is simple. Whenever only one of the incentive
compatibility constraints bind, the ombudsman can always relax pressure on one
of the constraints by throwing a fair coin right before the play of the default
game which publicly determines which of the players acts as “player 1”. The same
holds true in essence even if both incentive constraints bind at the unconstraint
optimum, but one has a larger shadow value in the Lagrangian sense. If both have
the same shadow value the game is already symmetrized.
3.4.2 Relevance of the Ability Premium
In addition to its intuitive interpretation the formulation (O3) has the advantage
that we can easily connect characteristics of the optimal mechanism to the under-
lying game. Observe that within
max
B,S
∑
i
E[w(θ)ψi(θ)] + E[Ui(θ)] (O3)
anything inside the expectations can directly be characterized for any belief,
only knowing the parameters of the underlying game. Observe that ψi(θK) = 0.
Thus, the more weight is put on the weakest type the more important becomes
the first part of (O3). w(θk) decreases in the prior belief on any type βl∅ with l ≤ k
and is unchanged for any l > k. We can deduct that a shift in the distribution
towards stronger types (in a FOSD-manner) decreases the relevance of the ability
premium. Intuitively that means, the smaller the ex-ante probability of paying a
high information rent, the less important it is to decrease this rent by offering a
high ability premium. In turn, if the distribution is such that the strongest type
becomes less and less frequent, her ability premium starts to dominate all other
parts of the objective (O3).
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Lemma 19. Fix any set of beliefs β∅ \ βk∅ with k 6= K. Then, if βk∅ goes to 0, the
optimal solution of the unconstraint problem gets arbitrarily close to the maximum
of the ability premium of type θk, maxB
∑
i ψi(θk).
Recall that reduction in the ex-ante frequency βk∅ corresponds to an increase
in the frequency of the lowest type occurring by the endogenous definition of
βK = 1 − ∑K−1i βki . The intuition behind this lemma follows directly from the
ombudsman’s accounting. Recall that the ability premium of type θk negatively
affects the information rent paid to any type weaker than θk. That is, the ability
premium is to be paid out to all types weaker than type θk. For the sake of
the argument assume there are only two types. Then, whenever β1∅ is close to
0, the ombudsman needs to pay the information rent almost always while any
post-breakdown conflict game is likely to take place between two weak types and
thus not very productive. Therefore, her aim is to minimize the information rent
by maximizing the ability premium. If we now increase the type space a similar
logic holds. As the ex-ante frequency of a certain type decreases, it becomes
less important to separate this type from the stronger types which is done by the
ability premia of types θl < θk, as the information rent paid to θk only becomes less
important. However, separating weaker types, in particular the weakest becomes
more important as her frequency increases by the endogenous definition of βK∅ .
Thus, any mass that is shifted from an intermediate type θk to the weakest type
corresponds to an increase in importance of the ability premium of θk.
3.5 Different Types of Conflict Games
Using the general results developed in Section 3.4, we can now apply these results
to different types of games to characterize the solution for these type of games. We
focus here on two types of games, namely “EPIC Games” and “Contests” which not
only cover a large part of conflict games used in the literature and in practice, but
also are very different in sensitivity of post-breakdown beliefs: While the actions
in “EPIC Games” are invariant to beliefs, “Contests” are typically highly sensitive
to the belief system.
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3.5.1 EPIC conflict Games
Definition 8 (EPIC Conflicts). A conflict game is called an ex-post incentive
compatible conflict (EPIC conflict) if each player’s action is invariant with respect
to the belief system.
The class of EPIC conflicts includes games with dominant strategies, detail
free games or games in which the conflict is inevitably resolved with full force.
Examples of an EPIC conflict are those conflicts where the relevant cost of effort
are paid prior to the dispute. Such models are for example studied by Hörner,
Morelli, and Squintani (2015) in the context of international relations or Spier
(1994) in the context of legal disputes. Formally, an EPIC conflict implies that
the expected payoff takes the form
Ui(θi,β) =
∑
βki u(θi, θk−i). (3.6)
and u(θi, θ−i) is independent of β. Reports to the ombudsman in these conflict
games have no strategic effect in case of failure. This has an important consequence
for the design of the optimal conflict management namely that it is possible to
establish “sure settlements”.
Proposition 11 (Optimal Conflict Management with EPIC Conflicts). The so-
lution to the reduced form optimal conflict management for EPIC conflict ensures
that weakest types are guaranteed a settlement except when they meet the strongest
type.
This result generalizes the findings of Hörner, Morelli, and Squintani (2015) who
derive a similar result with a particular EPIC default game played under a binary
type assumption. The intuition for this is straight forward. The weakest player’s
settlement value is not “challenged from below” as there is no weaker type. Thus,
the ombudsman does not need to send the weakest player into the conflict game for
reasons of incentive compatibility. The only reason left for sending her to conflict
is then to secure the strongest types’ participation constraint which is why conflict
games between strongest and weakest type may be possible. The result is also in
line with conventional wisdom that the primary purpose for conflict management
is to identify “sure settlements”.
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3.5.2 Contest Games
The property established in Proposition 11 is no longer true if the EPIC assumption
does not hold any more. If the conflict game does not satisfy the EPIC assumption,
the behaviour of the weakest type might depend on who she expects to meet in the
conflict game. If the effort of the player decreases in the expected strength of her
opponent, a strategy such as the one outlined in Proposition 11 may not be optimal
any more.3 In such a situation the weakest type expects to face the strongest type
and decides not to invest too much within the game since she expects to lose
anyway. This change in behaviour has a spillover on other types. If they claim to
be the strongest type and enter the conflict game they may face an opponent that
thinks she plays a strong opponent. Thus, conflict management may, for the sake
of incentive compatibility, allow also for weakest types to meet within the game.
To understand the solution structure of non-EPIC conflict games consider again
(O3). In EPIC conflict games the ability premium of any type is a constant by
definition. Thus, all the ombudsman can do is to change the post-breakdown
distribution such that the type with the highest ability premium is most prominent
after breakdown. Once we leave the class of EPIC games, this property is not true
any more as the ability premium is defined endogenously and depends on the
ombudsman’s choice of mechanism.
One particular subclass in the class of non-EPIC games is the class of contest
games. Indeed in reality many games are solved using some form of contest.
Intuitively speaking, a contest is a type of game in which each player exerts some
effort and a contest success function depending on the players’ effort determines
the outcome distribution. Formally, we define contest games as follows.
Definition 9. A conflict game is called a contest if, fixing any action, xi, the
expected utility takes the following form
U(θi,B) = FB(xi)− c(xi),
and Fβ is a distribution function.
3Many conflict games with incomplete information feature such elements. Examples include
contests, a war of attrition, or first price auctions.
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Contest games have the advantage that the cost function is independent of
the opponents behaviour and thus, given any action, independent of the beliefs,
too. Using an envelop argument we can deduct that for any point at which x∗i is
differentiable,
∂U(θi,B)
∂βki
= ∂FB(xi)
∂βki
|xi=x∗i ,
where x∗i is the optimal action given B.
By the same argument, the second derivative is equal to the second derivative
of F with respect to the belief βki . Thus, we know that the second derivative of
the ability premium in contest games can be displayed as
∂2ψ(θki ,B)
∂βki ∂β
k
i
= ∂
2FB(x∗i (θki ))
∂βi∂βki
− ∂
2FB(x∗i (θk+1i ))
∂βki ∂β
k
i
, (3.7)
for x∗i (k,m) being the optimal action in the contest of player i, type k, who
claims to be type m. The ability premium is non-convex if and only if (3.7) is
negative, or FB, is more convex at x∗i (θk+1i , θki ) than at x∗i (θki , θki ). Combining now
the results from Proposition 10 and lemma 19 we get that for any type θk for which
the ability premium is (strictly) convex for some belief at some point, there is an
ex-ante frequency β¯ such that for any βk∅ < β¯, the convexity of (3.7) dominates
the curvature of the other types. Then, we can exclude this point from the set of
hypothetical optima.
Although this convexity condition might seem weak at first glance, it is actually
very useful in particular for contest with little noise. In an all-pay auction for
example, a contest without any noise at all, the ability premium of the strongest
type is convex in the belief of the strongest player, β12(θ1) for all B whenever the
utility is differentiable. That means that given β12(θ1) is small we are guaranteed
to get a corner solution. Since parties play a mixed strategy in an all-pay auction,
the ability premium is differentiable whenever β12 6= β22 . Thus, given β12 small
enough we only need to check for β12(θ1) ∈ {0, β22(θ1), 1} as we can exclude the
entire interior via Proposition 10 and the rules of the game. It turns out that
β12 = β22 becomes optimal in such a case. For the binary type case this directly
implies that beliefs are report independent, that is βki (θ1) = βki (θ2). In Chapter 2
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we have shown that β¯ in such a case lies beyond the no-triviality condition such
that for any specification we get type independent beliefs. While adding noise to
the contest changes the players’ behaviour and by that (3.7) and β¯, all functions
are continuous in the contest success function such that adding some noise to the
contest success function does not change the results qualitatively, as (3.7) remains
to be positive for all B.
Finally, the second result we have established in ??, that is asymmetric beliefs
between players, can also be seen here. Assuming type-independence and thus
the maximization of the ability premium, the ombudsman wishes to maximize the
on-path expected utility of the parties. Since asymmetric contests are in general
less inefficient than symmetric ones, she has an incentive to introduce asymmetries
between players. This has a negative effect on the ability premium, but a positive
one on the expected contest utility. The ombudsman balances these two effects
to maximize (O3). Note again, that also here, as the ex-ante probability of a
strong type goes to 0, the forces of asymmetry decrease and the solution converges
towards symmetry.
3.6 Conclusion
In this paper we have generalized the findings of Chapter 2 and provided a gen-
eral approach towards solving for optimal conflict management. We have shown
that signals have no effect on the unconstraint optimal solution which allows us
to exclude convex areas from the optimum. We have further shown, how the op-
timal solution may be affected when reintroducing the ignored constraints. We
have highlighted the role of the ability premium and analysed two special cases
of underlying games. We conclude the paper by briefly discussing two possible
extensions to the model.
Ex-Post Participation. One of the main assumptions of our model is that
once the mechanism is ratified by everybody any allocation of the pie can be
enforced. In many settings with an underlying default game such commitment
is not possible. Since many default games are institutionalized either through
evolution or constitutions, it may be possible for any party to enforce the default
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game at any point in time. Such possibilities naturally constrain the ombudsman
further. Typically, however this does not change the results too much.
One way to deal with this issue is to augment conflict management such that the
ombudsman does not “order” on-path breakdown, but enforces it via a ridiculous
offer to either of the parties which the party rejects on-path. If the party does so,
the default game is invoked. The other party, however, has still not learned too
much about her opponent’s type. This can be used by the ombudsman to suppress
deviations. Consider the following mechanism. With probability 1 −  a mecha-
nism is played that enforces the same allocation as the one with full commitment.
With probability  the ombudsman announces breakdown and perfectly informs
all players about the type of the others. Now, consider a player who declines an
offer she should have accepted. In such a case the ombudsman knows about this
deviation, but the opponent does not. If the ombudsman then commits to sending
a signal to the opponent that induces a behaviour that is worst for the deviator, the
deviator would only reject the offer if it was lower than this worst punishment. If
no offer of the optimal mechanism is lower than the worst punishment the optimal
mechanism with ex-post participation constraints is arbitrarily close to the perfor-
mance of the optimal mechanism under full commitment since the two converge
as  goes to 0. This means, all mechanisms in which the lowest settlement share
is higher than the worst expected payoff (as a function of the beliefs) performs at
most -worse than the mechanism under full commitment. This is in line with e.g.
Hörner, Morelli, and Squintani (2015) who show that the two may sometimes be
completely equivalent.
Correlated Types. A second important extension is to consider what happens
if types are correlated. Such correlations are beneficial to the ombudsman as she
can elicit information of one player also from her opponent’s report. In general,
the logic of Crémer and McLean (1988) applies here where we can treat the shares
like the classical model treats transfers. Budget balance, however, limits the use of
Crémer-McLean type of mechanism. In particular, we can expect that the optimal
mechanism for correlated types is likely to involve a binding Border-constraint.
That is a deviator is punished as in Crémer and McLean (1988), but only to
the extend that ex-post implementation is possible. Consequently, full efficiency
cannot be achieved with any level of correlation.
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3.A Proofs
Proof of lemma 13
Proof. Using public signals we can lower the expected utility from not participating
whenever the deviating player’s utility is concave around the prior by using a
signal consisting of two realizations βˆ and βˇ such that λβˆ + (1 − λ)βˇ = β∅ by
using the same argument as in Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011). Such signals
relax the players participation constraint, such that the participation constraint.
Since relaxing the participation is only to the benefit of the ombudsman, we can
assume without loss of generality that she reduces the participation constraint as
much as possible. That means, the value of non-participation is on the convex hull
of the default games expected utility function with respect to the players belief.
If this is the case, we can directly use proposition 2 of Celik and Peters (2011) to
conclude that it is without loss of generality to assume full participation.
Proof of lemma 15
Proof. We apply theorem 3 of Border (2007) which says the following:
Border (2007), Theorem 3: The list P= (P1, ..., PN) of functions is
the reduced form of a general auction p= (p1, ....pn) if and only if for
every subset A ⊂ T of individual-type pairs (i, τ) we have
∑
(i,τ)∈A
Pi(τ)µ•(τ) ≤ ({t ∈ T : ∃(i, τ) ∈ A, ti = τ}).
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An individual type pair in our setting is given by (θm, i) The general auction p in
our setup is defined by a list
xi(θm, θn).
We want to implement p by the list P containing
Xi(m) :=
K∑
k=1
xi(θm, θk)µi(k|m)
where
µi(n|m) := µ(m,n)
µ•i (m)
,
µ(m,n) := βn∅ βm∅
1− γ(θm, θn)
1− Pr(Γ ) ,
µ•i (m) := βm∅
1− γi(θm)
1− Pr(Γ ) .
Plugging in yields,
Xi(m) =
∑K
k=1 β
k
∅ (1− γ(m, θk))xi(m, θk)
1− γi(θm) = xi(θ
m).
Applying the above quoted theorem of Border (2007) to this and reformulating
everything in terms of zi allows us to conclude that X can be implemented via
zi ≥ 0 if and only if the following conditions are satisfied:
βm∅ zi(θm) + βn∅ z−i(θn) ≤ (BC)
1− Pr(Γ)− ∑
k 6=m
∑
l 6=n
(1− γ(θk, θl))βl∅βk∅
zi(θm) ≤ 1− γi(θm) (BC1)
K∑
k=1
zi(θk)βk∅ ≤ 1− Pr(Γ) (BC2)
∑
i
K∑
k=1
βk∅zi(θk) ≤ 1− Pr(Γ) (AF )
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K∑
k=1
K∑
l=1
βk∅zi(k) + βl∅zi(l) ≤ 1− Pr(Γ). (BC4)
Note that equation (IF ) implies (BC2) and equation (AF ) which implies (BC4).
Proof of lemma 16
Proof. We proof this by contradiction. Suppose there exists a feasible X that
forms an optimal mediation protocol without (IC+i ) binding for some i and k.
That is, without loss of generality assume that for player 1 it holds that
z1(θk + 1)− z1(θk) > γ1(θk+1)U1(θk+1|θk+1)− γ1(θk)U1(θk+1|θk).
Recall that
z1(θk+1) =
K∑
l=1
βl∅(1− γ(θk+1, θl))x1(θk+1, θl)
but then if X was feasible before, it remains feasible if we reduce x1(θk+1, 1) such
that (ICh1 ) holds with equality. Changing this has no effect on the right hand side
of the inequality and (IC−i ) gets relaxed as it is
z1(θk + 1)− z1(θk) ≤ γ1(θk+1)U1(θk|θk+1)− γ1(θk)U1(θk|θk)
Similarly, suppose (PC1i ) is not binding, then
zi(θ1) > Vi(θ1)− γi(θ1)Ui(θ1|θ1).
Provided that zi(θ1) > 0 the ombudsman could reduce zi(θ1) such that the par-
ticipation constraint binds. Then she can adjust all zi(θk) such that the (IC+) is
binding and arrives at another X which gives the same value of the objective, is
feasible and features binding constraints.
If zi(θ1) = 0, we cannot apply this logic. However, the ombudsman could use
the homogeneity of degree 1 of γi(k) and the homogeneity of degree 0 w.r.t. G
to satisfy (PC1i ) by multiplying all elements of G by α < 1. Then the same logic
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applies as above provided that all zi(θk) > 0. If one of them was 0 than multiplying
G with α < 1 has a positive effect on incentive compatibility.
It is a direct consequence of monotonicity of U , that local incentive compatibility
holds globally. Similarly monotonicity of U also ensures that if the participation
constraint holds for the strongest type it also holds for the weaker ones.
Proof of proposition 8
Proof. By Bayes’ rule the post-breakdown belief that player j is of type θ1, given
that player i reported θ1 is
β1i (θ1) =
β1∅γ(θ1, θ1)∑K
k=1 β
k
∅γ(θ1, θ1)
= β
k
∅γ(θ1, θk)
γi(θ1)
(3.8)
Solving this for γ(θ1, θn) yields
γ(θ1, θn) = β
1
∅
βn∅
1
β1i (θ1)
γ(θ1, θ1)−∑
l 6=1
βl∅
βn∅
γ(θ1, θl) (3.9)
which is obviously linear all γ(θ1, θn) with a non-zero slope. Plugging all γ(θ1, θn)
into each other provides us with (K−1) linear equations which can be solved such
that γ(θ1, θn) can be expressed as a linear function of γ(θ1, θ1) with non-zero slope.
Now we can look at
βk−i(θn) =
βk∅γ(θk, θn)∑K
l=1 β
l
∅γ(θl, θn)
= β
k
∅γ(θk, θn)
γ−i(θn)
(3.10)
which we can then solve in a similar fashion such that all γ(θk, θn) are linear
functions of γ(θ1, n) and thus of γ(θ1, θ1) with non-zero slope. Moreover through-
out the construction no constant entered the utility function such that we got the
desired result for all γ(m,n). Finally setting γ(θ1, θ1) = α yields the desired result.
The reverse follows by simply plugging into (3.10).
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Proof of proposition 9
Proof. The proof is to a large extend provided in the main text. Thus, we provide
here only the missing steps.
The weighting function q is given by
qi(m, θk) =

(1−
k−1∑
l=1
βl∅) if m = θk
−(1−
k−1∑
l=1
βl∅) if m = θk−1
0 else.
Plugging everything into Q then yields (AF ).
Equivalence of equation (P ) and equation (O2) follows from the first order con-
ditions.
Suppose we are at an optimum in any variable x and denote ∂f(x)/∂x as f ′ for
any function f . Then The first order condition of objective (P ) are
(
R
Q−R(
∑
i
Vi(θ1))− 1)
)′
=
∑
i Vi(θ1)
(Q−R)2 (R
′Q−Q′R)
which, by construction, has the sign determining function (R′Q − Q′R). If we
consider the first order condition of Q/R we arrive at a sign determining function
of (Q′R−R′Q) such that the first order conditions of the problems
min R
Q−R(
∑
i
Vi(θ1)− 1),
and
max Q
R
yield identical predictions in terms of first order conditions. For sufficiency we need
to check second order derivatives two which are equivalent since (P ) is minimized
and (O1) is maximized whenever
Q′′R−R′′Q > 0.
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We show that ρ(m|Γ ) is independent of β∅ for the case of K = 2. However,
iteratively applying the same argument yields the result also for K > 2. If K = 2
we get
γi(θ1) = β1∅γ(θ1, θ1) + (1− β1∅)γ(θ1, θ2) = β1∅γ(θ1, θ1) + (1− β1∅)h1(B)γ(l, l)
β1∅
1− β1∅
where h1 is independent of β∅
β1∅γi(θ1) = (β1∅)2(1 + h1i (B))γ(θ1, θ1)
Spelling out in the same manner yields:
(1− β1∅)γi(θ2) = p2h2(B) + (1− p)
p
(1− p)h3(B)
p
(1− p)h1(B)
Such that we can write (1 − Pr(Γ ) = (β1∅)2f(B) and βk∅γi(θk) = (β1∅)2gki (B),
where both H and h are independent of the prior.
The transformations to (O2) and (O3) follow from spelling out the arguments
given in the text.
Proof of lemma 17
Proof. The result directly follows from a combination of lemma 15 and Observa-
tion 3
Proof of proposition 10
Proof. Assume for a contradiction, that signals are optimal. By Bayes plausibil-
ity each signal implements a mean preserving spread over an expected posterior.
Each of the realizations induces a realized posterior. By linearity of expectations
the expected value for the ombudsman over the signals is never greater than the
maximum over the realized values. Since any solution feasible including signals,
i.e. any posterior that is Bayes plausible to the prior is feasible already in ex-
pected posteriors, it is always possible to choose the posterior that induces the
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highest value for the ombudsman directly, making public signals not beneficial for
the unconstraint problem.
Proof of lemma 18
Proof. Assume either of the two downward incentive compatibility constraints is
non-binding and the signal is non-symmetrizing. Then, the ombudsman can re-
lay the constraint by introducing a symmetrizing signal, since, by symmetry the
players who’s downward incentive compatibility binds for the initial signal now
receives additional probability mass on states in which her incentive compatibility
constraint is non-binding. This relaxes the pressure of the incentive compatibility
constraint and is thus profitable for the ombudsman.
Next assume that both incentive compatibility constraints bind, but the shadow
value is large for one of the two. By symmetry a symmetrizing signal then relaxes
the pressure on the incentive compatibility constraint of the type with the larger
shadow value making it profitable for the ombudsman.
Proof of lemma 19
Proof. Consider the representation (O3) of the problem in the following sense
∑
i
(ρi(θk|Γ )w(θk)ψ(θk)) +
∑
l 6=k
ρi(θl)Di(θl) + Eρi [Ui]).
Now consider any changes in βk∅ . As βk∅ → 0 E[Ui] is not affected and all ele-
ments of ∑l 6=k ρi(θl)Di(θl) are bounded, but w(θk)→∞ such that ψ(θk) becomes
arbitrarily important compared to the other parts of the objective.
Proof of proposition 11
Proof. We show that β11(θK) = 1 to proof the claim, as this implies by Bayes
plausibility that β12(θK) = 1.
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Consider the representation of (P ). Next, observe that R is (weakly) decreasing
in βk1 (K). Thus it is sufficient to show that Q−R is increasing in β11(K) to proof
the proposition.
Observe that using the construction that leads to the result of Proposition 8,
γi(θ1) is independent of any βk1 (θK). Moreover all γ1(θl) are independent of βki (K)
for l 6= K. Finally, by construction, all utilities U1(θi|θl) are independent of βki (θK)
for l 6= K and so is U2(θi|θ1).
Next, by Observation 2 note that the endogenously determined beliefs are β2(θk)
for k 6= 1 and βi(θK). Moreover, by the definition of the utility function in EPIC
games each Ui(θ1|θk) of a weighted sum of βli(θk),
Ui(θk|θm) =
K∑
l=1
βli(m)ui(θk, θl).
Noticing, that, again by construction γi(θk)βli(θk) is independent of β1(θK) for
all, k 6= K and thus yi(θk, θ) is independent of β1(θK) for all k 6= K
We therefore can write Q−R as
q1(θK , θK)(y1(θK , θK)) + q1(θK , θK)(y1(θK , θK)− βK∅ γ1(θK) + C
with C a constant independent of β11(θK) and the second to last term, the part
of R depending on β11(θK).
Let us now assume the type space was only binary which yields γi(θK) = ξβ11(θ2)−
φi, with φi ≥ 0 with equality for i = 1, and ξ > 0 the same for both i.
Thus we know that γ2(θK) = γ1(θK)− φ2 and therefore
Q−R− C = (1− β1∅)
(∑
i
γi(θ2)Ui(θ2|θ2)− γ1(θ2)
)
= (1− β1∅)γ1(θ2)
(
U1(θ2|θ2) + U2(θ2|θ2)− 1
)
− φ2U2(θ2|θ2)
= (1− β1∅)γ1(θ2)
(∑
i
(
β1i (θ2)
(
ui(θ2, θ1)− ui(θ2, θ2)
)
+ ui(θ2, θ2)
)
− 1
)
− φ2
(
β12(θ2)
(
u2(θ2, θ1)− u2(θ2, θ2)
)
+ u2(θ2, θ2)
)
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Letting ∆i := ui(θ2, θ1) − ui(θ2, θ2), slightly rearranging and dropping all θ2
arguments for the sake of readability and taking the derivative with respect to
β11(θ2)
∂Q−R−C1−β1∅
∂β11(·)
= −γ1(·)
β11(·)
(∑
i
β1i (·)∆i +
∑
i
ui(·, ·)− 1
)
+ γ1(·)
(
∆1 + ∆2
∂β12(·)
∂β11(·)
)
− ∂β
1
2(·)
∂β11(·)
φ∆2
= γ1(·)
(
1−∑
i
ui(·, ·)
)
+
(
γ2(·)∂β
1
2(·)
∂β11(·)
− γ1(·)β
1
2(·)
β11(·)
)
∆2,
where the last term is 0 since the part in parenthesis is 0, and the first part is
positive by non-productiveness.
If the type space was not binary, we could use the same steps at the cost of
additional notation. However, at this point we had only established that β11(θK)
should be 1−∑K−2k=2 βk1 (θK). Having established this, we would perform the same
exercise given β11(θK) = 1 −
∑K−2
k=2 β
k
1 (θK) showing that 1 −
∑K−2
k=2 β
k
1 (θK) should
always be increased until β11(θK) = 1. Finally, β11(θK) = 1 never interferes with
the feasibility constraint or the downward-adjacent incentive constraints which
concludes the proof.
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4 Pandering, Persuasion and
Sequential Proposal
4.1 Introduction
An agent who implements a certain project often imposes an externality on the rest
of the economy through implementation. Examples include mergers that change
the market concentration, patent applications that limit competition, and research
projects that require resources that otherwise are available for different purposes.
To mitigate potential welfare losses caused by the project choices, agents are often
required to apply to an authority who decides whether the proposed project should
be implemented. In many cases, however, the authority is less informed than the
agent about both, the project’s realized quality itself, and the quality or existence
of a potential alternative project. If private benefits of the project do not coincide
with social benefits, the agent might have a strategic incentive to withhold a project
for reasons beneficial only to her. Thus, an authority receiving a project proposal
must therefore answer the following questions: How large is the likelihood that an
even better project exists, but is not proposed by the agent? To what extend is it
worth denying the current proposal in hope for a better proposal tomorrow?
The aim of this paper is to study dynamic project choice in a sender-receiver
framework. The sender has multiple rounds to propose projects to the receiver,
but only one project can be implemented in total. The receiver, in turn, can only
implement projects if they have been proposed. Thus, all the receiver can use as
a signal for the quality of both the proposed and the not proposed projects is the
choice of the sender’s proposal. That means the receiver might reject a proposal
in hope for a better proposal tomorrow, even if she expects the current proposal
to be beneficial.
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I show that in principle two types of equilibria arise: the first is a mixed-strategy
equilibrium in which the authority accepts the receiver’s less preferred project only
with some probability. Similar to a related, static model by Che, Dessein, and Kar-
tik (2013) the sender panders towards the receiver-preferred project as she expects
this to be implemented with a larger probability. However, the dynamic setting
allows for a second type of equilibria, if the time horizon is large enough. These are
equilibria in which the sender persuades by waiting to propose the sender-preferred
project. The set of waiting equilibria is potentially large. The waiting equilibrium
with the shortest waiting time yields the same payoff for the sender, but a lower
payoff for the receiver than the mixed strategy equilibrium. The receiver’s profits
are highest in a waiting equilibrium with intermediate waiting time. The reason
is that in such a case good realizations of the sender-preferred project are im-
plemented, but all others are deterred by the waiting period. Starting from the
optimum an increase in waiting time deters desirable projects. A reduction in the
waiting time, to the contrary, attracts undesirable projects. Both is not beneficial
to the receiver.
I contribute to the understanding of project choice problems in many environ-
ments by showing that the choice of an equilibrium with considerable delay is to
the benefit of the receiver, while the sender never prefers any delay. This may
be important in setting up institutions that determine the equilibrium choice.
Authorities prefer to pick equilibria that involve considerable delay while private
parties always prefer a quick solution.
As an application, I consider a firm (firm 0) within an oligopoly that proposes a
merger with another firm to an antitrust authority. Upon seeing only the proposed
merger, but not the realized synergies, the authority needs to decide whether to
allow the merger or to block it. Even if the merger is preferred to the status quo,
the authority faces the trade-off whether to allow the proposed merger or to block
it in hope that firm 0 proposes an alternative merger with another firm in the
next period. Different from Nocke and Whinston (2010), I consider non-disjoint
mergers which is why a myopic policy is not optimal in this setting. I show that
the implemented merger depends on the choice of equilibrium.
The analysis is motivated by two observations: first, a merger proposed by a
given firm has typically two components: the merging partner and a realization of
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synergies. Second, if a merger is denied, a firm can offer an alternative merger in
the subsequent period.
The two dimensions of a given merger proposal are particularly interesting as
preferences are aligned in one dimension, but orthogonal in the other. Preferences
about post-merger marginal cost are aligned: both the firm and the authority
prefer less costly projects. Across projects, however, preferences differ: while the
firm favors less competition post-merger, the authority wants to keep the level of
competition as high as possible.
The dynamic component becomes particular interesting if synergies are non-
verifiable. Then the merging firms can only commit on their identities, but not
on the particular realization. The authority, however, observing the merging firms
identities can only form beliefs about the merger’s quality based on the merger
choice by the proposing firm. Without commitment power this means that the
authority updates, both her beliefs about the proposed merger as well as those
about the non-proposed mergers before making a decision whether to accept or
reject the merger.
Although both, firm and authority, discount future payoffs in the same way,
increasing the time needed to implement the firm-preferred project is to the ad-
vantage of the authority. If the equilibrium is chosen such that decisions are always
made early in the process, the firm is willing to propose her preferred project when-
ever synergies are not far worse than in the authority-preferred project. Different
to that, an equilibrium that involves a longer waiting time for the firm-preferred
merger results in the firm proposing the authority-preferred merger more often. As
the authority-preferred merger can be allowed right at the beginning, the time loss
is mitigated for the authority. However, any equilibrium with a very long waiting
time is neither preferred by the authority: on the one hand, the firm would, of
course, always propose the ex-ante authority-preferred merger if available. On the
other hand, she would also do so in case the synergies in this merger are very low,
but those in the ex-ante firm-preferred merger are very high. As authority and
firm would prefer the same implementation in such a scenario scenario, both would
prefer an equilibrium with intermediate waiting time.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: in Section 4.2, I give an
overview on the related literature. Section 4.3 introduces the general model and
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the solution concept. In Section 4.4, I derive equilibria for the case of two possible
projects, and analyze the differences. Section 4.5 concludes.
4.2 Literature Review
The paper by Che, Dessein, and Kartik (2013) is probably the closest to mine.
Similar to my model, they are interested in a game between an informed sender and
an uniformed receiver. In their model, however, the receiver can in principle decide
freely what to do, even without the proposal of the sender. While this assumption
is reasonable in case a decision maker hires an expert to tell her what to do, my
model is more concerned about an authority that regulates what firms are allowed
to do. In many situations authorities have only the power to block certain actions,
but cannot enforce a particular action of the firm. The pandering equilibrium
in their model has similar characteristics to the mixed strategy equilibrium in
my model. I show, however, that adding a dynamic component also allows for
a second class of equilibria, which are worthwhile to study, as the authority is
actually better off in some equilibria within this class.
As proposals are needed, my model is not a model of cheap talk per se. How-
ever, given the multidimensionality of the project realizations, I relate to a model
by Chakraborty and Harbaugh (2010) who introduce multidimensionality into the
cheap talk literature. They show, that multidimensional cheap talk often leads to
full revelation. The major difference to this model is that senders in Chakraborty
and Harbaugh (2010) can choose in which dimension to communicate to the re-
ceiver, while the dimension is fixed in my model. Moreover, they, too, rely on
the fact that the receiver has all the decision power and can implement whatever
product she wants.
Different to the literature on sequential delegation, e.g. Kovác and Krähmer
(2013), who show that sequential delegation supersedes if the differences in pref-
erence is small, I do not have gradual information arrival in my model, but a fixed
multidimensional type space.
This model also contributes to the old literature on multidimensional signaling
of Quinzii and Rochet (1985), Wilson (1985), and Milgrom and Roberts (1986).
While Wilson (1985) and Milgrom and Roberts (1986) consider one dimensional
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types with multidimensional signals, my model has multidimensional types, as e.g.
Quinzii and Rochet (1985), but only a one-dimensional signal. Moreover, I consider
a dynamic environment which is why, even without explicit cost of signaling, the
firm is equipped with a signaling motive.
Since producing the signal itself is costless, this paper also relates to dynamic
bargaining models with one-sided incomplete information going back to Sobel and
Takahashi (1983). In line with that Fudenberg and Tirole (1983) and Admati
and Perry (1987) formulated a theory which uses time as a strategic variable.
While Sobel and Takahashi (1983) and Fudenberg and Tirole (1983) have a similar
negotiation structure to mine, that is one party makes an offer, the other can only
accept or reject and the game continues upon rejection, Admati and Perry (1987)
show that strategic delay can be used to signal one’s type in two sided-bargaining
problems. The main difference to the bargaining literature is that the signal space
in this paper is reduced to the identity of the project and payments are not allowed.
Firms want to signal that whatever they propose is “without alternative” which,
if credible, would lead to immediate implementation. Thus, the firm tries not
so much to signal anything about the value of the current project, but tries to
discourage the authority’s hope for a better project in the future.
In the application part, the model closest to mine is that of Nocke and Whinston
(2013). They, model a delegated choice problem to derive optimal merger control.
The difference is that is, despite their model being static, that the firm can verify
her synergies in the proposed merger. Thus, the only private information the firm
has is about the characteristics of the not proposed mergers. Further, Nocke and
Whinston (2013) assume full commitment of the authority, which is not assumed
in my model.
Asymmetric information between firm and authority has been studied also by
Besanko and Spulber (1993) who were probably the first to model merger control
explicitly as a game between firms and authorities.1 Ottaviani and Wickelgren
(2011) introduce a choice of timing on the side of the authority and derive condi-
tions when ex-post merger control is better than ex-ante merger control. Dynamic
1A small literature on merger remedies also connects to this paper, as “projects” can also
be seen as different types of remedies. Papers that asses remedies before are, e.g. Lyons and
Medvedev (2007), Cosnita and Tropeano (2009), Vasconcelos (2010), and Cosnita-Langlais and
Tropeano (2012).
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merger review is studied by Nocke and Whinston (2010) and Sørgard (2009). Both
papers look at disjoint mergers and how the decision on proposing the merger de-
pends on the approval rule of the authority. Sørgard (2009) derives a rule that
determines an optimal investigation probability, while Nocke and Whinston (2010)
consider sequential proposal. They show that a myopic policy is optimal if mergers
are disjoint. The main difference to my model is, that mergers are not disjoint
in my model. Much to the contrary, I look at the different merger options by on
single firm and ask how this effects the authorities decision. I find, different to the
setup of Nocke and Whinston (2010) that a myopic policy is not optimal in such
a case. In fact I show, that the authority can actually use the time dimension to
screen merger realization.
4.3 The General Model
This section gives a formal description of the game to be played.
4.3.1 Setup
Consider a game of two players, a sender (the firm) and a receiver (the AA). The
firm can choose one among a set of projects to recommend to the AA by sending
message m, and the AA can accept or reject the proposed project and a proposed
project only. The number of projects is N . The realisation of each project can be
one of the following
1. with probability 1 > λi > 0 project i is not available,2 or
2. with probability 1 − λi project i is available. If project i is available, its
realisation ci follows a random variable. I assume each ci to be independently
2Note: The non-availability probability subsumes not only the cases in which a certain project
is not available in the usual sense (in a merger context this could be due to personal problems
between CEOs, ...). Moreover non-availability may also occur if the project is neither profitable
for the firm nor the AA (for example if synergies are too low). In such a case the project never
gets proposed and may therefore be treated as if it was not available at all.
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drawn from a distribution Fi with a density fi that is continuous on its
support [c, c].3
The firm receives a payoff of δt−1pii(ci) if project i is implemented in period t,
the AA receives a payoff of δt−1wi(ci).
I assume that the functions are ordered such that ∞ > pi1(c) > pi2(c) > ... >
piN(c) > 0 and w1(c) < w2(c) < .... < wn(c) <∞ for any c ∈ [c, c].4 Each pii, wi is
twice continuously differentiable on [c, c] and decreasing in its argument.
The game has a total number of T periods and both players discount with factor
δ < 1. The value of the status quo is normalised to 0.
For the sake of simplicity and to make the decisions non-trivial assume the
following:
Assumption 3. Given it is the only project that is available, each project has, in
expectation, a positive payoff to both players. In other words:
E[wi] > 0 ∀i.
Assumption 4. The probability distributions are such that
E[wn+1] > E[wn] ∀n.
Assumption 5. Suppose the firm naively proposes the project that maximises its
payoff under full acceptance. Then, the distributions are such that there exists at
least one case in which the AAs best response is to wait for a better project in the
next round. More formally, this means:
∃j 6= i ∈ {1, 2, ..., N} : E[δwj|pii ∈ max
k∈N
pik] > E[wi|pii ∈ max
k∈N
pik].
3I assume common bounds for the ease of notation. None of the results depend on this if
there is at least some overlap between the two.
4In the case of the merger framework, this reflects the firms preferences c.p. towards larger
mergers (functions of lower cardinality) while the AA prefers smaller mergers (functions of higher
cardinality). In addition, to reverse the preference order completely simplifies computations, but
the general results do not depend too much on this particular preference order. All I need is that
firm and AA do not share the exact same order of preferences.
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Assumption 3 is only to facilitate computations. It serves to ensure that the
threat of non-availability of other projects is present for any project i. Assump-
tion 4, too, is for simplicity. It ensures that the AA not only pointwise prefers
projects with higher cardinality, but prefers them in expectation, too. Both as-
sumptions can be relaxed to milder versions, in which they only hold in conditional
expectations. Finally, the last assumption is made to make the problem interesting.
It is, thus, crucial to the problem. If assumption 5 was not fulfilled, preferences
would be completely aligned, and the solution to the problem would be trivial.
All, but the realisations of each project is common knowledge.
The timing of the game is as follows:
1. Before the beginning of the first period, the firm privately observes the vector
of realisations ψ = (c1, c2, ..., cN). I may refer to the vector also as the firm’s
type. The firm’s type remains constant throughout the game.
To deal with the non-availability of certain projects, assume that if a project
was not available (which as noted above happens with probability λi), the
entry in ψ is some number c > c.
2. At the beginning of each period, the firm can propose
a) nothing (by posting identity “0”)
b) exactly one project identity that
i. is available, i.e. where ci 6= c and5
ii. has not been proposed in any previous period.6
3. At the end of each period, after observing a non-“0”-proposal, the AA can
5Again this assumption is made to simplify the argument. An alternative way to model
reduced form unavailability would be to assume that an unavailable project has a negative payoff
to firm and authority. This way, if the AA accepts the proposal with positive probability, the
firm would never propose it or withdraw her offer after it has been made, which is essentially
the same as proposing 0. To avoid unnecessary notation, I simply assume such a proposal is not
possible.
6This assumption reduces the set of possible equilibria. Allowing re-proposal might cause
equilibria in which the firm persistently proposes the same project. All equilibria I derive in
this setting here, easily survive in a world were re-proposal is possible. Moreover, the set of
equilibria I derive here without re-proposal survives certain refinements, which they survive in
the re-proposal setup as well.
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a) accept the proposal: in this case we arrive at a terminal node, the
proposed project gets implemented and payoffs realize
b) deny the proposal: in this case the game advances to the next period.
4. After the firm has proposed “0”, the game continues independently of AA’s
action.7
I am looking for perfect Bayesian Nash equilibria in which no player plays a
weakly dominated strategy.8
4.3.2 Action and Strategies
The firm’s choice is a function that determines its proposal at each time t. This
function is a mapping from the set of possible types ψ defined as Ψ to some message
mt. That is,
mt : Ψ 7→Mt(Ψ, Ht−1).
By the rules of the game the set of available messages Mt depends both on the
type of the firm (since non-available states are excluded) and the history (since
re-proposal is excluded). Thus, at time t and for a given state ψ the set of available
messages, Mt(ψ), is defined as
M1(ψ) = {i : ci 6= c} ∪ 0
Mt+1(ψ) = Mt(ψ) \mt ∪ 0 ∀t ≥ 0.
Thus, the firm can only post an available project identity that has not been
proposed before (i.e. a positive number) or “0” (the Null-Project) which means
that it does not wish to implement anything.
The strategy of the AA is slightly more complex and involves a function that
determines the acceptance probability and a function of beliefs over types.
7A variant in which this is not the case is studied in section 4.4.1.
8Since this is a two player game, this restriction is equivalent to using an strategic form
trembling-hand refinement.
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Before taking an action, the AA forms a belief about the type of the firm. The
belief function takes the following form
βt : Ht−1 7→ ∆(Ψ),
where Ht = {m1, ....,mt} is an ordered set of received messages9 and ∆(Ψ) is
the set of probability distributions over the possible states.
The AA chooses further a function ρt in each period to determine the acceptance
probability after having received proposal mt. That is
ρt : Mmax0 \Ht−1 7→ [0, 1].
whereMmax0 , the maximal message space at the beginning of the game, is simply
the vector {1, ..., N} since in principle each project has a positive probability of
being available and thus in the message set. After each round, the AA can remove
all elements out of the message set that already have been proposed since we
excluded re-proposal.
4.3.3 Equilibrium Description
A configuration
{
{m∗}Tt=1 , {ρ∗t}Tt=1 , {β∗t }Tt=1
}
is a trembling-hand perfect Bayesian
Nash equilibrium if the following conditions hold:
• m∗t is chosen out of a set of best responses to the equilibrium probability
function of the AA. This set of best responses, M∗(ψ, ρ∗t , Ht−1) is described
as
M∗(ψ, ρ∗t , Ht−1) = {i ∈Mt : V (i, ψ, ρ∗t , Ht−1) ≥ V (j, ψ, ρ∗t , Ht−1) ∀j ∈Mt}
(∗)
9Formally, to be precise we need to define the order H as mi H mj ⇔ i > j and H˜t as
the set of all messages send up to point t. Ht(H˜t,H) is then the function that describes this
ordered set. For the ease of notation I am going to suppress the arguments H˜t and H .
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where V (i, ψ, ρ∗t , Ht−1) is the value of proposing project i in period t after
having proposed history Ht−1 in the past and acting optimally thereafter.10
To put some structure on V (i, ψ, ρ∗, Ht−1) it is useful to distinguish between
two types of value functions:
i. V (i, ·) denotes the beginning of period value function, that is the value of
proposing project i at the beginning of a period and acting optimally
thereafter.
ii. V˜ (i, ·) is the end of period value function, that is, it describes the value
the choice of i has on all future periods given the firm acts optimally
after that particular period.
Note that V˜ is only an auxiliary construction to properly describe the V ,
since for messagemt it holds that V˜ (mt, ρ∗t+1, ψ,Ht−1) = δV (m∗t+1, ρ∗t+1, ψ,Ht−1∪
mt).
V˜ serves the simple purpose to spell out the beginning of period value func-
tion:11
V (i, ·) = ρ∗t (i)pii(ci) + (1− ρ∗t (i)) V˜ (i, ·).
• The equilibrium probability function ρ∗t is chosen such that, for all messages
sent with a ex-ante positive probability, it holds that
ρ∗t (mt) ∈

0 if Et[wmt |Ht] < δΥ (Ht)
1 if Et[wmt|Ht] > δΥ (Ht)
[0, 1] else
. (∗∗)
Where Et[·|Ht] denotes the (rational) expectations of the AA in period t
conditional on a history of messages Ht, that is already including mt.
Further, Υ (Ht) is the expected value at the beginning of the next period
conditional on rejecting this periods offer and acting optimally thereafter.
10Note that the time dependency of the decision is already incorporated in the variables ρt
and Ht−1 such that the value function it self can be modelled as time independent.
11For the ease of notation it is, without loss of generality, assumed that ρ∗t (0) := 0.
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• Beliefs β∗t are consistent with Bayes’ rule whenever possible.
• No player plays a weakly dominated strategy.
4.4 Analysis
For the sake of tractability, I am considering the case of only two projects here.
4.4.1 Equilibrium of the modified game
Before looking at the general game, I want to focus on a slightly modified version
for the ease of exposition.
Definition 10. A game is called “modified” if it follows the setup as it was laid out
in section 4.3 except for the additional rule that the game ends directly whenever
the firm proposes 0, i.e. the “null-project”.12
This modification is primarily of didactic use as it reduces the number of equi-
libria. Later, I am going to show that the result also survives in the general game
even under quite demanding refinement criteria and discuss other equilibria (and
there relation to this one) that exist only in the general game.
The modified game with only two possible projects has a simple type space,
namely a vector ψ = (c1, c2), and a message set in the first period that is at
most {0, 1, 2}. Under assumption 3 and 5, proposing naively cannot result in an
equilibrium. The AA would never accept project 1 and thus proposing 1 when 2 is
also available is not optimal. If λ2 > 0, rejecting 1 always and accepting 2 can also
not be an equilibrium if we do not allow for weakly dominated strategies. Since
we ruled out weakly dominated strategies, the firm would always propose project
1 if it is the only project available and under assumption 3 the AA should accept
it. Moreover, it is even possible to state the following.
Lemma 20. For the case of N = 2 and under assumption 3 and 5, no pure
strategy trembling-hand perfect equilibrium exists in the modified game.
12An equivalent formulation would be a setting in which the authority can shut down nego-
tiations by formally “accepting” the null project and implementing it. Again, the equilibrium
proposed in this section would survive such a game.
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The proof of this lemma can be found in section 4.A, as can all others not in
the text.
The intuition behind this lemma is straight forward. Proposing “0” is always
weakly dominated if any other proposal is available since a proposal of “0” nec-
essarily terminates the game and keeps the status quo, which is never preferred
by the firm if any project is available. Thus the firm is always going to propose
something. Assumption 5 rules out that the AA just waives whatever project is
proposed. Since with some probability each project is not available, it cannot be
optimal to unconditionally block a certain project either. The firm best responds
to such a blocking strategy by proposing the project only if it is the only one
available. With this strategy of the firm, however, unconditional blocking is not
optimal since each project is profitable in isolation (assumption 3). Thus, pure
strategies played by the AA can never be optimal.
Since every finite game has at least one trembling-hand-perfect Nash equilib-
rium,13 the trembling-hand-perfect equilibria must involve at least one mixing
party. In fact, since project realizations are continuously distributed, the AA is
the only player that is going to mix on more than a probability zero set. To con-
struct the equilibrium, first recall the equilibrium conditions from equation (∗) and
equation (∗∗). For the equilibrium construction assume that the second project is
the conditionally better looking one, i.e.
Assumption 6. E[w1|pi1 > pi2] < δE[w2|pi1 > pi2].
Although it puts some restriction on the distributions, this assumption still
allows for a wide range of distributions. Whenever both state variables c1, c2 are
identically distributed or if c2 does not have too much weight on high cost draws
we always can find a δ < 1 such that the assumption is fulfilled. Further assume
that project 2 is always accepted.14
13The proof of this is due to Selten (1975) and can be found in various textbooks such as
Fudenberg and Tirole (1991) and Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green (1995).
14Later, I show that in equilibrium this is indeed the case.
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Under these assumptions, the probability qρ(ψ) of proposing project 1 for a given
acceptance probability ρ1(1) = ρ is characterised by
qρ(ψ) =
 0 if ρpi1(c1) ≤ ζpi2(c2)1 if ρpi1(c1) > ζpi2(c2) (4.1)
with
ζ = (1− δ + ρδ) ∈ [0, 1],
which accounts for both the alternative proposal and the second round. In
equation (4.1) we may assume that the firm does not mix since indifference only
happens on a probability zero set of ψ.
With the help of equation (4.1), it is possible to construct a cut-off function
c˜ρ(c2) that assigns, given ρ and c2, a unique value c˜ such that for all c1 < c˜ the
firm prefers to propose project 1 while she is going to propose project 2 whenever
c1 > c˜. The function takes the following form:
c˜ρ(c2) :=

max{c1 : ρpi1(c1) ≥ ζpi2(c2)} if it is not ∅
c if c2 = c
c else.
(∗′)
Note that the function (∗′) is defined for each ρ > 0 over c2 ∈ [c, c] ∪ c and has
the following properties:
i. it is continuous in ρ and c2, since pi2 is continuous;
ii. it is weakly increasing in c2 since pi1(c1) and pi2(c2) are both decreasing in
their arguments;
iii. it is weakly increasing in ρ since the left-hand side of the inequality increases
in ρ and pi1(c) decreases in c;
iv. for fixed ρ it is weakly increasing in δ since the right-hand side decreases in
δ, giving the inequality (weakly) more slack at all points.
v. as ρ→ 0 , c˜ρ → c for all c2. Since pi2(c) > 0 for all c2 there exists an εc2 > 0
such that ∀ ρ < εc2 ⇒ c˜ρ(c2) = c. Monotonicity of pi2(c2) ensures that εc2 is
decreasing in c2;
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vi. since pi1 > pi2 by definition, it holds that there also exists an ρ < 1 such that
for all ρ > ρ we have c˜ρ(c2) ≥ c2;
vii. as a consequence of the monotonicity in both arguments, it also holds that
the smallest c2 at which the highest c˜ρ(c2) is reached15 (weakly) decreases in
ρ. c˜(c), on the other hand, increases in ρ.
To define the equilibrium action of the AA, recall equation (∗∗). By Lemma 20
we have excluded pure strategy equilibria, thus, 1 > ρ > 0.
To re-write condition (∗∗), define 12 to be the event in which project 1 is recom-
mended although project 2 is available, too, and define 10 to be the event at which
1 is sent and it is the only message other than 0 that is feasible. Since condition
(∗′) defines the optimal behaviour of the firm for any ρ and therefore determines
the probabilities and expectations of events 12 and 10, it is sufficient to rewrite
condition (∗∗) as follows
E[w1|m1 = 1] = E[δw2|m1 = 1]
⇔ (1− λ˜2)E[w1|12] + λ˜2E[w1|10] = (1− λ˜2)E[δw2|12]
⇔ (1− λ˜2)E[w1|12] + λ˜2E[w1] = (1− λ˜2)E[δw2|12]
⇔ (1− λ˜2) (E[w1 − δw2|12]) + λ˜2E[w1] = 0,
(∗∗′)
where λ˜2 = λ2λ2+(1−λ2)P (m=1|12) .
The first step divides expectations into two subsets. The second then makes use
of the fact that, given that project 1, but not project 2, is available, the firm would
always propose 1 in order to not play a weakly dominated strategy. Noticing that
w2 and w1 in the first term are conditioning on the same event gives the third step
of equation (∗∗′ ).
Lemma 21. If assumption 3 and 6 hold, there always exists a ρ such that 1 > ρ > 0
and equation (∗∗′ ) are fulfilled.
15Typically this highest c˜ρ(c2) = c, but one may choose a ρ small enough that even c˜ρ(c) < c.
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Intuitively, this lemma says that it is always possible to choose a ρ so low that
whenever both projects are available, the firm chooses the second project. In turn,
this choice means that the firm only (weakly) prefers to offer project 1 if nothing
else is available. If it did so whenever only 1 was available, the AA would want to
accept that proposal since it is welfare-increasing in expectations. Since gradual
changes in ρ lead at most to a gradual change in both expectations, the difference
of the two is continuous. If the difference is continuous, the indifference condition
must, in line with the intermediate value theorem, eventually be satisfied for some
1 > ρ > 0.
In fact, it is possible to derive an even stronger statement
Lemma 22. If the conditions for Lemma 21 hold, then whatever ρ solves equa-
tion (∗∗′ ) is unique.
The intuition to this lemma is, again, quite simple. As ρ increases, the firm
increases the number of states in which it proposes project 1. For any given c2,
this increase leads to additional states that are all worse than the worst state
under the original regime. Therefore, the expected payoff the AA earns from
implementing project 1 can only fall in ρ for proposals of 1. The expectations
of postponing implementation, on the other hand, increase for the same reasons,
since there is a larger set of “desirable” c2 that lead to a proposal of 1. Thus,
increasing ρ decreases the expected payoff when implementing 1 and increases the
expected payoff of waiting for any ρ. Consequently equation (∗∗′ ) can at most
hold for one ρ ∈ (0, 1).
To describe the equilibrium, it remains to show that it is optimal to always
accept project 2, i.e. E[w2|m = 2] ≥ δE[w1|m = 2] needs to hold under the
equilibrium ρ. This is guaranteed by assumption 4, as the following lemma shows.
Lemma 23. The AA prefers project 2 over project 1 whenever 2 is proposed.
The intuition underlying this lemma is that, in expectation, whenever the firm
proposes a certain project, this project needs to be “better” than a certain thresh-
old. In turn, whenever the firm does not propose a project it must have a worse
realization than this threshold. Since in equilibrium the AA is indifferent under
the proposal of 1, the expected payoff from project 2’s realization must be higher
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for the authority if the firm proposes 2. Expectations of waiting after the proposal
of project 2 must be smaller by the same argument. Thus always accepting project
2 is optimal in equilibrium.
Combining Lemma 21 and 23 provides existence of a mixed strategy equilibrium
as the following lemma shows
Lemma 24. Suppose assumption 3, 4 and 6 hold. Then, there exists a unique
mixed strategy trembling hand perfect Baysian Nash equilibrium in the modified
game with the following properties:
• The second project is accepted whenever it is proposed.
• The first project is accepted with probability ρ < 1.
• If the second stage is reached, proposal project 2 in the second stage gets
accepted.
• Firms propose project one whenever ψ is such that c1 < c˜ρ(c2).
4.4.2 Comparison to the original game
All the results of the previous section have been derived under the assumption
that players play the modified game. In this section, I am going to discuss how
these results carry over to the original game.
Theorem 2. There exists an equilibrium of the original game that has the following
properties:
• It is outcome equivalent to the unique equilibrium of the modified game
• On the equilibrium path actions are identical to the ones of the modified game
• The equilibrium does not fail the universal divinity, if any of the two condi-
tions holds
i. the acceptance probability ρ∗ is larger than the discount factor δ, or
ii. the worst project is smaller than the outside option w1(c) < 0.
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The crucial aspect for survival of the refinement is to find beliefs such that the
AA wishes to deny off equilibrium proposals. For the second proposal this is not
that hard since the firm never wishes to deviate since that only would incur time
costs. Thus, any type is equally likely to deviate. The story is quite different
for project 1. There might be a reason to wait for the firm if it beliefs that in
later periods the acceptance probability was large enough. For sure, any off-path
acceptance probability that attracts at least some type ψˆ must also attract all types
that cannot propose project 2 because it is unavailable. However, discriminating
between those is not possible, since they are all only interested in implementing
project 1. This way, if any type has, for some off-path acceptance probability any
incentive to go off-path, also the type ψ = (c, c) has an incentive to do so. This
is, by definition the worst type in terms of payoff for the AA. Thus, if there is at
least one state such that the AA prefers the outside option, she prefers the outside
option to implementing project 1 under ψ. Since this type engages in all off-path
activities, it cannot be excluded under universal divinity. Thus, if the AA beliefs
any deviator is of type ψ she has reason to deny it and the equilibrium sustains.
The crucial aspect for the sustainability of the equilibrium is the fact that there
exists a positive probability that the better looking project does not exist.
Together with the second restriction, namely that w1(c) < 0, the non-availability
guarantees universal divinity for any length of the game. Thus, the existence of
the equilibrium of the modified game carries over to the general game even if we
were to restrict our self to a rather narrow set of equilibria.
Uniqueness, however, does not necessarily survive. In particular, the two dimen-
sional type space of the firm allows for a wide range of equilibria if we consider the
generalized game. Together with the possibility to sent the “0” message as often
as possible a wide range of justifiable off-equilibrium beliefs can be consistent even
under strict refinements such as universal divinity. To understand this recall that
the equilibrium of the modified game does not fail universal divinity in the general
game simply because “all” types for which project 2 was not available survive the
iterated D2 criterion. That is, if the AA sees a proposal of project 1 anywhere off
the equilibrium path it can, even with strong restrictions be of any type (regarding
project 1’s cost function).
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If negotiations go on for sufficiently many rounds, that is if T is large enough,
a second set of equilibria which I am going to call “waiting equilibria” would
arises. In such a “waiting equilibrium” the firm proposes the null-project for
sufficiently many rounds in order to signal that the ex-ante AA-preferred project
is of poor quality or not available. In the traditional bargaining literature these
are sometimes the only equilibria that survive even mild refinements and they are
typically called “signalling equilibria”.16 In the present context signalling also is an
issue in the “ρ∗-equilibrium” described above, which is why I differ in terminology.
The decision whether to accept or reject an offer made by the firm in those
type of equilibria is in fact very similar too the decision rule in the ρ∗-equilibrium.
Whenever the AA believes that the project offered in the current round is at least
as good as the discounted value of what she can expect in the future, she would
accept the proposed project, whenever this is not the case she denies approval.
Given this, the firm might delay its proposal strategically under some circumstance
while it may prefer to propose something that gets accepted right away instead
of suffering the cost of waiting. More precisely, suppose the AA always accepts
project 2 and accepts project 1 only at time t ≥ τ + 1.17 Then for each c2 it
is possible to construct a function cˆτ (c2) such that the firm chooses to propose
project 1 in period τ whenever c1 < cˆτ (c2) and project 2 (if possible) in all other
cases. More formally this is
cˆρ(c2) :=

max{c1 : δτpi1(c1) ≥ pi2(c2)} if it is not ∅
c if c2 = c
c else.
(∗′)
This function almost perfectly corresponds to c˜∗ρ(c2) defined in the beginning of
this section. Consequently, this, too, provides a cutoff value for the firm given any
τ . As in the other equilibrium the AA optimally chooses τ such that whenever
the firm proposes project 1 in period τ + 1 it holds that the AA only accepts
the proposal if Eτ+1[w1|Hτ+1] ≥ δEτ+1[w2|Hτ+1]. Before describing the possible
“waiting equilibria” let us first properly define the term.
16Examples would be Admati and Perry (1987) or Cramton (1992)
17To understand why this is τ + 1,recall that a proposal in t=2 is discounted with δ1 since
participants ex-ante payoffs are given in period one values.
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Definition 11. An equilibrium is called a “waiting equilibrium at τ” if it is an
equilibrium of the game and the authority uses the following strategy:
• Project 2 is accepted in any period
• Project 1 is rejected in any period t ≤ τ and accepted in all other periods.
Next, it is straightforward to use the cutoff function cˆτ derived above to describe
the equilibrium that is closest related to the ρ∗-equilibrium from above.
Lemma 25. Consider a certain specification of the game and fix the equilibrium
at ρ∗. Ignoring the integer constraint in t there exists a “waiting equilibrium at τ”
where
τ = ln(ρ
∗)− ln(1− δ(1− ρ∗))
ln(δ)
that corresponds in the firms decision rule to the ρ∗-equilibrium, that is cˆτ (c2) =
c˜ρ∗(c2) for all c2. This equilibrium may be considered as the “shortest possible”
waiting equilibrium in a sense that all other waiting equilibria require a waiting
time τ ≥ τ . Moreover, if and only if ρ∗ > δ
δ+1 , then τ < 1.
The intuition behind this becomes quite clear if you think about what happens
if the AA accepts proposals of project 1 “too early”. Then the firm would propose
them in a way, such that the AA better denies it in hope of a better outcome on
the other project. From the construction of the ρ∗-equilibrium it is already clear
that whenever the firm decides via cutoff rules, then there exists a unique decision
function such that the AA is indifferent in expectations between the two projects.
While this function was enforced in the ρ∗-equilibrium with the acceptance prob-
ability, it is now done by appropriately choosing τ . Since the two correspond we
just need to look for the parameter in which the functions are identical. This is
what describes the smallest τ .
In the model, of course, time is discrete and thus the above described point is
generically never an integer. However, as the following proposition shows, for all
τ > τ a waiting equilibrium at τ exists.
Theorem 3. If T − 1 > τ , there exists a set of waiting equilibria at τ for all τ
such that τ ≤ τ ≤ T − 1. All waiting equilibria survive under the refinement of
universal divinity if w1(c) < 0
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While each equilibrium on its own is in fact independent of the maximum du-
ration of the game, there is a one to one mapping between numbers of proposal
rounds played after τ and the number of waiting equilibria that exist.
4.4.3 Welfare effects
To compare the different equilibria it is useful to think about how the equilibrium
payoffs in the different equilibria behave and to exercise some comparative statics.
Following the order in which the equilibria were characterized, I start by examining
the ρ∗-equilibrium and thereafter looking at the waiting-equilibria.
Besides comparing the equilibria with each other, a natural benchmark would
also be the (ex ante) equilibrium payoffs if the AA had the ability to commit
ex-ante to accepting only project 2. This benchmark case is going to be called a
“conservative AA” throughout the rest of the paper.
To simplify notation denote Ea[w|ρ∗] to be the ex-ante payoff expectation of
the AA under equilibrium acceptance probability ρ∗ as in the equilibrium of sec-
tion 4.4.1 and let Ea[w|0] be the ex-ante expectations if the AA was to deny project
1 always, i.e. behaving conservatively.
Proposition 12. The ρ∗-equilibrium always assigns a lower payoff to the AA than
she gets when committing to only accepting the second project.
Proof. The mixed strategy equilibrium increases the AA’s payoff only if Ea[w|ρ∗] >
Ea[w|0]. The following argues that this is not true.
Spelling out the first yields
Ea[w|ρ∗] =(1− λ2)(1− λ1)
c∫
c
w2(c2) (1− F1(c˜ρ∗(c2))) dF2(c2) (4.2)
+ (1− λ2)λ1E[w2] (4.3)
+ (1− λ2)(1− λ1)
c∫
c
δw2(c2)F1(c˜ρ∗(c2))dF2(c2), (4.4)
where the first is the expected value in case both projects are available and
project 2 is proposed given ρ∗, the second is the part in which project 2 is proposed
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since it is the only one available, and the last part covers the expectations whenever
1 is proposed, using the indifference condition (∗∗′ ).
Further we may decompose
Ea[w|0] =(1− λ2)E[w2]
=(1− λ2)
(
λ1E[w2] + (1− λ1)E[w2]
)
=(1− λ2)λ1E[w2] + (1− λ2)(1− λ1)
c∫
c
w2(c2)dF2(c2)
=(1− λ2)λ1E[w2]
+ (1− λ2)(1− λ1)
c∫
c
w2(c2) (F1(c˜ρ∗(c2) + (1− F1(c˜ρ∗(c2))) dF2(c2)
=Ea[w|ρ∗] + (1− δ)(1− λ2)(1− λ1)
c∫
c
w2(c2)F1(c˜ρ∗(c2))dF2(c2)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
. (4.5)
The first step just spells out the conditional expectations, the second divides it
into the events in which project one is or is not available. The third transforms
them into integral form, the fourth multiplies with 1 to back out the ex-ante
expectations of the equilibrium in the last step. Since expectations in equilibrium
are positive when 1 is proposed, the leftover term is positive. Thus, from an ex-ante
point of view the AA prefers accepting only project two if both were available.
Intuitively, this is rather obvious if one thinks about the different channels at
work in the model.
If the AA was able to allow only project 2 the firm can never exploit the game
in her preferred way if opinions about optimal actions differ. Thus, the persua-
sion channel is completely shut down. Pandering, to the contrary, is driven to
its maximum.18 Finally, the sequentiality channel is shut down as well, since in
18In fact ex-ante pandering is optimal from the point of view of the AA. However, on an
interim stage there might actually be over-pandering, that is the firm proposes a project that
both firm and AA prefer less than the other one (interim), but that was not preferred ex-ante
by the AA.
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equilibrium there is no second period. This sequentiality works, as we saw in
the discussion of the equilibrium, as an insurance for the firm to “try out” her
preferred project. That way, commitment to pure strategies in fact must work
in favour of the AA since it only shuts down the channels that benefit the firm.
The AA therefore earns something like a “conservative commitment markup”. To
facilitate later comparison it is useful to think of this markup as relative to the
expected payoff if only project 2 was was proposed. To do so, define
φ(ρ∗) := E[w|0]− E[w|ρ
∗]
E[w|0]
and rewrite equation (4.5) as
Ea[w|0] = (1− φ(ρ∗))Ea[w|0] + φ(ρ∗)Ea[w|0]. (4.6)
In this context φ can be interpreted as the “relative conservative commitment
markup” (RCCM).
With this reformulations it is easier to tell how much (in relative terms) the AA
looses by being unable to ignore any proposals of 1 in equilibrium.
Proposition 13. Consider the ρ∗-equilibrium. An increase in the time preference
parameter δ leads to
• a decrease in the acceptance probability ρ∗,
• a decrease in the ex-ante likelihood that project 1 is being proposed and
• a decrease of the RCCM (and a higher absolute payoff for the AA).
While an increase in δ decreases the cost of waiting one more round for both the
firm and the AA, the increased expected welfare in the second period leads the AA
to reduce its probability of accepting the first project. That means that the firm
reduces the states at which it proposes the first project and panders more towards
the second. This way it needs to give up some of the gains from the increased δ.
Further, the “commitment markup” goes down and thus, the AA loses less from
not being able to commit to a pure strategy.19
19In section 4.4.4 I discuss why commitment to a pure strategy is not optimal either and why
this leads to lower credibility of a commitment assumption on the AA’s side.
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Figure 4.1: Comparative statics with respect to availability of the second project λ2 and
discount factor δ. The upper panels deal depict effects on the ρ∗-equilibrium
and the lower panels that on the shortest waiting equilibrium.
Another interesting comparative statics in this model is the effect of non-availability
of the second project. This sheds light on to the point of how much the threat of
not having an alternative projects works in favour of the firm.
Lemma 26. Consider the mixed strategy equilibrium ρ∗. An increase in the non
availability probability of project 2, λ2, leads to
• an increase in the acceptance probability ρ∗ in equilibrium
• an increase in the ex-ante likelihood that project 1 is being proposed and
• an increase of the RCCM.
This result is, of course, not very surprising. As it becomes more likely that the
second project is not available at all, the firm creates, by proposing project 1, a
larger threat to the AA that this is the only project it has in fact. Thus, given
project 1 has been proposed, there is a higher chance that it is the only one around
(in which case the AA would want to accept) and the interim expectations of the
AA are driven down. She reacts by increasing the acceptance probability.
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In terms of the AAs payoffs under no commitment, to the contrary, the story is
not so clear since λ2 effects both the ex-ante expectations of a conservative strategy
as well as those under the equilibrium strategy.
The relative mark-up increases nevertheless, as the interim pressure the firm can
put on the AA increases with a higher probability of project one being the only
one available.
Turning to the waiting equilibria, it might at first be interesting to see how the
set of possible waiting equilibria changes with the parameters. While the largest
waiting equilibrium (if any such equilibrium exists) is always defined by T , as
Theorem 3 shows, the shortest waiting equilibrium might change as we change the
parameters of the model. With help of Lemma 25 it is obvious that all parameters
except the discount factor δ effect τ only through ρ∗. Observe, that
∂τ
∂ρ∗
= 1
ln(δ)ρ∗
1− δ
1− δ(1− ρ∗) < 0.
Thus, as ρ∗ increases τ decreases. The reason can easily be found in the equiv-
alence of the decisions rules of the firm in both equilibria. Therefore, a higher
effective acceptance probability needs to result in a smaller minimum waiting pe-
riod.20
The only parameter, that effects τ also in another way than through ρ∗, is the
discount factor δ. Its effect on τ is not all that obvious since the direct effect could
go either way. Nonetheless, as the following lemma shows, the overall effect of a
change in δ on τ has the opposite sign than a change of δ has on ρ∗.
Lemma 27. Consider a waiting equilbrium at τ . An increase in the discount
factor δ leads to an increase in τ .
Even if the effect though ρ∗ always supersedes the direct effect of δ, the additional
effect that a change in the discount factor has already points towards the presence
of some difference in the analysis of the waiting equilibria compared to that of the
20In fact, in terms of elasticity, one can show that the movements do not correspond one-to-
one but that τ shrinks less than proportional compared to the increase in ρ∗ if δ > ρ∗ since that
implies
0 > ∂τ
∂ρ∗
ρ∗
τ
> −1.
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ρ∗-equilibrium. These differences are what is going to be considered next. To do
so, I especially focus on two effects not present in the ρ∗-equilibrium, that may,
in addition, help to understand the change in payoff between the different waiting
equilibria.
First, each round of waiting decreases the AAs payoff since the agreement is
reached later in time. The AA is impatient and therefore suffers “cost of delay”.
Second, and quite different is what I call the “benefit of the doubt” effect which
works in the other direction. If in equilibrium there is a longer waiting period, this
does not only lead to pandering, but also to a smaller set of states for which the
firm decides to wait. That means the more costly it is to wait for the firm, the
more often she proposes the AA-preferred project already in the first round and
thus the (potential) delay is to the benefit of the AA.
Which effect dominates, if we were to move from the waiting equilibrium at τ
to the one at τ + 1 is hard to say without further parameter restrictions. Ignor-
ing again, the integer constraint in t and assuming that T is large enough, the
“AA-most-preferred” equilibrium (in an ex-ante sense) lies in the interior of the
interval (τ , T − 1). In fact the shortest waiting equilibria, i.e. that at τ is never
the most preferred one as it is always dominated by the ρ∗-equilibrium. For T
sufficiently large, the most preferred equilibrium is in addition also neither the
ρ∗-equilibrium nor an equilibrium in which for all possible states at most project
2 gets implemented as the following proposition shows:
Proposition 14. Consider a game in which
T − 1 > τ = ln pi2(c)− ln pi1(c)ln δ .
Then, ignoring the integer constraint in t, the “AA-most-preferred equilibrium” is
a waiting equilibrium at τ ∗ with τ ∗ ∈ (τ , T − 1). Moreover, independent of the
length of the game, the “AA-most-preferred equilibrium” is never at τ .
Further description of the AA-most-preferred waiting equilibrium is, however,
hard to accomplish since there are counteracting effects in the derivative of the
expected payoff of the AA. To see this, it may be helpful to disentangle these
expectations:
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Figure 4.2: Welfare effects in a linear demand Cournot economy for mergers from three
firms to two. The blue line is the (ex-ante) payoff of the AA in a waiting
equilibrium at τ . It always starts below the black solid line (by assumption 6)
and is above the dashed line and decreasing to the right of τ . For comparison
the black solid line is the (ex-ante)payoff of the ρ∗ equilibrium and the red
dashed line denotes the (ex-ante) payoff to the AA if she could (again ex-ante)
commit to reject any proposal of the larger merger. Although single-peakness
of the blue line is assured in simple linear-demand Cournot models, it cannot
be generalized to more complex settings.
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E[w|τ ] = (1− λ1)(1− λ2)
∫ c
c
w2(c2) (1− F1 (cˆτ (c2))) dF2(c2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
A
+ λ1(1− λ2)E[w2]︸ ︷︷ ︸
B
+ (1− λ1)(1− λ2)δτ
∫ c
c
∫ cˆτ (c2)
c
w1(c1)dF1(c1)dF2(c2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
C
+ λ1(1− λ2)δτE[w1]︸ ︷︷ ︸
D
.
Terms A and B describe the expectations in cases in which the firm decides to
propose project 2 right away. C and D describe them in cases in which project 1
is proposed after the waiting time. Within the two blocks, the first term (i.e. A
and C) describes the situation in which both projects are available, the second (B
and D) the case in which the proposed project is the only one available.
Observe that term B is in fact completely independent of τ and D decreases
in τ . The other two terms are not that easy to determine, so let us look at the
derivatives a bit closer
∂A
∂τ
= (1− λ1)(1− λ2)
∫ c
c
w2(c2) (1− f1 (cˆτ (c2))) ∂cˆτ (c2)
∂τ
dF2(c2) (4.7)
∂C
∂τ
= (1− λ1)(1− λ2) ln(δ)δτ
∫ c
c
∫ cˆτ (c2)
c
w1(c1)dF1(c1)dF2(c2)
+ (1− λ1)(1− λ2)δτ
∫ c
c
w1(cˆτ (c2))f1(cˆτ (c2))
∂cˆτ (c2)
∂τ
dF2(c2) (4.8)
While the sign of the first derivative and the second part of the second derivative
remain unidentified due to the fact that wi can take on different values, the first
part of the second derivative is clearly negative. However, the results of Propo-
sition 14 indicate that at some point ∂A
∂τ
in combination with the second part of
∂C
∂τ
must overturn the negative effects in the rest of the terms. Without further
parameter restrictions, it is not possible to pin down when this overturning is going
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to take place or even to decide whether the E[w|τ ] function is single peaked in τ
between τ and τ .
4.4.4 The case of commitment
In many application it is assumed that authorities such as an AA have the pos-
sibility to ex-ante commit themselves to a certain probability rule. This is often
justified by the idea that an authority is a long lasting institution that cares for
reputation and therefore has the opportunity to credibly commit itself to a certain
action. As shown above, a commitment to a pure strategy is ex-ante preferred by
the AA if she finds herself in the ρ∗-equilibrium. In this part I am going to argue
that such a commitment cannot be optimal. Thus, the AA would need to commit
to a mixed strategy. This, in contrary is in practice again hard to implement.21
In terms of the structure of the game, notice that allowing for commitment
changes the following to aspects:
(i) With commitment the game changes in a way such that the AA is now a
first mover.
(ii) With commitment the AA can only gain compared to the case without com-
mitment.
The second statement is not only a corollary to Proposition 12, but in such
settings an even more general point. If commitment is an option the AA could
always replicate the outcome of the game as if it was played without commitment
by simply committing to some ρ or τ as needed in any equilibrium. Since it has no
private information at all, the firm would, given the probabilities, propose exactly
as in the case without commitment. This way any commitment device can only
be to the benefit of the AA.
Another important fact, that is useful for constructing a solution to the com-
mitment game is the following
21One reason might be, that (real) randomization across proposals might violate legal statues.
However, if the AA needs to justify denials, she might have an incentive not to stick to the
commited randomization rule and thus acts in an interim optimal way as in my model.
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Remark. A commitment game can be modelled w.l.o.g. ignoring any beliefs either
of the players have.
To see this, observe that the only private information present here is the state
vector ψ. If we let nature move after the AA has chosen their probability rule
(which by definition only depends on common knowledge parameters, i.e. the
prior), then there is never any uncertainty about the state in this game and we
can restrict ourselves to (trembling-hand) subgame perfect equilibria.
Suppose now, the AA would commit to a rule where she accepts project 1 with
probability 0 and project 2 with probability 1. In such a case the expected welfare
was
(1− λ2)E[w2], (4.9)
since the firm always proposes the second project whenever it is available.
However, a pure strategy as described above is not optimal in the commitment
case as the next proposition shows.
Proposition 15. It cannot be profitable for the AA to commit to a rule of pure
time-invariant strategies in which she always accepts one of the projects and always
rejects the other (in each period). it is neither optimal to accept both projects in
the first period nor to accept none.
This proposition is strongly connected to Proposition 14. There it is already
stated that the best waiting equilibrium yields a higher payoff than commitment
to a pure time-invariant decision rule would.
One might now wonder whether commitment to a pure strategy is possible in
which the firm accepts a certain project only after some time period much like
the waiting equilibria. In fact this can also never be optimal as the following
proposition shows:
Proposition 16. In a game with commitment it is never optimal for the AA to
commit to a strategy where she accepts one project right away and another after a
certain time t has past.
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Proof. Recall the decision of the firm in any waiting equilibrium. For any τ it is
possible to find a ρ < 1 such that
δτ = ρ1− δ(1− ρ) .
Under such ρ it holds that cˆτ = c˜ρ by definition. But whenever the firm proposes
1 under τ she does so under ρ as well, but earlier than under ρ. Thus, the cost of
delay shrinks, yielding a higher payoff to the AA.
In other words, pure strategies are never optimal with commitment.22 But that
might lead to some “strategic trembling” as for example to accept project 1 once
it has been proposed, since it might be the only one available. Afterwards, to
maintain credibility, an institution would of course claim this only happened by
“mistake” or has an even easier job by blaming the randomization device if we
allow for commitment to mixed strategies. Thus, avoiding interim information
updates of the AA might be a hard job even for an authority and not too easy to
assume in this setting.
To sum up, the commitment option might serve as a benchmark, but should not
be taken too seriously when it comes to implementation. If at all, the AA could
impose a fixed waiting time to achieve at least second best and to use this as a
coordination device to pick her most preferred equilibrium.
4.5 Concluding Remarks
I consider a dynamic sender-receiver game in which an informed firm can propose
a project to an uniformed authority who decides whether to implement the project
or to block it. A proposal is required to implement a project and the firm may
propose an alternative project in case her proposal is rejected. Overall, only one
project can be implemented.
In principle there a two types of equilibria: There is a mixed-strategy equilib-
rium in which the authority implements her less-preferred project with a certain
probability already in the first period, and a set of waiting equilibria in which the
22Note that we ruled out trivial examples with assumption 6.
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authority implements it only after a certain period of waiting. A firm that post-
pones her proposal signals a high quality of the authority’s less-preferred project.
The authority’s most-preferred project, on the other hand, is always implemented
right away in both types of equilibria.
I find that both firm and authority prefer the mixed-strategy equilibrium over a
short waiting equilibrium to save on the cost of delay. However, as the time of wait-
ing increases, intermediate realizations of the authority’s less-preferred projects are
deterred from being proposed. This has a positive effect on the authorities ex-ante
expected payoff. If the waiting time becomes too long, however, all realization of
the authority’s less-preferred project are deterred which decreases the authorities
payoff. The sender never prefers a waiting equilibrium over the mixed-strategy
equilibrium.
My findings show that multiple periods allow authorities to learn from the pro-
posal of the firm and yields a better solution than the static model from the
authority’s point of view. The reason is that the firm is in competition with her
future self. The improvement materializes either through pandering by the firm
such that she sometimes proposes a less-preferred project to avoid it being blocked.
Alternatively, the firm may persuade the authority by delaying her proposal to sig-
nal a good realization of the firm-preferred project.
I show that firms always prefer a quick implementation of a project, while au-
thorities prefer to delay the implementation of an ex-ante less-preferred project for
an intermediate length. Delaying the implementation for too long is not beneficial
for the authority, but still preferred to mixing at the initial period. A delay time
that is too short on the other hand is not preferred by either of the two players.
The findings contribute to the discussion on how approval processes should be
designed in a dynamic setting. I show that delaying certain approval decisions can
be more effective in screening projects than probabilistic acceptance rules. Such
waiting games are, however, not to the benefit of the firm who has an incentive
to lobby for an equilibrium that leads to instantaneous proposals at any point.
Thus, I provide a theory that suggests that delays in the merger review process
might not entirely be determined by technical constraints. Instead, there may be
a strategic component for delay depending on the choice of equilibrium. Moreover,
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although possible, an authority would not want to switch to an equilibrium with
shorter waiting time as this harms her ex-ante expected payoff.
The insights gained in this analysis provide several interesting directions for
future research. While I focus on a game theoretic approach in this paper, a natural
follow-up is to consider a mechanism design approach instead. Close to the analysis
here would be a mechanism without commitment power. That is a third-party that
collects the multi-dimensional private value of the firm, i.e. the realizations of all
projects available, and offers a recommendation to both firm and authority on how
to proceed. This may overcome parts of the coordination failure in the mixed-
strategy equilibrium and makes this equilibrium more attractive for the authority.
A second possible direction is to allow the authority to costly investigate the
proposal of the firm. If she had some technology to test any efficiency claims, e.g.
via a mean-preserving spread as in Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011), at an interim
stage, she may have an incentive to do so if the alternative project is likely to be
similar in terms of quality. On the other hand, if she expects the alternative to be
considerably different, she might not want to bear these cost. Finally, results may
be affected if there was competition on the firms side, that is if two firms compete
about whose project is going to be implemented. In such a case firms have a
stronger incentive to pander towards the authority preferred project, as they do
not compete only against their future selves, but also against a competitor within
each period.
157

Appendix
4.A Proofs
Proof of Lemma 20
Proof. The proof proceeds by contradiction.
In general, in any pure strategy equilibrium, it needs to hold for the acceptance
vector ρ1 = (ρ1t , ρ2t ) that ρit ∈ {0, 1} for all i and t. In this case, both i and t need
only to be considered within {1, 2}.23
In a first step, I show that if least one project is profitable in the second stage,
there is no pure strategy equilibrium. The second step considers then the remaining
case.
First Step
Define Et[wi|j] the expectations of the authority at time t about project i if
project j has been proposed in t.24
For an equilibrium in pure strategies in the subgame of the second period, it
must be the case that ρ2(i) = 1 if E1[wi|j] > 0 for j 6= i. Suppose this was the
case.
Then, for a pure strategy equilibrium of the whole game, ρ1(j) = 1 if E1[wj|j] >
δE1[wi|j] > 0. Again suppose this was the case.
If all this was true, the Firm for sure proposes j if pij > pii and whenever only
project j is available. Assumption 5 implies that ρ1(i) = 0, since otherwise the
firm would propose i whenever it maximises its profits.
23Note that if the game comes to a third period, then the firm must propose 0 along the way
which ends the modified game immediately.
24Note again by the rules of the modified game and N = 2 the tuple (j, t) suffices for a full
history of proposals.
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This implies that for all cases in which both ci 6= c and cj 6= c, the firm proposes
j.
If cj = c but ci 6= c, the firm must propose i because proposing 0 is a weakly
dominated strategy. In fact this is the only state at which the firm proposes i, but
then, by assumption 3, E1[wi|i] > 0 = E1[w2|i]⇒ ρi1 = 1, a contradiction.
Thus, whenever assumption 3 and 5 hold and E1[wi|j] > 0, it cannot be that
ρ1(k) = 1 for k ∈ {i, j} .
This means the only possibility left in this case is to deny all proposals in the
first period.
With this, it is not possible that ρ2(k) = 1 for both k since that would lead the
firm to propose j whenever i is more profitable and the other way around. But by
assumption 5 the AA would then accept at least one proposal. This violates the
assumption that ρ1(k) = 0 for both k and is a contradiction.
In turn, this means at least one merger needs to be denied even in the second
round. Let this be merger j. As a result, whenever j is available, j is proposed
and gets denied in the first stage for trembling-hand-perfection. But then again,
if only i was available, this would be proposed for sure in period 1 due to the
refinement and the assumption of the modified game. As discussed above the AA
would then need to accept such a proposal since she knows that j does not exist.
This violates ρ1(i) = 0 and is, again, a contradiction.
Second Step
To complete the proof we need to consider the case in which E[wi|j] < 0 for
both i = 1, 2. Suppose this was the case, then we know that ρ2(k) = 0 for any k.
As we know from the previous discussion ρ1 = 1 cannot be true, thus at least one
merger needs to be declined in the first stage.
If only one gets denied in the first period, the same arguments as in step 1 hold.
If the firm knows merger j gets rejected in both stages, while i gets accepted only
in the first stage, it proposes i whenever possible in the first period. However, if
only j is around it is going to be proposed. But then j must be accepted by the
AA.
The remaining pure strategy equilibrium candidate is now that no project gets
accepted at any stage. Thus, Et[wi|i] < 0 for all i and t. This again cannot be
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achieved if assumption 3 holds and the firm never chooses a weakly dominated
strategy.
Proof of Lemma 21
Proof. Notice first that equation (∗∗′ ) is continuous in ρ since c˜ρ is continuous.
Notice further that by assumption 6 for ρ = 1 it holds that E[w1|m1 = 1] <
δE[w2|m = 1] conditional on the firm best responding. Now pick some ρ′ > 0 such
that
qρ′(ψ) = 0 ∀ψ : c1, c2 6= c,
which exists since pi1(c), pi2(c) > 0. Choosing such a ρ′ is equivalent to setting
c˜ρ′ = c. The first part of the last line in equation (∗∗′ ) reduces to 0 with c˜ρ′(c2).
The latter part, however, does not depend on it and is, by assumption 3, positive.
Thus, the left hand side of the last line of equation (∗∗′ ) can be both positive and
negative within the relevant range and due to continuity and the intermediate value
theorem, this means that equation (∗∗′ ) also holds for at least one 1 > ρ > 0.
Proof of Lemma 22
Proof. To prove uniqueness first observer from the second line of equation (∗∗′ )
that λ2E[w1] is constant over all 0 < ρ < 1. To show that ρ is unique it suffices
thus to show that h(ρ) := E[w1|12] − δE[w2|12] is decreasing in ρ. I do so in two
steps. The first proofs that E[w1|12] is in fact decreasing in ρ and the second is
to show that E[w2|12] is increasing in ρ. This suffices to conclude that h(ρ) is
decreasing in ρ and thus, ρ is unique.
First Step To see that E[w1|12] is decreasing in ρ fix some 1 > ρ > 0 and c2.
Given this observe that the firm proposes project 1 if c1 ≤ c˜ρ(c2). Suppose
now that ρ was increased to 1 ≥ ρ′ > ρ > 0. By the properties of c˜ρ we
know that c˜ρ′ ≥ c˜ρ. This in turn means that there exists a (possibly empty)
interval [c˜ρ, c˜ρ′ ] for which the firm proposes project 1 under ρ′ but not under
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ρ. Whenever project 1 was proposed under ρ, it is also proposed under ρ′.
Since w1 is a decreasing function in c this means that E[w1|c1 ≤ c˜ρ′ , c2] ≤
E[w1|c1 ≤ c˜ρ, c2] for all c2. Integrating over all c2 this leads to the following
statement:
E[w1|c1 ≤ c˜ρ′ ] ≤ E[w1|c1 ≤ c˜ρ],
and thus E[w1|12] is decreasing in ρ.
Second Step To see now that E[w2|12] is increasing in ρ fix again some 1 > ρ > 0
and in addition c1.
Define now
cˆ2 :=
 min[c˜
−1(c1)], if it exists
c, otherwise.
(4.10)
Then the firm proposes 1 for every draw c2 ≥ cˆ2. If we now pick 1 ≥ ρ′ > ρ >
0, the firm would propose 1 under the new regime whenever it has been
proposed under the old regime. In addition due to the c˜ρ being increasing
in ρ there exists an additional (possibly empty) interval [č2, cˆ2] for which
the firm proposes project 1 as well. Since č2 ≤ cˆ2 this leads to (weakly)
increasing expectations in the decreasing function w2. Thus,
E[w2|c2 ≥ cˆ2] ≥ E[w2|c2 ≥ č2].
Since this holds for a generic c1 we can similar to step one draw the conclusion
that E[w2|12] increases in ρ, thus h(ρ) is decreasing in ρ which completes the
proof.
Proof of Lemma 23
Proof. The AA strictly prefers project 2 to project 1, whenever project 2 is pro-
posed if and only if the following condition holds
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E[w2|m = 2] > δE[w1|m = 2].
Claim. Suppose the firm plays its equilibrium strategy given any 0 < ρ < 1. Then
E[w1|m∗ = 1] ≥ E[w1|m∗ = 2].
To see this, fix some c2 and ρ.
Recall that w1 is a monotone decreasing function and observe that thus
E[w1(c1)|c2, c1 < c˜ρ(c2)] ≥ E[w1(c1)|c2, c1 > c˜ρ(c2)] (4.11)
since
inf{w1(c1) : c1 < c˜ρ(c2)} = w1(c˜ρ(c2)) = sup{w1(c1) : c1 > c˜ρ(c2)}.
Since the relation in equation (4.11) holds for any c2 it also holds that integrating
out c2 we have the following relation
E[w1(c1)|c1 < c˜ρ(c2)] ≥ E[w1(c1)|c1 > c˜ρ(c2)]
⇔ E[w1(c1)|m∗ = 1] ≥ E[w1(c1)|m∗ = 2]
Note that for this we only used the decision rule of the firm and thus can by the
same argument (just redefining the cut-off as a function of c1) state that
E[w2|m∗ = 2] ≥ E[w2|m∗ = 1].
Together with the equilibrium condition from equation (∗∗′ ) this implies the
following
E[w2|m∗ = 2] ≥ E[w2|m∗ = 1] > δE[w2|m∗ = 1] = E[w1|m∗ = 1] ≥ E[w1|m∗ = 2]
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and thus,
E[w2|m∗ = 2] > δE[w1|m∗ = 2]. (4.12)
Proof of Lemma 24
Proof. The first two properties directly come from Lemma 21 and 23 except for
the part that E[w2|m = 2] > 0. Uniqueness follows from Lemma 22.
For the remaining property, namely that project 2 gets accepted in the second
period, observe that this only happens if project 1 is proposed in the first period.
A proposal of 1 in t = 1 occurs if either 1 is the only available project or 1
and 2 are available, but 1 is more profitable to the firm given the AAs strategy.
In the first event, the expected payoff is simply E[w1]. For cases where both 1
and 2 are available, notice that this event implies that for every c2 there exists
a c˜ρ(c2) ≤ c. The firm only proposes 1 if c1 < c˜ρ(c2). Given any c2 this implies
E[w1|m = 1, c2] ≥ E[w1] > 0. Integrating over all c2 can therefore not change the
sign. Thus, E[w1|m = 1] = δE[w2|m = 1] > E[w1] > 0 and the proposal in the
second stage, project 2 is always accepted.
What is missing is now to show that E[w2|m = 2] ≥ 0. This holds since we
already know from the above that E[w2|m = 1] > 0. If this is the case, we also
know that (similar to the discussion about c˜ρ(c2)) there exists a cut-off cˆ(c1) for
each c1 such that message project 2 is sent whenever c2 < cˆ(c1). Since w2 is
decreasing in c it must be the case that E[w2|m = 2] ≥ E[w2|m = 1] ≥ 0. Thus,
project 2 is not only preferred to project 1 if project 2 is proposed but it is also
preferred to not accepting.
Trembling hand perfection of the overall game is easily checked, recognizing that
players play no weakly dominated strategies if indifferent. Neither accepting nor
rejecting is weakly dominated and so is no mixture of the two. The firm is only
indifferent on a probability zero event, and even then there is no strategy that
dominates the other. For all other cases, trembling of the AA would not change
the result. For the outcome irrelevant subgame after 2 has been proposed and
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denied (which never occurs in equilibrium), we can take any of the trembling hand
perfect equilibria in the subgame, which exist for sure.
The last part that is missing is to show that expectations are positive along the
path. This is ensured by assumption 3 and the observation that project 1 needs to
be sufficiently good to be proposed, thus its expectations cannot be negative. Since
they equal the expected value of waiting this cannot be negative either. Lemma 23
then provides that the expectations of project 2 cannot be negative either.
Proof of Theorem 2
Proof.
On the equilibrium path: First, observer that on the equilibrium path of the
modified game, the AA accepts any proposal in the second round. Sup-
pose now, that players play the same strategies in the original game, then
there is no reason why in the second period either off the players should have
an incentive to deviate from the strategies they played in the modified game.
Taken this as given, the reduced form game of the first period leaves the same
options for both players as the modified game. Except for the case in which
the firm proposes 0, the game is of no difference from the perspective of the
players as the reduced form game of the first period of the modified game.
Thus, again there is no incentive to deviate from the equilibrium strategies
of the modified game. Since 0 is only proposed if the firm has no project
available in the modified game, the same is going to happen in the original
game. This way, on the equilibrium path it is trivial that the firm would (for
any history of 0) have only 0 in its message set and would thus propose 0 in
every period until T . Thus, the actions of both players on the equilibrium
path are identical to those of the modified game and the outcome is the same
as that of the modified game. The same holds if the firm only has project 1
available and gets rejected. Then the firm proposes 0 in the second period
and forever after until the termination period T .
Off the equilibrium path:
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1. First consider the off equilibrium action in which the AA observes the firm
proposing project 1 in the second period after a proposal of 0 in the first
period. These are in terms of off equilibrium beliefs the most problematic
ones.
The proof of this part is of constructive nature and defines beliefs that are
consistent with the notion of universal divinity25 In each step I am going to
describe which beliefs actually are in line with the criterion itself to thereafter
argue why iterative application would not fail the criterion either.
i. Assume ρ∗ > δ. Suppose further project 1 is available. This means
that whenever the firm was to propose 1 on the equilibrium path, a
necessary condition for a deviation with positive probability under the
intuitive criterion (and therefore also necessary under D2) is
ρ∗pi1 + (1− ρ∗)δmax{pi2, 0} ≤ δpi1.
This can be rearranged to
(ρ∗ − δ)pi1 + (1− ρ∗)δmax{pi2, 0} ≤ 0.
The above cannot hold if ρ∗ > δ and therefore whenever project 1
was proposed in the first round on the equilibrium path, it has a 0
probability to be proposed after a 0 is observed off the equilibrium
path.
If 2 was proposed in the first round it gets accepted for sure, thus a
deviation into the second round can only be profitable for types where
ρ∗ < δρ′2, with ρ′2 < 1 being the second round acceptance probability for
project 1. This necessity contradicts the assumption that ρ∗ > δ. Thus,
also those types are eliminated under the intuitive criterion. Since no
type survives the intuitive criterion, none thus survive D2. Thus, the
equilibrium is robust to those refinements.
25This has been introduced by Banks and Sobel (1987).
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Iteration in this case is not in question, since all types are eliminated
already after the first round.
ii. Assume that w(c) < 0.
For what follows, it is necessary to define the set of best responses the
AA has to such an off equilibrium deviation. In principle the AA can
respond either with 0 or 1 and both responses can be supported by at
least one belief system. Due to the continuous density, there also exists
at least one convex combination of beliefs that justify a response of 0
and 1 respectively which makes the AA indifferent. thus, all (mixed)
actions of the AA are part of the best response.
Next, for a given state ψ = (c1, c2) with ci 6= c and the equilibrium ρ∗ a
deviation for the firm as proposed can only be profitable if the following
condition holds:26
max{pi2(c2), ρ∗pi1(c1) + (1− ρ∗)δpi2(c2)} ≤ ρ′δpi1(c1) + (1− ρ′)δ2pi2(c2)
(4.13)
This can be rearranged to
max{(1−δ2+ρ′δ2)pi2(c2), ρ∗pi1(c1)+(1−ρ∗−δ(1−ρ′))δpi2(c2)} ≤ ρ′δpi1(c1)
(4.14)
Fixing some arbitrary c1 = c and ρ′ for which the firm wants to deviate
at least in some states and propose 0 in the first and 1 in the second
period. With this, the left hand side of condition 4.14 is increasing in pi2.
For the first element this is trivial, since (1− δ+ ρ′δ) > 0 by definition.
For the second part, observe that the second element is increasing in pi2
26Note that I am assuming here, that project 2 gets accepted in the subsequent period.
Assuming any kind of different acceptance probability for project 2 other than 0 would not
change the result. Since this effect is independent of the parameter c1 those types may not be
excluded under certain belief systems. However, results (and passing the divinity criterion) does
not depend on this at all.
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if and only if
1− ρ∗ − δ(1− ρ′) > 0.
Suppose now, this was not the case, i.e.
1− ρ∗ ≤ δ(1− ρ′).
Then, since δ < 1, it must hold that ρ′ < ρ∗. If that was the case, then
a deviation is never profitable for any state since waiting for the second
period actually would yield a worse outcome even ignoring any time cost
δ. Thus, the ρ′ that has been chosen does not fulfil the requirement that
at least someone wants to deviate.
However, for ρ′ > ρ∗ the left hand side of condition (4.14), is increasing
in pi2.
That, in turn implies, that if condition (4.14) would not hold for any
ψ = {c, cx} it does not hold for any ψ{c, c2 > cx} either.
Finally, consider the case where ρ′ = ρ∗
δ
. Under this regime it holds
that
ρ′δpi1(c1) < ρ∗pi1(c1) + (1− ρ∗ − δ(1− ρ′)δpi2(c2),
but at the same time if project 2 was not available, it is true that
ρ′δpi1(c1) = ρ∗pi1(c1) (4.15)
and thus, a deviation is (weakly) profitable.
Last, observe that in equation (4.15) the value of pi1 does not matter
at all, i.e. whenever it is profitable to deviate for some state ψ(cˆ, c)
deviations for all other states ψ(c1, c), given c1 6= c are also profitable
for the agent.
With this, D2 eliminates all types accept for those where c2 = c, and
since this contemplates to the complete range of c1 ∈ [c, c] it is in fact
possible for the firm to have any sort of believe that is consistent with
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D2, that is any believe that excludes project 2 from being existent. A
belief of β(m1 = 1) = B(ψ), where B(ψ) is a probability function with
B (ψ) =
 1 if ψ ≥ (c, c)0 else,
would be of such kind and justifies a rejection in the second period,
whenever 0 was observed in the first period as long as w1(c) < 0.
To complete universal divinity for this type of deviation, notice, that
the set of best responses does not change, as long as w1(c) < 0. Thus,
no further elimination takes place and universal divinity is fulfilled for
this type of deviation.
2. Second, consider deviations in which the firm after l < T periods of proposing
0 suddenly proposes project 1.
Since a deviation in case 1. fulfils the criteria of universal divinity, it mus
also hold that any later period fulfils the criteria since the only thing that
changes is the discount factor which is now δl. Since 0 < δl < 1 the same as
in case 1. applies.27
3. Third, consider deviation in which the firm proposes 2 off the equilibrium
path.
This deviation is (due to the discount factor) never profitable for any state
(given that the AA rejects 1 with probability 1 at all times except t = 1).
Thus, the AA cannot infer any beliefs from the observed deviation and the
equilibrium action is arbitrary and we can (for the sake of simplicity) assume
that 2 is always accepted after l rounds of 0s.
4. Finally, consider deviations in which the firm proposes 0 in period 2 after
having proposed 1 in period 1.
Then again, since on the equilibrium path the firm accepts 2 always, there
is no possible gain from deviation and the AA cannot infer anything from
27An exception might be the terminal period. If w1(c1) < 0, there exists a reasonable belief
that justifies ρT = 0 even in the terminal period and the argument goes through.
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it. Thus, we might as well assume whatever we want, e.g. that 2 is always
accepted.
Proof of Lemma 25
Proof. The proof of existence is a straightforward adaptation of the results of the
ρ∗-equilibrium. Observe that due to the two decision rules whenever
δτ = ρ1− δ(1− ρ) , (4.16)
the function cˆτ is in fact identical to c˜ρ∗ . Thus, the decision rule of the firm is
the same. Applying the ln on both sides of equation (4.16) yields the expression
for τ . This constitutes an equilibrium only if the AA acts optimally, too. On path,
this holds, since we know already from the ρ-equilibrium that E[w2|2] > δE[w1|2]
in the first period. Since the firm is going to propose 2 in the first period whenever
c1 > cˆτ (c2), all subsequent periods must be due to some trembling error the firm
has made. It is always possible to find a totally mixed strategy sequence such that
for → 0 the AA prefers to accept 2 whenever proposed.
If project 1 is proposed in any period prior to (and including) τ this is an off path
action and can be rejected by the AA if we assign beliefs that such early proposal
of project 1 are often enough28 made by types for which the second project is
more beneficial to the firm. After period τ the firm nonetheless proposes project 1
whenever c1 < cˆτ (c2). As in the description of the ρ∗-equilibrium, this decision rule
makes the AA indifferent at time τ between accepting or rejecting the proposal.
Thus, there is no incentive to deviate from the proposed strategy. Finally, for all
subsequent periods anything gets accepted for example, if we assign beliefs to the
AA that only “good enough” types make the mistake of proposing very late in the
game.
To see that no equilibrium with less waiting time exists, fix the set ψ˜ of pos-
sible states ψ in which the firm proposes project 1 in the first period of the ρ∗-
equilibrium. This set is identical to the set ψˆτ of states in which the firm chooses
28In a sense that it is very likely that such off path behaviour comes from this type of firms.
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to wait. If the waiting need was reduced to τ < τ , the set ψˆτ ⊃ ψˆτ . Since δ < 0
there exist some 0 < ρ′ < 1 such that
δτ = ρ
′
1− δ(1− ρ′)
Since the left hand side decreases in τ and the right hand side increases in ρ,
the corresponding ρ′ > ρ∗. By the monotonicity arguments used in the proof of
the ρ∗-equilibrium, this means that the AA is not indifferent any more between
accepting the offer and delaying it another period. In fact, she prefers to wait.
Thus, there exists an incentive to deviate on path and thus, there does not exist
any shorter waiting equilibrium than τ .
The last part follows by simple algebra. τ ≤ 1 is equivalent to
δ ≤ ρ
∗
1− δ(1− ρ∗) .
This statement is in turn equivalent to
ρ∗ ≥ δ
δ + 1
Proof of Theorem 3
Proof. Recall from Lemma 25 that under the decision rule that is described there,
the AA is indifferent between accepting and rejecting the offer of the firm in τ .
If the AA increases τ , monotonicity in cˆτ shrinks the set of states in which the
firm chooses to wait. As in the proof of Lemma 22, “worse” states of project 1
are dropped earlier than “better” ones. Thus, the AA is not indifferent but in fact
strictly prefers acceptance in period τ+1 under the firms decision rule cˆτ whenever
τ > τ . By the same reasoning, the firm accepts project 2 whenever it is proposed.
By asuumption E[w2] > 0. However, only if pi2(c) is “bad enough” the firm chooses
to wait. Thus, expectations are higher than E[w2] and positive whenever project
2 is proposed. Finally, for the same reason it never pays off for the AA to wait for
a proposal of project 1 whenever the firm offers project 2. Thus, the AA has no
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incentive to deviate. The firm has neither, since she follows her optimal decision
rule cˆτ .
For universal divinity consider first the following equilibrium situation. The
firm has some type ψ = {c1, c2} for which it is optimal to wait for τ periods to
propose project 1 in the (τ + 1)th period. Consider now a deviation in which the
firm proposes project 1 at an earlier stage, that is e.g. τ . The firm would benefit
from this type of deviation whenever the acceptance probability of project 1 in
period τ is such that δτ−1ρτ (1)pi1(c1) > δτpi1(c1). Since this condition is in fact
independent of c1, all such types are equally likely to deviate and non can be
excluded by universal divinity. The same reasoning obviously holds for any τ ′ < τ
Second, consider a type ψ′ in which the firm chooses to propose project 2 in
period 1 in equilibrium. When, would such a type choose to deviate and to pro-
pose project 1 in τ? The condition for this is a bit more involved and requires
that δτ−1ρτ (1)pi1(c1) > pi2(c2). This is now of course not independent of the type
any more, but due to the fact that the firm chose to propose project 2 in equilib-
rium, it must hold that δτpi1(c1) < pi2(c2). Combining the two, requires thus that
δτ−1ρτ (1)pi1(c1) > δτpi1(c1), but then no one has a greater desire to deviate to τ
than all types that propose 1 at t = τ + 1 in equilibrium and we can exclude all
types that propose 2 in equilibrium. Since there is no further distinction possible,
all surviving types survive any further iteration of this reasoning and cannot be
separated. Thus, any type that chooses to wait in equilibrium can be part of the
belief of the AA. If we, as in Theorem 2, assign a degenerate belief that the firms
type is ψ = {c, c} whenever a deviation is observed, then the firm has even under
universal divinity no incentive to react any different than staying on the equilib-
rium path. With this belief, the AA denies all earlier off-equilibrium proposals
and the equilibrium survives universal divinity.
Proof of Proposition 13
Proof. First, recall again the equilibrium condition as used in the proof of Lemma 22
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λ2E[w1] + (1− λ2)h(ρ∗) = 0 (4.17)
⇔λ2 (E[w1]− h(ρ∗)) + h(ρ∗)= 0
where
h(ρ∗) = E[w1|12]− δE[w2|12] =
c∫
c
c˜ρ∗ (c2)∫
c
[w1(c1)− δw2(c2)]dF1(c1)dF2(c2)
c∫
c
F1(c˜ρ∗(c2))dF2(c2)
where the first term is the expected value whenever only project one is available
which is independent of δ and ρ. The h(ρ) function, however, depends on δ both
directly and indirectly via ρ∗.
Since equation (4.17) exists and holds for all 0 < δ < 1 and 0 < λ2 < 1 and by
assumption 3 (unconditional expectations are positive), it holds that h(ρ∗) < 0.
Using that equation (4.17) must hold as δ changes, we can derive the following
∂λ2E[w1] + (1− λ2)h(ρ∗)
∂δ
= (4.18)
(1− λ2)
∂h(ρ
∗)
∂δ︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
+ ∂h(ρ
∗)
∂c˜ρ∗︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
 ∂c˜ρ∗∂δ︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
+ ∂c˜ρ
∗
∂ρ∗︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
∂ρ∗
∂δ

 = 0.
The sign of the direct derivative can be seen by inspection, that of the derivative
with respect to ρ has been shown in the proof of Lemma 22 and the discussion of
c˜ρ(c2). Recall further that for all c2 for which the equality that describes c˜ρ∗ is not
binding a marginal change in ρ∗ has no effect, while for all c2 such that
c˜ρ∗(c2) = max
{
c1 :
ρ∗
ζ
pi1(c1) = pi2(c2)
}
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c˜∗ρ is increasing in ρ∗. Since the acceptance probability is independent of c2, we
may conclude that
dc˜ρ∗(c2)
dδ
= ∂c˜ρ
∗
∂δ
+ ∂c˜ρ
∗
∂ρ∗
∂ρ∗
∂δ
≤ 0
is necessary for equation (4.18) to hold and requires
∂ρ∗
∂δ
< 0.
Second, observe that the ex-ante probability that project 1 gets proposed is
(1− λ1)
λ2 + (1− λ2) c∫
c
F1(c˜2) dF2(c2)
 .
Taking the derivative with respect to δ yields
(1− λ1)(1− λ2)
c∫
c
f1(c˜ρ∗)
dc˜ρ(c2)
dδ
dF2(c2) ≤ 0,
since f1 ≥ 0 by definition and dc˜ρ(c2)dδ is negative for reasons given above.
Finally, recall from equation (4.5) that
φE[w|0] = (1− δ)(1− λ2)(1− λ1)
c∫
c
w2(c2)F1(c˜ρ∗(c2))dF2(c2).
The RHS decreases in δ both directly and indirectly via c˜ρ∗ .
Thus the RCCM goes down. Since E[w|0] is independent of δ, E[w|ρ∗] increases
in absolute terms, too.
Proof of Lemma 26
Proof. Similar to the proof of Proposition 13, we take the derivative of equa-
tion (4.17) and take the derivative with respect to λ2, that is
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∂λ2E[w1] + (1− λ2)h(ρ∗)
∂λ2
= (4.19)
E[w1]− h(ρ∗) + (1− λ2)
[
∂h(ρ∗)
∂c˜ρ∗
∂c˜ρ∗
∂ρ∗
∂ρ∗
∂λ2
]
= 0
Now recall from equation (4.17) that, since h(ρ∗) < 0, it must hold that E[w1]−
h(ρ) > 0 Thus, the second term in equation (4.19) must be negative. Since the
first derivative is negative, the second is positive and λ2 < 1 it must hold that
∂ρ∗
∂λ2
> 0
The second part results from taking the derivative of the ex-ante probability of
proposing 1 with respect to λ2 which is:
(1− λ1)

1− c∫
c
F1(c˜2) dF2(c2)
+ c∫
c
f1(c˜ρ∗)
(
∂c˜ρ∗
∂ρ∗
∂ρ∗
∂λ2
)
dF2(c2)
 ≥ 0. (4.20)
Within the parenthesis the first term is (weakly) positive since the conditional
probability cannot be greater than 1. The second part is positive in all derivatives
which makes the whole equation positive. Thus, the probability of proposing
project 1 increases in λ2.
To see the effects of a change in λ2 on the RCCM, recall first the last term of
equation (4.5) and observe that we may write this part as
(1− λ2)g(ρ∗) := (1− δ)(1− λ2)(1− λ1)
c∫
c
w2(c2)F1(c˜ρ∗(c2))dF2(c2),
where g(ρ∗) only depends indirectly (via ρ∗) on λ2.
using φ(ρ∗) as defined above this enables us to state the following
φ(ρ∗)E[w|0] = (1− λ2)g(ρ∗)
dividing by 1− λ2 this straightforwardly yields
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g(ρ∗) = φ(ρ∗) E[w|0](1− λ2)
Observe now that E[w|0](1−λ2) is constant over both λ2 and ρ2 and φ is thus propor-
tional to g w.r.t. ρ∗ (and λ2).
Knowing that an increase λ2 leads to an increase in ρ∗ and thus an increase in
c˜ρ∗(·) also g(ρ∗), and therefore φ(ρ∗) increases in ρ∗.
Proof of Lemma 27
Proof. First, recall from Lemma 25 that in the decision rule of the firm about
which project to propose (in general) is the same in both the ρ∗-equilibrium and
the waiting equilibrium at τ . Hence, the function c˜ρ∗ = cˆτ . Further, recall, that
for any c2 such that cˆτ (c2) 6= {c, c} the following equation holds
g
(
δ, τ , cˆτ (c2)
)
:= δτ pi1
(
cˆτ (c2)
)
− pi2(c2) = 0
Since expectations are positive, there is at least one state c2 for which g(δ, τ , cˆτ (c2)) =
0.
Next, totally differentiate g(·) to get
dg(·)= 0
⇔ 0 = (τ δτ−1 pi1
(
cˆτ (c2)
)
dδ
+ δτ ln(δ) pi1
(
cˆτ (c2)
)
dτ
+ δτ pi′1
(
cˆτ (c2)
)
dcˆτ (c2)
⇔ dτdδ =
−1
ln(d)
τ
δ
+
pi′1
(
cˆτ
)
pi1
(
cˆτ
) dcˆτ
dδ

Since cˆτ = c˜ρ∗ for all δ the following also holds
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dcˆτ
dδ =
dc˜ρ∗
dδ ≤ 0
as discussed in the proof of Proposition 13. Since pi′1 < 0 by definition the term
in square brackets is positive, and so is the one outside the brackets as δ < 1.
Thus,
dτ
dδ > 0.
Proof of Proposition 14
Proof. The proof proceeds in three steps. First I show that the AA has a lower
payoff in the waiting equilibrium at τ than in the ρ∗-equilibrium. Second I show
that if T − 1 ≥ τ , the waiting equilibrium at T − 1 yields a higher payoff for
the AA than the ρ∗-equilibrium and that the AA’s waiting equilibrium payoffs
are continuous in τ . Finally, I show that the derivative of the AA’s payoff at the
waiting equilibrium at τ is in fact negative (and remains negative for all T−1 ≥ τ)
and thus, the “AA-most-preferred” equilibrium lies in the interior if T> τ .
First Step The claim in this part is, that Ea[w|ρ∗] > Ea[w|τ = τ ], where E[w|τ ]
is the ex-ante payoff the AA expects in an waiting equilibrium at τ . The
derivation of this claim is pretty straightforward. Recall that the decision
rule in the two equilibria is nearly the same, only that in all cases in which
the firm does not propose project 2 in both equilibria the firm chooses to
wait in the waiting equilibrium while she directly proposes project 1 in the
ρ∗ equilibrium. In those cases the decision by the authority is again the
same, once project 1 has been proposed. She is (interim) indifferent. Thus
whenever the the AA sees a proposal of project 1 she knows at time t when
message one is sent that
Et[w1|mt = 1] = δEt[w2|mt = 1].
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However, in the waiting equilibrium we have t = τ while in the ρ∗-equilibrium
t = 1. Thus, ex-ante expected payoffs for the AA are
Ea[w|ρ∗] = Ea[w|0]− (1− δ)
c∫
c
r˜ρ∗ (c2) dF2(c2) (4.21)
Ea[w|τ = τ ] = Ea[w|0]− (1− δτ+1)
c∫
c
rˆτ (c2)dF2(c2) (4.22)
where
r˜ρ∗(c2) = (1− λ2)(1− λ1)
c∫
c
w2(c2)F1(c˜ρ∗(c2))dF2(c2)
and rˆτ (c2) is defined respectively. Since c˜ρ∗ = cˆτ , the two expressions are
identical except for the factor in front of the last term. Since τ > 0 by
construction, in particular by assumption 6, (4.21)> (4.22) and the waiting
equilibrium at τ can never be optimal.
Second Step To see the second part, observe that when T −1 ≥ τ , it must be the
case that under a waiting equilibrium at τ , the decision rule cˆτ (c2) = c for
all c2 6= c. In other words, whenever project 2 is available, the firm proposes
it already in the first period. Thus, the AA gains profits of at least E[w2].
If project 2 is not available, the firm still can make some profit by proposing
project 1 after a waiting time of T−1 periods. Thus, the AA’s ex-ante payoff
is
E[w|τ = τ ] = (1− λ2)E[w2] + δτλ2(1− λ1)E[w1]. (4.23)
This way, it is clear, that E[w|ρ∗] < (1− λ2)E[w2].
Continuity can be shown, by observing that cˆτ (c2) is continuous in τ for all c2
since δτ is. Then, each part in the additive form of the ex-ante expectations
of the AAs welfare is a continuous in τ and by that the expectations itself
are as well.
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Third Step Finally, I show that the derivative of the expected welfare for the AA
at τ is negative and remains negative as τ increases.
The latter is easy to see by inspecting equation (4.23). The first term is
independent of τ while the second decreases in τ . As a consequence, each
waiting equilibrium at t ≥ τ yields lower welfare than the waiting equilibrium
at τ . If projects are such that pi1(c) ≥ pi2(c, then it is even possible to find a
neighbourhood of size  around τ such that the “AA-most-preferred” waiting
equilibrium is in fact shorter than τ .
Proof of Proposition 15
Proof. To begin with, observe that, if the AA would only play pure strategies,
delaying a decision is not optimal. I first prove that a rule at which only project
two is accepted cannot be optimal. The proof can w.l.o.g. be applied to a situation
where the candidate is the other way around, that is 1 gets always accepted and
2 never. In the second part I show that an acceptance vector of (1,1) cannot be
optimal either.
First Part In this part, I show that it is never optimal for the AA to commit
to a strategy in which project 2 is always accepted and project 1 is always
rejected.
First, recall that in such an equilibrium the ex-ante expectation of the AA
were (1 − λ2)E[w2] since the firm always proposes 2 if it is available and
something else in all other cases, but only two gets accepted.
Second, suppose now that the AA accepts project 1 with a probability ρ11 = ,
where  is chosen such that
pi1(c) + (1− )δpi2(c) < pi2(c). (4.24)
From the discussion in section 4.4 we know that such an  exists (since
pii(c) > 0) and the firm would under this probability rule still always propose
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2 whenever it is available. However, if only 1 was available the firm would
actually strictly prefer to propose 1.
The ex-ante expected value of such a probability rule for the AA would be
(1− λ2)E[w2] + λ2(1− λ1)E[w1] > (1− λ2)E[w2]. (4.25)
Thus, it cannot be optimal to accept 2 always and never 1.
Second Part In this part I, show that a “accept all” policy is even worse than
what we derived in the first part. This follows, essentially by definition and
is repeated here only for the sake of completeness. Suppose the firm accepts
all proposals in the first round. If the AA were to choose an acceptance
probability of 1 for both projects, the firm would propose naively. Thus the
ex-ante expected payoff for the AA was
E[w](1,1) := Ppi1>pi2E[w1|pi1 > pi2] + Ppi2>pi2E[w2|pi2 > pi1], (4.26)
where Ppii>pij denotes the probability that pii > pij.
Now recall the payoff the AA earns when only commiting to project two,
that is
(1− λ2)E[w2], (4.27)
By assumption 6 it holds that
E[w](1,1) < Ppi1>pi2δE[w2|pi1 > pi2] + Ppi2>pi2E[w2|pi2 > pi1].
But then (4.26)<(4.27) or in other words, “accept all” is ex-ante less prof-
itable for the AA than “accept only 2”.
Finally, accepting no project at all is not optimal since it has no influence on
the behaviour of the firm, but leads only to waiting costs for both parties.
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